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1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Technology advancements facilitate the online collection and publication of data about individ-
uals, which could potentially be distributed among several organizations (e.g., testing labs, research
institutes, etc.). Each organization may manage it’s data access and usage through a specialized
Web service. In line with the different data sharing environments, health science data is a prime
example, where the focus has been on transforming the data into ontology-based repositories us-
ing RDF (as a universal healthcare exchange language). Each repository defines an ontology (in
OWL format) of all the concepts that can be searched for in a requester’s query. OWL defines
classes as a generic concept of individuals (e.g., Patient) and data type properties to link individu-
als of those classes to their data values (e.g., hasPatientStatus). For example, the Bio2RDF project
incorporates data from the following ontologies (NCBIGene,PharmKGB, DrugBank, CDT, and
GeneCDS). Each of the above mentioned repositories manages data access through a SPARQL
endpoint. Table 1.2 shows examples of concepts from these ontologies including both data classes
and data type properties. To query instances in a data repository, a requester can ask for any of
the data type properties by which those instances can be identified. For example, an instance in
a pharmacogenomics repository (e.g., PharmGKB, Table. 1.1) can be identified by the set of data
type properties (drug, disease, gene, etc.) defined on the set of classes (Dosage, Drug, DrugGene-
Associations, etc.).
1.1 Data Access Patterns
In such services-based interactions, data can be accessed in several ways, including manual
query submission (Fig. 1.1,I) through SPARQL endpoints (e.g., Bio2RDF), automated analysis
pipelines and scientific workflows (e.g.,Taverna), and mashup service APIs (e.g., AIDSInfo) with
minimal human interaction (Fig. 1.1,II). We briefly explain each access pattern:
SPARQL End points. SPARQL Endpoints are RESTful Web services that allow SPARQL queries
to be executed against RDF datasets. They accept queries and return results via http. Some end
points are generic (query any Web-accessible RDF data), while others are specific (hardwired to
query against particular datasets). Results are often rendered as XML, JSON, RDF, HTML etc.
Accessing Endpoints can be done via a command interface, an API, or on a graph. SPARQL end-
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Table 1.1: Ontology concepts from health data projects.
Project (Ontology)
Bio2RDF (NCBI Gene)
Classes DataType properties
Gene, ProtienCodingGene, GenefunctionAssociation Symbol, function, startPosition, endPosition,
Chromosome
Bio2RDF (DrugBank)
Classes DataType properties
Drug, DrugDosage, DrugTarget Label, Function, Dosage, Enzyme, Gene, Protien,
Chromosome
Bio2RDF (PharmGKB)
Classes DataType properties
Variant, Gene, Drug, Association, Disease, Disea-
seVariantLocAssociation, DiseaseGeneAssociation,
GeneGeneAssociation, DrugGeneAssociation, Drug-
VariantLocAssociation
gene, symbol, protien, drug, variant location, disease,
isgenotyped
Bio2RDF (GeneCDS)
Classes DataType properties
Gene, Allele, Phenotype, Drug, Polymorphism, Hu-
manWGeneticPolymorphism
Gene Symbol, rs, SPLTarget.
Bio2RDF (CDT)
Classes DataType properties
Chemical Disease Association, Chemical Gene Asso-
ciation, Gene, Chemical, Disease
gene symbol, disease, chemical, function, location,
participant,
E-Hip (HPMS)
Classes DataType properties
Cardiologist, Date Helper, ElderCareSpecialist, GP,
MedicalPersonnel, Nurse, Oncologist, Patient, Pa-
tientStatus, Person, Pysician
patientstatus, discharged, dischargeddate, location,
treated, treatedbyteam, treatedInLastSixMonths,
department, Emergency
points allow for federatedqueryprocessing by querying a mediator which distributes subqueries
to relevant data sources and integrates the results. We take the Bio2RDF project as an example. In
Bio2RDF project data sources are exposed as DaaS services. RDF views are incorporated within
service’s WSDL files as annotations. Users can then issue SPARQL queries on a mediated ontol-
ogy. Then, a mediator service uses WSDL files of those services for service selection.
Scientific Workflows and Online Analysis Pipelines. Analysis pipelines and workflows rely on
downloading multiple datasets from public databases, copying and pasting from one web-based
tool to another, integrating data, and transferring it into another tool. Scientific workflows have
emerged as a paradigm for scientists to formalize and structure complex and distributed scientific
processes to enable and accelerate scientific discoveries. Org4 (Fig 1.1,D) best describes this data
access scenario.
Mashup Service APIs. Mashups are composed of easy to integrate data sources. A data source
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Table 1.2: Selected data type properties from the ontologies in Table 1.1.
Ontology DataType properties
NCBI Gene Symbol, function, startPosition, endPosition, Chromosome
DrugBank Drug Label (DL), Function, Dosage, Enzyme, Gene, Protien
PharmGKB Gene, Symbol, Protien, Drug, Price (PR), variantLocation (SNP), disease (DI)
GeneCDS GeneSymbol (GS), SNP, SPLTarget.
CDT gene symbol, disease, chemical, function, location, participant,
E-Hip PatientStatus (PS), Discharged (D), DischargedDate (DD), Location (L), Gender (G),
Department (DE)
US Census Age (A), Address (AD), Income(IN), Employer(EM), MaritalStatus(MS)
Org 2
Private 
data
(II) Minimal human interaction (Web service composition): Analysis pipelines, scientiﬁc workﬂows, data mashups
Purpose: 
research
Org 1
Private 
data
getGeneInfo()
patientStatus
Purpose: 
diagnosis
Org 3
Private 
data
Disease“cancer”
getPrice(medicine) 
Genomic 
Service
Clinical 
Service
Pharma
Service<rdf:RDF mc="http://www.michcare.com/michcare.owl#">
<mc:Patient rdf:about="patient1">
 <mc:hasGene>HLA-B</mc:hasGene>
<mc:hasGenePreference>yes</mc:hasGenePreference>
<mc:GenePreference>
<mc:canDisclose>yes</mc:canDisclose>
<mc:hasPurpose>Research</mc:hasPurpose>
</mc:GenePreference>
</mc:hasGenePreference>
</rdf>
(I) Human interaction (Web Service Endpoints): SPARQL <rd:fRDF xmlns:mc="http://www.michcare.com/michcare.owl#" >
<mc:Patient rdf:about="patient1">
<mc:hasPatientStatus>Bad</mc:hasPatientStatus>
<mc:hasStatusPreference>
 <mc:StatusPreference>
  <mc:canDisclose>yes</mc:canDisclose>
  <mc:hasPurpose>Diagnosis<mc:hasPurpose>
  </mc:StatusPreference>
 </hasStatusPreference>
</rdf>
Alicepolicy patient1Policy { 
apply firstApplicable
rule patientStatusAccessRule{
target clause Attributes.resourceId=="hasPatientStatus" 
and actionId=="view" 
condition canDisclose="yes" and 
subjectPurpose==purpose 
permit} }
Pay
Service
Private 
data
A
SELECT ?gender ?status ?location
WHERE {
?patient rdf:type mc:Patient .
?patient mc:hasGender ?gender .
?patient mc:hasLocation ?location.
?patient mc:patientStatus ?status.
?patient mc:patientStatus ’Bad’ .}
SELECT ?gender ?gene ?geneloc
WHERE {
?patient rdf:type mc:Patient .
?patient mc:hasGender ?gender .
?geneinfo rdf:type mc:PatientGenomics .
?patient mc:hasGene ?gene.
?patient mc:hasGene ’HLA’ .
?geneinfo mc:hasGene ’HLA’ .
?geneinfo mc:hasGeneLocation ?geneloc}
Q1
Q2
Gene, GeneLoc
i1
i2
p
Org 4 (GVD Analysis Pipeline)
WS1/getGeneInfo() 
WS1/getVariantInfo() 
WS1/getGenPhenAsso() 
WS2/getDrugInfo() 
WS3/getPatientInfo() 
buy(price) 
C
D
B
E
Figure 1.1: Different data access scenarios in Services-based interactions.
could be an in-house database, a web page, a web service, etc.. Using mashup technology, the
mashup Web application receives a service request, dynamically determines the service providers,
requests the required data through their APIs, integrates the collected data, and returns it to the
original requester. A good example of this is BioCatalogue. BioCatalog provides a set of public
RESTful endpoints that allow you to query the registry programmatically and integrate the data
and functionality into your own scripts, workflows, apps, tools and mashups. Scientific workflows
(e.g. taverna) are integrated with service registries, such as BioCatalog, and analysis pipelines,
such as MyExperiment.
1.2 Dynamic Web Service Composition
In all scenarios mentioned above, dynamic Web service composition [73] may be involved,
especially since the queried data may not necessarily get retrieved from a single Web service. Dy-
namic composition enables the specification of composite services without knowing a priori which
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Web services will be actually used at run-time. Therefore, each composite service should have a
composition plan CP . Fig. 1.2 depicts one CP, where nodes represent services and edges repre-
sent functional dependencies between services based on relations between their input and output
parameters. Several composition plans CP = {CP1, ..., CPn} can be returned by an execution
engine to answer a query Q. In a CP, any service WS1 which depends on another serviceWS2 is
considered a user of the data provided by WS2. Thus, WS1 can be viewed as a client and WS2
can be viewed as a provider.
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Figure 1.2: A sample composition.
For example, Org3 (Fig. 1.1) is composed of a payment service (PayService), which depends
on a pharmacy service (PharmaService) to accomplish its task. Similarly, in SPARQL endpoints,
a mediator service uses WSDL files of those services for service selection and CP formation. In all
cases, a query gets decomposed into several sub queries if the data asked for in the query should
be retrieved from multiple Web services (Fig. 1.3).
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Figure 1.3: A sample composition plan that breaks a query down into subqueries against several services.
51.3 Private Dynamic Web Service Composition
Dynamic composition of services in those environments also requires appropriate privacy mech-
anisms to guarantee the confidentiality of all participants along the composition chain. Thus, before
providing WS1 with a data item, WS2 should check the data owners privacy policy rule regarding
that item. Checking for privacy rules should hold along the composition chain until all the data
items requested in the original query initiated by the user are retrieved. Thus, privacy requirements
should hold for all the dependencies among the services in CP, and our role becomes to validate CP
in terms of privacy. If at least one dependency in CP violates a privacy rule, then CP is discarded
from CP and the corresponding data item is discarded from the query results.
For instance, consider the query Q=”What are the ages, genders, zip, DNA, and income for
patients infected with cancer and what are the prices paid by patients who reside in that area. A
subset of the services that might be involved in answering this query are depicted by the composi-
tion plan in Fig. 1.3, which takes the queryQ = {A,G,Z,N} and combines the results and returns
the output. The data item DR (i.e. drug) is an input for WS6, WS7 and WS8 and it is an output
forWS5.. Thus,WS6,WS7, andWS8 depend onWS5, for example, for providing DR.
Assume that Actiq (which is a cancer medication) is one of the very few medicines that costs
$45.89. It is very easy for an adversary to use the above query to deduce that a patient has been
diagnosed for cancer if they know how much they paid for a medicine (via a payment service) that
is used for cancer. However, a smart privacy management engine should track the query history
against all participating Web services to fulfill that query and use that history to learn more about
the motives of the requester. If we treat each subquery aginst each sub Web service as a request
and apply our inference algorithm to those requests.
A PEP at the composition orchestrator or mediator level as well as individual PEPs at compo-
nent service levels can help propagate that query history information and infer context from the
query history. Each component service may be in itself a composition of another group of services
and so on. Since the inferred context is tied to the data resource, and since a data source can be
shared by multiple services our approach works regardless of which Web services participated in
the plan.
61.4 Problem Statement
The research problem discussed in this dissertation is motivated by adversarial data access
scenarios that may take place in collaborative service-based data sharing environments. Namely,
we study environments in which the participating services host different sets of data about the same
users, identified by some common properties. We generalize two of the main privacy issues from
which such environments may suffer:
• First, transforming such data sets into semantic data makes data linkage easier and machine
processable.
• Second, dynamic composition of different data items (retrieved through participating Web
services) may be misused by adversaries to reveal sensitive information, which was not
deemed as such by the data owner at the time of data collection. Atomically, these data
items may not reveal personally identifiable information, but linking those items may lead to
unintended breach of privacy.
Thus, the user’s consent that is statically defined in a privacy policy may not be enough for
restricting data disclosure. We need a privacy management solution that is, dynamic, context-
sensitive, and semantic-based.
1.5 Contributions To Research and Practice
This thesis makes the following contributions and focuses on dynamic privacy management
in services based interactions. The thesis deemphasizes the role of applying cryptography and
security techniques in achieving privacy, focusing instead on using data mining techniques to make
privacy management smarter. I assume that the proposed techniques can be complemented by
existing security and cryptography techniques, but these contributions are not in the scope of this
thesis:
• We build a dynamic, context-aware, semantic-based privacy policy management framework
on the top of the XACML reference architecture for policy-based access control. We evaluate
implement the proposed framework using an existing deployment engine that incorporates
the proposed context handling model into the privacy management module, and we incorpo-
rate the implemented framework into both a Web based and mobile based prototypes. We
evaluate the feasibility of the implemented approach in two case studies in comparison to
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similar existing works.
• We build an approach for private Web service selection that leverages the notion of K-
Anonymity to the level of a Web service operation. We generalize the approach to the level
of business process by solving the problem of protecting privacy in Web service outsourc-
ing. We integrate the proposed model into an existing framework to achieve privacy at the
level of the outsourced data, the outsourced operation, and the outsourced business process
logic. We provide an implementation of our approach using an existing process management
framework and provide an empirical evaluation of the feasibility of the approach.
• We introduce Pri-calculus, as an extension of the Pi-calculus with privacy level types;
We define a data flow analysis for private service composition, including the lattice model,
the abstract syntax, and dynamic semantics of our extended calculus; We also present a
prototype implementation of our analysis as a privacy level annotations-based type checker
and incorporate it into a composition engine;
1.6 Dissertation outline
The dissertation proposal is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2, introduces some background
information. The chapter first introduces some mathematical concepts that we apply in this disser-
tation. It then describes a standard privacy policy language. Chapter 3, explains an approach for
dynamic privacy management at the data access level. Chapters 4 and 5 explain two approaches
for dynamic privacy management at the operation level. Chapter 6, discusses some related works.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes and highlights future research directions.
8CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND
This dissertation proposal utilizes several mathematical frameworks and techniques and this
chapter highlights those techniques through an example. We also give a brief background about
some Web service standards and privacy policy languages.
2.1 Information Theory
We briefly list basic definitions from information entropy theory followed by examples from
our scenario.
2.1.1 Entropy
Entropy is a measure of uncertainty of a random variable [31]. The entropyH(DA) of a discrete
random variable DA is defined by:
H(DA) =  
X
da2DA
Pr(da)log2Pr(da)
2.1.2 Joint Entropy and Conditional Entropy
The notion of entropy can be extended to two random variables. The joint entropy H(DA, DB)
of two discrete random variablesDA andDB with joint probability Pr(da, db) is defined as:
H(DA, DB) =  
X
da,db2DA,Db
Pr(da, db)log2Pr(da, db)
Conditional entropy of one random variable given another is defined as:
H(DA|DB) =  
X
da,db2DA,Db
Pr(da, db)log2Pr(da|db)
2.1.3 Data Diversity
Diversity of a set of data depends on the number of homogeneous groups of data and the pro-
portion of attributes in each group. Entropy can be used as a measure of data diversity. According
to Shannon: First, if there are multiple possible options which are equally likely, there is more
uncertainty (monotonicity). Thus, the smaller the entropy, the fewer the number of different data
items or the more regular the data items are. Second, if a data set is defined as the combination of
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Table 2.1: A set of queries QS collected over several submissions.
phase Qi Pi Di
I 0 Research IncomeLevel,age
I 0 Diagnosis name,testResult
I 0 Research employer, incomeLevel
I 0 FederalTax name,incomeLevel
II 1 Research age,incomeLevel
II 0 Research employer,incomeLevel
II 1 Diagnosis name,testResult
II 2 Research incomeLevel,testResult
several disjoint data sets, the entropy for them combined should be at least the weighted sum of
the individual entropy values for the individual sets. For two data sets denoted by DI and DII , the
overall entropy should be higher, or at least equal to the weighted entropy of the individual data
sets involved:
H(D) = H(a, b) + aH(DI) + bH(DII), where a =
DI
D
, b =
DII
D
For example, we can use entropy as a measure of irregularity among a set of queries in a query
space QS by determining the constant and varying attributes of QS. The attributes in our case are
the query’s purpose P and the set of data type propertiesD in the query and a combination of both.
For instance, assume a set of queries that are gathered from several submissions (Table 2.1). In the
following, we explain how we calculate the diversity based on each of these attributes:
RR            
D
F    
RRR            
D
RRRRR            
DD
F              
2/4,1/4,1/4 2/4,1/4,0/4
5/8,2/8,1/8
4/8               4/8 
Figure 2.1: Diversity of combining queries from different phases. We assume the number of queries per phase is 4.
Diversity of queries by purpose P. Assume a set of queries gathered from several submissions
(Table 2.1). We divide the queries into two phases assuming the number of queries per phase is
4. First, for the P attribute, in phase I, we have 4 queries two of which are for research purposes,
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while the other two are for two different purposes so the initial entropy of QS with respect to
attribute P is:
HP (QSI) =
2
4
log
2
4
+
1
4
log
1
4
+
1
4
log
1
4
In phase II, two queries are for research purpose, one is for diagnosis purpose, and one is for
federalTax purpose:
HP (QSII) =
2
4
log
2
4
+
1
4
log
1
4
+ 0
If we combine both phases, the diversity increases (Fig. 2.1):
HP (QS) = H(
4
8
,
4
8
) +
4
8
H(
2
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
) +
4
8
H(
2
4
,
1
4
)
Diversity of queries by data D broken up by purpose P. Next, for each purpose, we calculate
entropy for each subset of the data as broken up by that purpose. For example, our data suggest
that of the queries that are for research purpose, one is asking for {income,age} while the other is
asking for other data. For the other two purposes the entropy is 0.
HD|P=Research(QSI) =  12 log(
1
2
)  (1
2
)log(
1
2
)
HD|P=Other(QSI) =  (1)log(1) = 0
If we include the queries from phase II, three queries are for research purposes. Of these, two are
asking for {age,income}. One is for diagnosis and it asks for {name,test}:
HD|P=Research(QSII) =  (23)log(
2
3
)  (1
3
)log(
1
3
)
HD|P=Diagnosis(QSII) =  (1)log(1) = 0
Then, we combine data from both phases HD|P (QS) for each purpose P and monitor the change
in diversity.
Diversity of queries by Purpose P and Data D combined. Then, we consider both attributes
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combined. Our collection shows that in phase I the requester’s set of queries contain one query that
is asking for {income level,age} for research purpose, one query asking for name and testResult
for diagnosis purpose, one asking for employer and income for research purpose and one asking for
{name,incomeLevel} for federalTax purpose. Thus, the initial entropy of QS is 1 which implies
regularity of the query data:
HD,P (QSI) = 1
We calculate the entropyHD,P (QSII) by combining results from phase II. Then, we combine data
from both phases H(QSD,P ) and monitor the change in diversity.
2.1.4 Information Gain
Information gain I is a measure of mutual information between two random variables DA and
DB. In terms of entropy, mutual information is the reduction in the uncertainty of DA due to
the knowledge of DB. Thus, I can be calculated based on entropy values H of each variable as
follows:
I(DA, DB) = H(DA) H(DA|DB)
H(DA) =  
X
da2DA
Pr(da)log2Pr(da)
H(DA|DB) =  
X
da,db2DA,Db
Pr(da, db)log2Pr(da|db)
2.2 Data Mining
2.2.1 Naiive Bayes Calssification
To classify the queries in the above scenario as malicious or legitimate, we can use a classifica-
tion model. Bayesian classification is appropriate for our purposes. We assume that the presence
of one data type property in a classification is conditionally independent of another data type prop-
erty. We make the same assumption regarding the purpose of a query. Based on this assumption,
we construct a Naive Bayesian Classification model. We convert a query Qi into a Bayesian
Network BN (Fig. 2.2), where the root node represents the query’s purpose Pi and the children
represent the data type properties dk in that query. In the rest of this dissertation, we treat the
data type properties in a query as a set Di. Based on our assumption, Pr(Di|Cj) is equivalent to
12
Pr(d1, d2, .., dk|Cj) which is equivalent to Pr(d1|Cj)Pr(d2|Cj)...P r(dk|Cj).
Purpose Pi
Query Qi
   Pr[Pi]
 
Pr[d1|Pi]
Data 
type property dn
...
 
Pr[dn|Pi]
Data 
type property d1
 
Di={d1,…,dn.}
Figure 2.2: A bayesian network that reflects our query classification model. The lineDi = d1, d2, ..., dk is just added
for clarification purpose and is not part of the network structure.
We then apply the Naiive Bayesian learning algorithm 1. The input to the learning algorithm
is a set of labeled data (training data) and the instance to be classified (query) and the output is a
classification Cj of that instance. For each query Qi the learning algorithm is given the purpose Pi
and the set of data type properties Di. The parameters to be estimated are the purpose probabil-
ities Pr(Pi) and the conditional probabilities Pr(Di|Pi). For example, given the training data in
Table 2.2, we wish to predict the class label of a newly submitted query Qi+1:
Qi+1 = [Cj+1 =?, Pi+1 = Research,Di+1],
where Di+1 = {incomeLevel, age, employer}
The prior probabilities can be computed based on the training samples. From the prior probabili-
ties, we compute the posterior probabilities. The goal is to maximize Pr(Cj|Pi,Di)Pr(Cj), for
j = {malicious, legitimate}. First, we compute the prior probability Pr(Cj) for each classifi-
cation from the training set. Then, to compute P (Cj|Pi,Di)P (Cj) we compute the conditional
probabilities Pr(Pi,Di|Cj) for all values of Pi and Di assuming conditional independence be-
tween the two random variables Pi and Di. We summarize the results in a conditional probability
table CPT (Table 2.3). A CPT correspond directly to the learned parameters mentioned earlier.
Based on the estimated parameters, the learning algorithm computes:
1The algorithm is implemented in several software packages including weka [44], matlab and orange
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Table 2.2: Sample training data in the form of a set of queries data and previously determined classification
No. Qi Pi Di Ci
1 0 Research Income,age Legitimate
2 1 Research age Legitimate
3 0 Diagnosis name Malicious
4 0 Research employer Malicious
5 0 Diagnosis name Legitimate
6 1 Diagnosis age Malicious
7 0 Diagnosis Testresult Legitimate
8 0 Diagnosis Testresult Legitimate
9 0 Diagnosis Testresult Legitimate
10 0 Diagnosis Testresult Legitimate
11 0 Research Age,employer, incomelevel ?
Table 2.3: Conditional Probability Table
Pi,Di Ci Marg.
dist.
for
Pi, Di
Malicious Legitimate
Research, incomeLevel 0 0 0
Research, name 0 0 0
Research, age 0 1/10 1/10
Research, employer 1/10 0 1/10
Research, incomeLevel,age 0 1/10 1/0
Diagnosis, incomeLevel 0 0 0
Diagnosis, name 1/10 1/10 2/10
Diagnosis, testResult 0 4/10 4/10
Diagnosis, age 1/10 0 1/10
Marg. dist. for Ci 3/10 7/10 1
Pr(Qi+1|Cj)Pr(Cj), forj = {malicious, legitimate}
Qi+1 = (Pi+1 = Research,Di+1)
, where Di+1 = {incomeLevel, age, employer}
If the probability of malicious, malicious is greater than legitimate, legitimate, then we deduce that
the NBC predicts the new query Qi+1 to be malicious.
2.2.2 Feature Selection
Feature or attribute selection (significance) is a contrast data mining technique that assess the
discriminative power of a certain feature or attribute in representing the entire data set. The tech-
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nique is often used to enhance classification accuracy or speed up the model training. The metric
can be measured in two ways: information measures including signal to noise, information gain
ratio, etc. or statistical tests such as t-tests, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Chi squared, etc.
In our case, for example, if the query is classified as malicious, feature selection can be used to
filter out the subset of data type properties D0j in the query that resulted in a malicious classifica-
tion.
2.2.3 Hierarchical Clustering
Hierarchical Clustering is a technique to group a set of data into groups based on similar at-
tributes [9]. The technique produces a set of nested clusters organized as a hierarchical tree, which
is often visualized as a dendrogram (a tree like diagram that records the sequences of merges or
splits) at each stage in the algorithm. The power of Hierarchical Clustering lies in the fact that it
does not assume a particular number of clusters. Any desired number of clusters can be obtained
by “cutting” the dendogram at the proper level.
Hierarchical clustering can be classified into two main techniques: Agglomerative and Divi-
sive. Agglomerative clustering starts with the data points as individual clusters. Then, at each
sage, merges the closest pair of clusters until only one cluster (or k clusters) are left. Divisive clus-
tering, on the other hand, starts with one, all-inclusive cluster. Then, at each stage, splits a cluster
until each cluster contains a data point (or there are k clusters). In this dissertation, we focus on
Agglomerative clustering.
The key operation in hierarchical clustering is calculating the similarity or distance matrix,
through which a merge or split decision is made. Different approaches to defining the distance
between clusters distinguish the different algorithms. The widely studied algorithm in this category
are the following: single linkage, complete linkage, average linkage among others. Single linkage
algorithm computes similarity of two clusters based on the two most similar (closest) points in the
different clusters. So, it is determined by one pair of points, i.e., by one link. Average linkage, on
the other hand, is determined based on the average of pairwise similarity between points in the two
clusters. We focus on these techniques for the purpose of this dissertation.
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2.3 Privacy Policy Languages
Several privacy policy languages have been proposed, including P3P, Reni, etc. Our focus in
this dissertation is on the Access Control Markup Language XACML.
2.3.1 XACML Context Handling
One of the most widely used privacy policy languages is XACML [91]. According to a stan-
dard XACML-based privacy policy management model, the organization hosting the Web service
should define a Policy Administration Point (PAP), through which policies can be defined and
deployed to a Policy Decision Point (PDP). Context handling in XACML is a protocol of commu-
nication between a PDP and a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) (located either on the user agent
side, the Web service side, or on a gateway between the user and the service). The PEP forms
an XACML request and sends it to the PDP through the Context Handler, which collects initial
attributes from the Policy Information Points (PIP). The PDP then uses those attributes to evaluate
policies. The PDP requests additional attributes from the context handler as needed and finally
returns a Permit or Deny decision to the PEP, which enforces the final decision.
2.3.2 XACML Static Privacy Policy Definitions
In XACML, a policy consists of a set of rules, each of which consists of a subject, object, action,
and a set of optional obligations. An XACML request consists of attributes including the subject,
object, action, and environment. The PDP evaluates the request against the deployed policies in it’s
policy store based on the predefined rules. In case of “permit” decisions, the PEP performs obli-
gations specified in a policy rule. We posit that we need a mechanism to dynamically identify the
context of data usage and make a decision regarding data disclosure based on the inferred context
at run-time. Context has been defined in the literature in terms of trust, affiliation, query history,
temporal or spatial relationships [96]. Some of these solutions base access control decisions on
static information, such as particular users or roles, and are therefore pre-determined. Recently,
few researchers proposed solutions to dynamically handle context. However, the dynamicity of
these solutions is not achieved at the privacy policy rule level. Moreover, these rules are not de-
fined in semantic terms and do not infer context based on previous data usage behavior. We aim
to extend the XACML PEP to be dynamic, context-sensitive, and semantic-based. Example of a
policy with obligation is shown below:
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Listing 2.1: A privacy policy that governs the usage of the instance in Listing 3.1 written in ALFA
namespace obligations{ obligation QRObligation = "edu:wayne:obligation:ch"}
policy patient1Policy {
rule patientStatusAccessRule{
target clause Attributes.resourceId=="patientStatus" and actionId=="view
"
condition canDisclose="yes" and subjectPurpose==purpose
permit}
on permit{
obligation obligations.QRObligation{
Attributes.resourceId = "hasContext"
}}}
XACML Requests. An XACML request consists of a set of attributes. An attribute can have
one of three categories: resource, subject, and action. A request can also have a content element
as we will explain later. Listing 2.2 depicts a simplified XACML request that corresponds to the
SPARQL query in Listing 3.2.
Listing 2.2: An XACML request corresponding to Q6
<Request>
<Attributes Category="resource">
<Attribute AttributeId="resource-id">
<AttributeValue>patientStatus</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
<Attribute AttributeId="mc:canReleaseStatus">
<AttributeValue>yes</AttributeValue>
</Attributes>
<Attributes Category="access-subject">
<Attribute AttributeId="subject-purpose">
<AttributeValue>Diagnosis</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
<Attributes Category="action">
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<Attribute AttributeId="action-id">
<AttributeValue>view</AttributeValue></Attribute>
</Attributes>
</Request>
Request handling in XACML is done in two different forms:
• In the first form, a PEP uses the Content element in XACML to send data directly to the
XACML engine (PDP) together with the request and the PDP takes care of it. The PEP adds
the retrieved data under the content element of the request and indicates the requested data
as a resource attribute using XPath expressions. Finally, the PEP sends the request over to
the PDP, who does policy evaluation by looking at the content element. The PDP extracts
data from the content element using XPath. For example it can extract the hasGene data
from content element. In this case AttributeSelector elements are used to define the
policies. Figures. 2.3 and 2.4 show a sample policy and it’s corresponding request.
• In the second form a PEP parses the content of the matching data and extracts the values
and sends them over to PDP. In this case, AttributeDesignators are used in XACML
policy definitions to refer to data within files since the PDP can not parse the file content.
This is called direct attribute matching, where the PEP uses a parser for fetching data from
the data file then puts the desired attributes in the XACML request using the PEP client code.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show a sample policy and it’s corresponding request.
In both cases, the PEP creates a XACML request with the set of attributes of one or more
category ( subject, resource, action, environment). For example, we can define policies whose
target will check if resource attribute hasGene can be released and then there will be a permit
effect rule which will check if resource attribute “canReleaseGene” is yes.
2.4 Private Data Publishing
2.4.1 K-Anonymity
K-Anonymity is an effective privacy requirement that has been first proposed by Samarati and
Sweeny [92] to prevent linking an individual to a record in a data table through a quasi-identifier
QID. A data table satisfies k-anonymity if every combination of values on a unique identifier is
shared by at least k records in the table, where the identifier is a set of data items that could
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<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17" xmlns:xacml="
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
PolicyId="policy1"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-
algorithm:first-applicable" Version="1.0">
<PolicyDefaults>
<XPathVersion>http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116</XPathVersion>
</PolicyDefaults>
<Target>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="gender_disclosure_rule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
//mc:Patient/mc:hasGene</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false" Category="
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource" AttributeId="
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" DataType="http://www.w3
.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
</AttributeDesignator>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
yes</AttributeValue>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-one-and-only">
<AttributeSelector MustBePresent="false"
ContextSelectorId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:content-selector" Category="
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource"
Path="//mc:Patient/mc:canReleaseGene/text()"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
</AttributeSelector>
</Apply>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="rule2" Effect="Deny">
<Description>Deny rule</Description>
</Rule>
</Policy>
Figure 2.3: Policy defined using XACML AttributeSelectors.
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<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
CombinedDecision="false"
ReturnPolicyIdList="false">
<Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource
">
<Content>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:mc="http://localhost:9443/GenomicWS/michcare.owl#"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#"
xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#">
<mc:Patient rdf:about="http://localhost:9443/GenomicWS/michcare.owl#patient1"
>
<mc:hasIncome>50K</mc:hasIncome>
<mc:hasLocation>UnitedStates</mc:hasLocation>
<mc:canReleaseGene>yes</mc:canReleaseGene>
<mc:hasGene>HLAB</mc:hasGene>
<mc:hasRace>White</mc:hasRace>
<mc:hasEducation>Bachelors</mc:hasEducation>
</mc:Patient>
</rdf:RDF>
</Content>
<Attribute IncludeInResult="false"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:content-selector" >
<AttributeValue
XPathCategory="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:data-type:xpathExpression">
//mc:Patient/mc:hasGene
</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
</Request>
Figure 2.4: Request corresponding to the policy in Fig. 2.3. The matching instances should be appended to the request
as content elements.
potentially identify a record in the table. Formally, a table is called K-Anonymous if for one
record in the table that has some value QID, at least k-1 other records also have the value QID.
In a K-Anonymous table, each record is indistinguishable from at least k-1 other records, with
respect to QID. For example, Table 2.4 is 2-anonymous with respect to QID={Race,Birth, Sex,
ZIP}.
Table 2.4: k-Anonymity for k=2 and QI={Race, Birth, Gender, ZIP}
Race Birth Gender ZIP disease
black 1965 m 0214* short breath
black 1965 m 0214* chest pain
White 1964 m 0213* obesity
White 1964 m 0213* depression
White 1964 m 0213* cancer
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<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
PolicyId="policy2" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-
combining-algorithm:first-applicable" Version="1.0">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
hasGene</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0
:resource:resource-id" Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-
category:resource"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true">
</AttributeDesignator>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
<Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="rule-1">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">yes</
AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator AttributeId="mc:canReleaseGene"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="false">
</AttributeDesignator>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="rule2" Effect="Deny">
<Description>Deny rule</Description>
</Rule>
</Policy>
Figure 2.5: Policy defined using XACML AttributeDesignators.
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<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
CombinedDecision="false"
ReturnPolicyIdList="false">
<Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource
">
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
IncludeInResult="false">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
hasGene</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
<Attribute AttributeId="mc:canReleaseGene" IncludeInResult="false">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
yes</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
</Request>
Figure 2.6: Request corresponding to the policy in Fig. 2.5. The matching instances do not have to be appended to the
request as content elements. Rather, a direct attribute matching is performed.
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CHAPTER 3 DYNAMIC PRIVACY AT THE MANUAL DATA QUERY LEVEL
Of the Web service data access patterns described in Section 1.1, this chapter focuses on manual
data access via query submission and how privacy can be achieved in that case.
3.1 Privacy at The Data Level
All the scenarios mentioned above involveWeb service operation invocation which takes data as
input and provides other data as output. For example, a requester may ask for the Geneomic data of
patients who have a specific employer, then he asks for demographic information of those patients.
The request first gets directed to a lab WS with hasGene as Di(input) and hasDiagnosis as
Di(output). It then goes to a demographics WS with hasDiagnosis asDi(output) and hasName
asDi(input). Considering the analysis pipeline scenario , the following Web services are involved
in the analysis process:
WS1 = (Symbol, {Location,OMIM,Symbol}, getGeneInfo())
WS1 = (rs, {rs, location, gene}, getSNPInfo())
WS1 = (trait, {trait, rsno., gene, location}, getGenPhenAssoc())
WS2 = ({Drug,Gene, SNP,CoMedication}, getDrugInfo())
WS3 = ({HGV S,Disease,OMIM,Date, Treatment, LabResult}, getDiagnosis())
WS4 = ({Dosage,Drug,GeneDrugAsso,GenPhenAsso}, getPharmInfo())
If we abstract away the operation names and input, output parameters, and focus on the data items
that flow between the different services, we get the following queries:
Q1 = (Research, {Location,OMIM,Symbol})
Q2 = (Research, {rsno., location, gene})
Q3 = (Research, {Trait, rsno., gene, location})
Q4 = (Marketing, {Drug,Gene, SNP,CoMedication}, )
Q5 = (Diagnosis, {HGV S,Disease,OMIM, V isitDate, T reatment, LabResult}
Q6 = (Marketing, {Dosage,Drug,GeneDrugAsso,GenPhenAsso})
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3.2 Motivating Scenario
Data collection. Assume that Alice is a recently diagnosed ’cancer’ patient, who uses a wearable
device to monitor her status by instantly collecting her data and publishing it to a clinical service
(Fig. 1.1, A). Alice also visits a Genomic lab (Fig. 1.1, Org2), which might also interact with her
clinic. Alice conducts most of her purchases online using various devices (smart phone, laptop,
etc) (Fig. 1.1,B) via an online service provider (Fig. 1.1, Org3) that is a composite service that
dynamically discovers and selects its providers (e.g., a pharmacy service and a payment service)
from a pool of competing services. Other organizations that might have Alice’s data include re-
search institutes, insurance companies, census databases, etc.. Thus, each of these organizations
has a subset of Alice’s data.
Listing 3.1: An ontology instance of a patient from our scenario with no context detected
<rdf:RDF xmlns:mc="http://www.michcare.com/MC.owl#">
<mc:Patient rdf:about="patient1">
<mc:hasName>George</mc:hasName>
<mc:hasNamePreference>
<mc:NamePreference>
<mc:canDisclose>No</mc:canDisclose>
<mc:hasPurpose>None</mc:hasPurpose>
</mc:NamePreference>
</hasNamePreference>
<mc:hasStatus>Bad</mc:hasStatus>
<mc:hasStatusPreference>
<mc:StatusPreference>
<mc:canDisclose>yes</mc:canDisclose>
<mc:hasPurpose>Research</mc:hasPurpose>
</mc:StatusPreference>
</hasStatusPreference>
</rdf>
Listing 3.2: A SPARQL query corresponding to the request in Listing 3.2
PREFIX mc: <http://192.168.0.8:9763/com.medi.sample.webapp-1.0.0/
generatedpatient.owl#>
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PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#>
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>
SELECT ?s ?l
WHERE {
?patient rdf:type mc:Patient .
?patient mc:hasLocation ?l.
?patient mc:patientStatus ?s.
?patient mc:patientStatus ’Bad’ .
?patient mc:canReleaseStatus ’yes’}
Private Data Publishing. Each of the above mentioned organizations expose data as a Web ser-
vice WSi using a set of operations Op1, ...Opj that get invoked upon Web service usage. For
example, a physician can inquire about a patient’s status (Fig. 1.1,C) and a researcher can use a
Genetic Variation Detection (GVD) analysis pipeline (Fig. 1.1, D). Regardless of the data access
technique used by a user, a query Qj gets submitted to WSi, which searches it’s ontology-based
repository and returns a set of data type properties Dj to the user. Assume that the set of all
data type properties that a requester can search for are defined in a generic ontology. The on-
tology has a taxonomy for purposes P (e.g., P = {Research,Diagnosis,Marketing}) and
another for data type properties D that can be obtained from several data repositories (e.g., Ge-
nomic, Drug, Pharmacy, Clinicial, and demographic). For simplicity, we refer to these prop-
erties as D = {PS,D,DD,L,G,DE,GS, SNP,DI,DL, PR, A,AD,EM, IN,MS} (Ta-
ble 1.2).
To manage data privacy,WSi defines a privacy policy for each patient instance ij in it’s repos-
itory, including Alice. Together with every instance, WSi records patients predefined disclosure
preferences over each data type property dk in ij , including whether dk should be disclosed, and
the purpose of disclosure Pj . For example, Alice’s RDF file under a clinical service repository
indicates that she has chosen to disclose the hasPatientStatus data type property for Diagnosis
purposes (Fig. 1.1, i1). The usage governance of hasPatientStatus is defined as a rule in Alice’s
policy file (written in ALFA [1]) (Fig. 1.1, p).
Adversarial Scenario. Assume that an adversary aims at linking genomic data of a victim with
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Table 3.1: A subset of the Web services in CP
Service description
WS1.1(?L,?OMIM,?GS) returns gene location, OMIM, and gene symbol for all
genes
WS1.2 ($RS,?RS,?L,?GS) returns gene symbol, location, and RS no. for genes with
“RS”
WS1.3($TR,?TR,?RS,?GS,?L) returns trait, RS no., gene symbol, and gene location for
a trait “TR”
WS2($GS,?DR,?SNP,?CM) returns drug, SNP, and co medication associated with
gene $GS
WS3($DI,?HGVS,?DI,?OMIM,?T) returns HGVS, Disease, OMIM, and Treatment for a dis-
ease DI.
WS4(?DO,?DR,?GDA,?GPA) returns dosage,drug,gene drug and genotype phenotype
associations.
WS5($DI,?DR) returns medicine for disease “DI”
WS6($DR,?A,?G) returns Age and gender for patients who are covered for
medicine “DR”
WS7.1($DR,?Z,?I) returns zip and income for patients who ordered medicine
“DR”
WS7.2($DR,?P) returns price for medicine “DR”
WS8($DR,?N) returns DNA for patients who has subscriptions for
medicine “DR”
WS9($Z,?P) returns price “p” for orders from patients who live in zip
“Z”
other clinical, pharmacy, and demographic data. He may ask for ”the ages, genders, zip, genomic
data, and income for cancer patients”. He can also use his background knowledge. For instance,
if he knows that Actiq is one of the very few cancer medications that costs $45.89, he can craft a
query to deduce that a patient has been diagnosed for cancer if he knows how much he paid for a
medicine that is used for cancer. He submits a query to know ”the price ranges paid for certain
medicines by patients who reside in a certain area”. Alternatively, he asks for ”Gene variation
data of patients within an area and the genotype phynotype associations” to get to a certain disease
then link that with other demographic data. To accomplish his task he submits queries (e.g., Q1
and Q2 in Fig. 1.1, E) or invokes operations on several data services (Fig 1.1, Org2, Org3, ...) and
analysis pipelines (Fig 1.1, Org4). A subset of the services that might be involved are shown in
Table 3.1.
Several composition plans CP = {CP1, ..., CPn} can be returned by the execution engine
to answer the adversary queries. Fig. 4.4 depicts one possible CP. The CP takes a query (e.g.,
Q = {A,G,Z,N, I}) and combines the results and returns the output. The data item s (e.g.
medicine) is an input parameter for WS6, WS7 and WS8, and an output for WS5. Thus, WS6,
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WS7 and WS8 depend on WS5 for providing DR. Thus, before providing WS6 with DR, WS5
should check the data owner’s privacy policy rule regarding that item. Checking for privacy rules
should hold along the composition chain until all the data items requested in the original query
initiated by the user are retrieved. The privacy management engine should validate CP in terms of
privacy, and if at least one dependency in CP violates a privacy rule, then CP should be discarded
from CP and the corresponding data item should be discarded from the query results.
Table 3.2: Sample queries from our adversarial scenario
Qj Pj Dj
1 Research PS,DD,SNP,DI,A,IN
2 Research D,L,G,DE,DI,DL,PR,A,EM,IN,MS
3 Research L,DI,MS
4 Marketing D
5 Research D
6 Research PS
7 Diagnosis G
8 Research PS,D,G
9 Diagnosis PS,D
10 Diagnosis PS,D,L,MS
3.3 Why Context Matters?
For illustration purposes we abstract away the operation names, input (denoted by $), and output
(denoted by ?) parameters in Table 3.1, and represent the data type properties that flow between
the different services as queries. Table 3.2 shows a subset of those queries. Without context
information, the data type properties requested by the adversary will be disclosed as long as the
static privacy policy rules tied to those properties match the purpose of usage. For example, upon
receiving Q10 (Table 3.2), the Web service looks up its repository for a set of matching instances
I10={i101, i102, i103, ..., i10k} (including Alice). Then, for each instance in I10 it checks the policy
rules tied to each of the data type properties in Q10. In the case of Alice, the hasPatientStatus
property can be disclosed for the purpose indicated in Q10. Thus, the adversary can continue
to submit queries asking for more data type properties by repeating some of these properties in
subsequent queries, with the goal of linking them to other properties available from other data
sets (e.g. hasAddress). For example, in Q1 he asks for D1={PS, DD, SNP , DI, A, IN} and
indicates the purpose as P1={Research}. Then, in Q2 he repeats some of the data type properties
as well as the purpose (D2={D, L, G, DE, DI, DL, PR, A, EM , IN , MS} and indicates the
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purpose as P2={Research}). In Q3 he repeats some of the data type properties in the previous
queries as well as the purpose (D3={L, DI, MS}, P3={Research}). Later, in Q10 he repeats the
data type properties in the previous queries but with a different purpose (D10={PS, D, L, MS},
P10={Diagnosis}).
To avoid the above scenario, we need to make WSi context-sensitive by tracking the query
history against all participating Web services, including each subquery against each sub service,
and use that history to infer context. A PEP at the composition orchestrator level as well as indi-
vidual PEPs at component service levels can then help propagate that query history information.
Each component service may be in itself a composite service. Since the inferred context is tied to
the data resource, and since a data source can be shared by multiple services our approach works
regardless of which Web services participated in a CP.
Our definition of context is inspired by the above mentioned adversarial query behavior. First,
our intuition is that a learning engine can be beneficial for the Web service by inferring the context
of a query based on previous queries to make the inferred context a function of prior contexts. The
Bayesian learning and updating mechanism helps achieve this capability. Second, we argue that
an adversary is likely to submit several queries asking for data items that are not in themselves
sensitive but may reveal, when combined, information about predetermined sensitive data items.
Conditional Entropy helps achieve this goal. Third, we argue that an adversary may ask for data
in subsequent phases seeking more sensitive data in each phase. In an initial phase, the requester
may submit initial exploratory queries that do not explicitly ask for sensitive data. The purpose
of those queries is to get an overall view of the data. For example, an adversary can first ask for
hasPatientStatus of all patients that are within some hasAge range for Research purposes. In
later phases, he may look for patients who have been diagnosed for a certain disease forDiagnosis
purpose. To this effect, he changes the purpose of the query. Therefore, in each phase some query
attributes are expected to change abnormally. So, we use Data Diversity as an indicator of the
difficulty in identifying sensitive data. We combine, in a novel way, existing techniques from the
fields of probability theory and information theory. We Next, we present our solution by defining
the system architecture, our notion of context, and how we incorporate it into dynamic privacy
management.
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3.4 Architecture
We build a dynamic, semantic-based privacy policy management framework on the top of the
XACML reference architecture for policy-based access control (Fig. 3.1). According to a standard
XACML engine, whenever a user submits a query, the query first goes to the PEP, which wraps it
into an XACML request and forwards the request to the PDP, which communicates with the PIP to
fetch the required attributes. For example, Listing 2.2 shows the XACML request that corresponds
to Q6 (Table 3.2).
Listing 3.3: An XACML request corresponding to Q6
<Request>
<Attributes Category="resource">
<Attribute AttributeId="resource-id">
<AttributeValue>patientStatus</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
<Attribute AttributeId="mc:canReleaseStatus">
<AttributeValue>yes</AttributeValue>
</Attributes>
<Attributes Category="access-subject">
<Attribute AttributeId="subject-purpose">
<AttributeValue>Diagnosis</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
<Attributes Category="action">
<Attribute AttributeId="action-id">
<AttributeValue>view</AttributeValue></Attribute>
</Attributes>
</Request>
System components. In our system, the PIP communicates with the Semantic Handler (SH),
which looks up the required attributes in the service’s repository (More details in Section. 3.5.3).
The PDP then uses the attribute values to evaluate the request. If a permit decision is returned, the
PDP consults the semantic handler (via the PIP) for previously recorded context of the matching
data instances. The retrieved context is considered as a resource bag of context elements. The PDP
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Figure 3.1: Dynamic Semantic-based Privacy Management.
then wraps the context bag as an XACML obligation element and sends it over to the PEP together
with the obligation logic to be performed (i.e., handle context).
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Figure 3.2: Approach.
The PEP uses the obligation to perform further check by communicating with the Semantic
Handler (Fig. 3.2, 1). The Semantic handler passes the set of instances Ij that match the query
together with the query Qj to the Context Handler (Fig. 3.2, 2). The context handler consists
of two sub components: the Classifier, which dynamically classifies a query as being potentially
malicious or legitimate, and the Sensitive Data Detector, which dynamically determines the
subset of data type properties in a query that could potentially be sensitive (More details in Sec-
tion. 3.5.2). The PEP uses the context CTXT (inferred by the context handler) to update the
context of each instance ik in the set Ij that matches Qj via the Semantic Handler (Fig. 3.2,
4). The PEP then uses CTXT to make the final decision through the Dynamic Rule Evaluator
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(Fig. 3.2, 5) (More details in Section 3.5.4). Finally, the PEP then sends the final response back to
the requester.
3.5 Formal Model Definition
3.5.1 Dynamic Privacy Policy Rule Definition.
We define a privacy policy of an instance as a set of rules. A privacy rule consists of the
following:
• Property: the data type property of a data owner for which the rule is defined.
• Condition: the condition(s) that must be satisfied for a data type property before access can
be granted. A condition is expressed using concepts and relationships from the ontology.
Namely, the patient preference regarding the disclosure of a data type property. A patient
Preference includes the following: Disclosure, which is a boolean property disclosure indi-
cating whether a data type property dk can be disclosed. Purpose, which limits the purpose
of usage Pi for dk.
• Obligation: We define obligation elements for each policy rule to be dynamically fulfilled
only when a rule evaluation yields a “permit” decision. PDP uses Obligations to tell the PEP
to not only rely on statically defined rules by the data owner, but to further apply the context
inference algorithm.
Context: The inferred context consists of previous requester’s behavior, including previous
queries (Qj), previous classifications (Cj), previous relatively sensitive sets (DB), and previous
diversity triggers.
• Qj: the submitted query. This query is fed into the context handler to infer the next context.
• Cj: is the query classification. This item helps to check if a data type property dj resulted in
a malicious classification of the submitted query.
• DB: this is the detected set of sensitive data type properties relative to the requested set Dj .
It helps to check if any of the data type properties dj in Dj is included in DB.
• trigger: this helps to check if dj caused irregularity in the query diversity values. In summary:
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Policy = (Pid, Rule1, Rule2, ..., Rulen)
Rule = (Property, Condition,Obligation)
Condition = (disclosure, purpose)
Obligation = (Oid, Context1, Context2, ..., Contextn)
Context = (Qj , Cj , DB , trigger)
3.5.2 Context Handling
We express a query Qj as a tuple hPj, Dji that consists of the purpose Pj and the set Dj (Ta-
ble 3.3). We represent Pj by a numerical value, and represent the set Dj by a vector of binary
values, where 1 indicates that dk appears in the query and 0 indicates that it does not.
Table 3.3: Queries from Table 3.2 as tuples.
Qj Pj Dj
PS D DD L G DE GS SNP DI DL PR A AD EM IN MS
1 1.0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 1.0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
3 1.0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 3.0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1.0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1.0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 2.0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 1.0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 2.0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 2.0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Algorithm 1 summarizes our context inference algorithm. We break our solution to context
inference into the following two sub problems:
Query Classification. For classifying queries we use the Naive Bayesian learning (NBL) algo-
rithm. The input to the learning algorithm is the query space QS and the output is a classification
Cj . We assume that the presence of one data type property in a classification is conditionally inde-
pendent of another data type property. We also assume that the data type properties asked for in a
query are dependent on a query’s purpose. Based on that, we construct a Naive Bayesian Classifi-
cation model by converting a query Qi into a Bayesian Network, where the root node represents a
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query’s purpose Pi and the children represent data type properties d1, ..., dk. In the rest of this the-
sis, we treat the data type properties in a query as a setDi. So, based on our definition, Pr(Di|Cj)
is equivalent to Pr(d1, d2, .., dk|Cj) which is equivalent to Pr(d1|Cj)Pr(d2|Cj)...P r(dk|Cj). For
each query Qi the learning algorithm is given the purpose Pi and the set of data type proper-
ties Di. The parameters to be estimated are the purpose probabilities Pr(Pi) and the condi-
tional probabilities Pr(Di|Pi). Therefore, to predict the class label Cj+1 for a newly submitted
query Qi+1 with purpose Pi+1 and set of data type properties Di+1, the NBL algorithm computes
Pr(Pi+1, Di+1|Cj)Pr(Cj), for j = {malicious, legitimate} based on the estimated parameters
from the training data.
Sensitive Data Detection. Our goal for sensitive data detection is to determine the set of data type
properties in a query that could potentially be sensitive, even though those properties have not been
deemed sensitive at the time of data collection. This problem reduces to two sub-problems:
Relative Sensitivity of a Set of Data Type Properties: Algorithm 2 summarizes the relative
sensitivity algorithm. We apply conditional entropy to measure the relative sensitivity of a set of
data type properties Di that is asked for in a newly submitted query with respect to two things.
First, users are often asked to make privacy decisions regarding their sensitive data (e.g., Name)
at the time of data collection. Let DA be the set of predetermined sensitive data type properties.
We apply conditional entropy to measure the relative sensitivity ofDi with respect toDA. Second,
we measure the relative sensitivity of Di with respect to all sets of data type properties D1, ..., Dk
in the previously submitted queries in QS. In both cases, we use the notion of information gain
as a measure of the mutual information between two random variables. We define the information
gain I(DA, Di) for Di with respect to DA, as the reduction in uncertainty about the value of DA
Algorithm 1 Context Inference Algorithm
1: Input: QS,Qj
2: Output: CTXT
3: Cj  QUERYCLASSIFICATION(QS,Qj)
4: DB  RELATIVESENSITIVITY(QS,Qj , t,DA)
5: if i mod M equals 0 then
6: trigger  QUERYDIVERSITY(QS, t,M )
7: end if
8: CTXT  Cj [DB [ trigger
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when the requester knows the value of Di. Formally:
I(DA, Di) = H(DA) H(DA|Di)
H(DA) =  
X
da2DA
Pr(da)log2Pr(da)
H(DA|Di) =  
X
da,di2DA,Di
Pr(da, di)log2Pr(da|di)
We apply the same formulas above to measure I(Dk, Di). The relative sensitivity algorithm first
computes the information gain between the sets Di and DA. It then computes the information
gain between Di and each set of data type properties D1, ..., Dk in the set of previously submitted
queries QS. If either case results in an information gain that is higher than a threshold t, the
algorithm distills the data type properties in Di that caused the highest information gain (Dsig).
The resulting data type properties (Dsig) are then added to the subset of relatively sensitive data
DB.
Algorithm 2 Relative Sensitivity Algorithm
1: input: QS,Qj , t,DA
2: output: DB
3: DB   
4: if I(Dj , DA)   t then
5: Dsig  SIGNIFICANTSUBSET(Dj , DA)
6: DB  DB [Dsig
7: end if
8: for each Qk in QS do
9: if I(Dj , Dk)   t then
10: Dsig  SIGNIFICANTSUBSET(Dj , Dk)
11: DB  DB [Dsig
12: end if
13: end for
To get the most significant subsetDsig, we iterated through each set, and moved one element at a
tiem from each set. We then calculated the gain of the new sets and observed the difference from the
principal gain. We did this step for all elements in each set and observed which element(s) (when
removed) affected the gain the most. This metric was justified since information gain ignores the
population size, so it is valid to directly compare the information gain computed from a vector
of n elements with another of n   1 elements. Other methods that could be applied to find the
most interacting subsets between Di and DA or Dk. For example, we could calculate the Singular
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Vector Decomposition (SVD) of the conditional probability matrix (CPM) of Di and Dk or DA,
respectively. The singular vectors with the largest values indicate which subset of Di and Dk or
DA interact the most with each other.
Table 3.4 shows an example of applying the relative sensitivity algorithm to a set of queries
from three iterations. In the in the 3rd iteration, the query {Marketing, yes, yes,
yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, no, no, yes, yes, no, yes, no} was in-
dicated as being related to both DA and to the set of data type properties in the
query {Marketing, yes, no, yes, no, yes, yes, no, yes, no, no, yes,
yes, no, yes, no} that was submitted previously in the same iteration. In the 4th iteration,
the query {Diagnosis, yes, no, yes, no, yes, no, yes, yes, yes, yes,
no, no, no, no, no} was indicated as being related to the query {Research, yes,
yes, yes, yes, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no} from itera-
tion 3.
Data diversity for a set of queries. The diversity detection part of the sensitive data detector
provides an extra check for data sensitivity. The query diversity algorithm calculates the entropy
for each criterion in a and creates a map of entropy values for each phase. It then uses the resulting
phase diversity map to monitor the change in diversity between phases by comparing the change
to a threshold t. The query diversity algorithm takes the query space QS, the threshold t, and the
number of queriesM to consider in each phase as inputs and returns a boolean value to the context
inference algorithm indicating whether there is an attempt to breach sensitive data in the recently
submitted query.
Algorithm 3 summarizes the query diversity algorithm. We use the notion of joint entropy as a
measure of data diversity. The diversity of a set of data depends on the number of homogeneous
groups of data and the proportion of attributes in each group. The data set in our case is a set
of submitted queries QS. Our desired metric shares some properties that Shannon sought in his
measure of information uncertainty [89]. First, if there are multiple possible options which are
equally likely, there is more uncertainty. Thus, the smaller the entropy, the fewer the number
of different queries or the more regular the queries are. Second, if a data set is defined as the
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combination of several disjoint data sets, the entropy for them combined should be at least the
weighted sum of the individual entropy values for the individual sets. In our case, for a query set
QS composed of query subsetsQSI andQSII submitted in two phases, the overall entropy should
be higher, or at least equal to the weighted entropy of the query sets involved. Formally:
H(QS) = H(x, y) + xH(QSI) + yH(QSII), s.t x =
QSI
QS
, y =
QSII
QS
We use the above formula to measure the change in diversity among a set of queries by determining
the constant and varying attributes of QS assuming all queries are submitted by the same source.
The attributes in our case are the purpose Pi and the setDi. In each phase either of these attributes
is expected to change abnormally. To measure this change we track the entropy for both query
attributes. Formally, for a query setQS we calculate the entropyH for each group of homogeneous
queries. We determine the homogeneity of a group of queries based on the following criteria:
• The purpose regardless of the data (P );
• The data given a purpose (D|P );
• Both attributes combined (PD).
Algorithm 3 Query Diversity Algorithm
1: input QS, t,M
2: output: trigger
3: QSselected   , QSprevious   , count 0, phase 1
4: while count < size(QS) do
5: for each Qk in QS such that k M do
6: QSselected  QSselected [Qk
7: k  k + 1
8: end for
9: Calculate diversity maps HP , HPD, HP |D
10: Update phase diversity map Hphase
11: Update QSprevious
12: phase phase+ 1
13: count count+M
14: end while
15: if DIVERSITYCHANGEDETECTION(Hphase)   t then
16: trigger  1
17: end if
We calculate the entropy for each criteria a as:
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Ha(QS) =  
nX
i=0
Pr(ai)log2Pr(ai) where a = {P,D|P, PD}
3.5.3 Semantic Handling
For dynamic rule evaluation the semantic handler gets invoked in two cases.
Updating Instance Context. The semantic handler interprets the submitted query Qj as a
SPARQL query and runs it be the RDF repository. If Qi matches a set of instances Ij , the se-
mantic handler keeps a log of Ij (Fig. 3.2). After inferring the context, the Web service PEP
updates the context block of each matching instance in it’s repository (Fig. 3.2).
Checking updated context. If a query Qi matches an instance, the PDP first checks the policy
rules that govern each of the data type properties in Di of that instance to see if the purpose Pi of
the query matches the purpose indicated in each rule. If any of the data type properties di in Di
does not match any of the rule conditions, a “deny” response is returned and the corresponding
data type property will not be disclosed. However, if a “permit” response is returned, the PDP
consults the semantic handler (via the PIP) to retrieve the contents of the hasContext data type
property of each matching instance ik in Ij . The result is returned as a bag of context elements
that are added as attribute assignments in the obligations stated in the policy rule. The PDP sends
the response together with the obligations over to the PEP. The PEP performs the obligation by
iterating through the context block of each of the data type properties in each of the matching
instances and checking the components of a context block. For example, suppose that the set
of instances that match a query Q1 is denoted by I1 = i11, i1n. If we take instance i11 =<
d1, CTXT1, d2, .., dn, CTXTn > as an example, it consists of several data type properties each
of which has a set of contexts. For example, the context set associated with d1 is CTXT1 =
ctxt1, .., ctxtn, where ctxt1 = (Q1, C1, DB1, trigger1) and ctxt2 = (Q2, C2, DB2, trigger2),
etc.. So if a newly submitted query Q2 asks for d1(i.e., Q2 =< P2, D2 = d1, d2, , dn >, the
algorithm checks the previously submitted queries Q1, , Qn, that also asked for d1, which are
stored in the context block CTXT1 of d1, and that is done for every dk that appears in a newly
submitted query.
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First, the PEP checks if any of the data type properties di in Di is included in a previously
detected relatively sensitive data set DB. It then checks if di has resulted in the classification of
a malicious query (Ci). Finally, it checks if di caused irregularity in the query diversity values
(trigger). If at least one match is found, the PEP rejects the disclosure of di. For example, the
policy in Figure 1.1 permits the disclosure of the PatientStatus property for the purpose stated
by the requester. However, a previously inferred context indicates that PatientStatus has been
marked to be potentially sensitive as indicated in the DB part. Thus, the PEP denies access to
PatientStatus.
3.5.4 Dynamic Rule Evaluation
In this section, we explain how the inferred context can be used to achieve dynamicity at the
rule level. After receiving the obligations from the PDP, the PEP uses the set Ij and the queryQj to
perform Dynamic Rule Evaluation (Fig. 3.2, 5). Algorithm 4 explains the dynamic rule evaluation
algorithm. First, if the query is classified as malicious, a feature selection is used to filter out the
subset of data type properties D0j in the query that resulted in such a classification. Second, a
check is made to see if any of the data type properties dk ofDi is included in a previously detected
relatively sensitive data set DB. Finally, the diversity trigger is checked to determine if there has
been irregularity in the query sets due to the newly submitted query. If any data type property dk
requested in the query is either sensitive, relatively sensitive, resulted in a malicious classification,
or caused irregularity in the query set, the set Dj in the query Qj is revised to exclude dk and the
new data set D00j is returned to the requester (Fig. 3.2, 8).
3.6 Prototype Implementation
In developing our privacy management framework, we took into account the technical implica-
tions that we need to be aware of in Services based environments. Namely, Web browsing entails
that privacy protection need to be performed while the individual is on-line or when a developer
is using a Web service based API, etc. Also, we were aware of existing standards such as pri-
vacy policy languages, etc. Therefore, we developed an XACML-compliant Web sites driven by
PEP-enabled Web services as well as end user analysis tools that are compliant with those Web
site policies and users privacy preferences. This way those sites can advise the user if there are
potential privacy issues.
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Algorithm 4 Dynamic Rule Evaluation Algorithm
1: Input: Qj , I
2: Output: Q0j
3: for each Ik in I do
4: for each Rk in Ik do
5: if Pk not equals Pj then
6: Dj  Dj \ dk
7: end if
8: for each CTXTk in CTXT do
9: if Ck equalsmalicious then
10: DSelected  FEATURESELECTION(Dj)
11: for each ds in DSelected do
12: D0j  Dj \ ds
13: end for
14: end if
15: for each db in DB do
16: D0j  Dj \ db
17: end for
18: end for
19: end for
20: end for
The privacy management framework can be developed in several ways. It can be developed as
a downloadable plug-in for all service providers. So, an organization does not need to implement
its own privacy management component. Alternatively, it can be implemented as yet another cloud
service that is operated by an independent organization.
3.6.1 Extending XACML PEP
We implemented the proposed solution in Java (Fig. 3.3) with the following main compo-
nents:
Context handler: We implemented the classifier component using the Weka API [44] and the
query diversity and relative sensitivity components using the JavaMI API [24]. For relative sensi-
tivity, we used an implementation of the Chi-Squared test [74] to measure the significance of the
mutual information between two sets of data type properties with an alpha level of 0.05. For query
diversity, we chose anM value of 5 (as detailed in Algorithm 3).
PEP: We used the WSO2 Identity Server 4.5 (WSO2 IS) [7] as our XACML engine. WSO2 IS
acts as combination of PDP , PAP and PIP components. The PIP uses an LDAP-based user store
embedded with the server. We implemented two forms of request handling in our PEP client:
• In the first implementation our PEP uses the Content element in XACML to send RDF
data directly to the XACML engine (PDP) together with the request and the PDP takes
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care of it. The PEP adds the RDF data retrieved from running the SPARQL query under
the content element of the request and indicates the requested data as a resource attribute
using XPath expressions. Finally, the PEP sends the request over to WSO2 PDP, who does
policy evaluation by looking at the content element. The PDP extracts data from the content
element using XPath. For example it can extract the hasGene data from content element.
In this case we used AttributeSelector elements to define the policies. Figures. 2.3 and 2.4
show a sample policy and it’s corresponding request.
• In the second implementation our PEP parses the RDF content of the matching instances and
extracts the values and sends them over to PDP. Therefore, we used AttributeDesignators in
XACML policy definitions to refer to data within the RDF files since the PDP can not parse
an RDF content. In this case, we designed our PEP based on direct attribute matching, where
the PEP uses an RDF parser for fetching data from the RDF file and then puts the desired
attributes in the XACML request using the PEP client code. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show a
sample policy and it’s corresponding request.
PAP, PDP, PIP
PEP
(1) invoke
(2) authorization request (3) authorization decision
(4) allowed request to backend service
Proxy 
Service 1
PEPProxy 
Service 2
PEPProxy 
Service 3
Malicious user
Benign users
Backend 
service 3
Backend 
service 2
Backend 
service 1
Figure 3.3: WSO2 based implementation of our framework
In both cases, the PEP creates a XACML request with the set of attributes of one or more
category ( subject, resource, action, environment). For example, we defined policies whose target
will check if resource attribute hasGene can be released and then there will be a permit effect
rule which will check if resource attribute “canReleaseGene” is yes. In our implementation the
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PDP makes a decision based on the XACML policies stored for each instance, which also take the
updated context into account and the PEP enforces the final decision. Based on that final decision
the PEP calls the appropriate Web service operation, which in turn generates a SPARQL query
against an RDF file.
Web Portal: We built a portal for health data inquiry. Since the PDP functionality of the WSO2 IS
is exposed as a web service, our Portal functioned as a PEP. We used the WSO2 PEP agent library
that provides a client side API to communicate with the WSO2 IS PDP. For request handling, we
used AttributeDesignators in XACML policy definitions to refer to data within the RDF
files since this technique is faster and more reusable than using AttributeSelectors with
XPath expressions. The former technique is based on direct attribute matching, where the PEP
uses an RDF parser for fetching data from the RDF file and then puts the desired attributes in the
XACML request.
Web Services: We implemented five Web services which expose a set of operations to retrieve the
patient’s data. Each service provides an end point to query data. We used the WSO2 Application
Server 4.1 to host the Web services and the portal.
3.6.2 MobiDyc: Private Mobile Based Cloud Based Framework
With the emergence of the Participatory Sensing paradigm [33], and the widespread use of
mobile phones, users can now share their data, e.g., health data. The success of cloud service
models increased the adoption of mobile healthcare applications [4, 5], which instantly record and
analyze patients data. Mobile applications collect data from ubiquitous devices and combine it
with other data about users for different purposes. Atomically, these data sources may not reveal
personally identifiable information for individuals, but linking a number of distributed sources
may lead to unintended consequences and breach of privacy. A malicious request, for instance,
can benefit from combining atomic data items even if it claims a purpose that complies with a
patient’s privacy preference for each of the atomic items. Thus, the patient’s consent and his
privacy policy at the time of data collection may not be enough for data disclosure. According to
governmental reports, around eight million records of patient’s health data was leaked in the past
few years [79]. Therefore, in order to encourage users to share their data we need to provide them
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with privacy-enabled infrastructures.
This section contributes a privacy framework for mobile health care applications with support
for dynamic privacy management of health data sharing. We provide an implementation of our
approach that builds on top of the Google App Engine cloud platform.
ArchitectureWe build a semantic privacy policy management framework on the top of the Google
App Engine reference architecture for Mobile App development and the XACML reference archi-
tectures for policy-based access control. Fig. 3.4 illustrates the main components of our system.
The data generated by the users is eventually stored and managed by the GAE data store. The data
store also stores the users data and associated access policies, and the later are deployed in the
PDP. A requester using our system uses his mobile device to query data. The application forwards
the request to the PEP component, which forwards the request to the PDP, which retrieves the
policies from the data store and evaluates them. In case of a Permit decision, a set of obligations
is sent to the PEP for further check. The PEP then communicates with the Semantic Handler
(SH), which interprets the request as a SPARQL query Qj and looks up attributes in the service’s
ontology-based repository and passes the set of instances I that match the query together with
the queryQj to the Context Handler (CH). The Context Handler consists of two sub components.
The Classifier, which dynamically classifies a query as being potentiallymalicious or legitimate,
and the Sensitive Data Detector, which dynamically determines the subset of data type properties
in a query that could potentially be sensitive. WSi uses the context CTXT inferred by it’s sub
components to update the context of each instance in I . The PEP uses CTXT to make the final
decision by performing Dynamic Rule Check (DRC). The PEP then notifies the PDP, which looks
up the updated rule context and sends the response back to the PEP.
Implementation We programmed all projects in Java using Eclipse 3.4 and instrumented it with
the Google plugin for Eclipse and the Android Development Tools. We detail the main parts of our
project below:
• Context Handler: we implemented the classifier component using theWeka API [44] and the
query diversity and relative sensitivity components using the JavaMI API [24]. For relative
sensitivity, we used the Chi-Squared test to measure the significance of the mutual informa-
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Figure 3.4: Dynamic privacy policy management solution.
tion between two sets of data type properties with an alpha level of 0.05. For query diversity,
we chose anM value of 5.
• PEP Agent We implemented a PEP agent client using the SunXACML engine [3], and we
incorporated our context handler implementation into the PEP implementation. In XACML,
a policy rule does not control data retrieval. For policy enforcement, we used XACML
obligations at the PEP level to ensure only desirable data type attributes are returned to the
user. We define our own obligation for query rewriting (QRObligation) by extending
the Obligation class. We execute an instance of QRObligation at the PEP in case of
permit decisions by calling the evaluate()method. The method reads the rewritten query
Q0j returned by the QueryRewriting algorithm and returns the subset D0j of the requested set
Dj to the user.
• MobiDyc is the Android client through which the user can query data (Fig. 3.5). The ap-
plication allows users to retrieve health data stored in the cloud through an Android mobile
device or emulator. The client communicates with the App Engine in the background to
gather stored information requested by the user. We created an object-relational mapping in-
terface which interacts with the backend data repository to enable users to query data using
their mobile devices. Each user query gets inserted to the backend data store.
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• TheMobiDyc-AppEngine is the backend project through which we provide the service in the
cloud. We implemented a service that exposes patients data as operations and we deployed
our services as backends to the GAE repository.
Figure 3.5: Dynamic privacy policy management solution.
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Table 3.4: Results from different components for the iterations 3, 4, and 5.
3 4 5
Q Cluster Rel. Sen. data de-
tected? (DB)
Class Rel. Sen. data de-
tected? (DB)
Class Rel. Sen. data de-
tected?
1 1 no malicious yes (Research, no,
no, yes, yes, yes, no,
no, no, no, no, no, no,
no, no, no)
malicious no
2 1 yes (Research, no,
no, yes, yes, yes, no,
no, no, no, no, no, no,
no, no, no)
legitimate yes (Research, no,
no, yes, yes, yes, no,
no, no, no, no, no, no,
no, no, no)
legitimate yes (Research, no,
no, yes, yes, no, no,
no, no, no, no, yes,
yes, no, no, no)
p¡¡0.05, IGain: 0.49
3 1 yes (Research, no,
yes, yes, yes, no, no,
no, no, no, no, no, no,
no, no, no)
legitimate yes (Research, no,
yes, yes, yes, no, no,
no, no, no, no, no, no,
no, no, no)
legitimate yes (Diagnosis, yes,
no, yes, no, yes, no,
yes, yes, yes, yes, no,
no, no, no, no)
p 0.02, IGain: 0.31
4 0 no (conflict) legitimate yes (1.0, 1.0, 0.0,
1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 1.0,
1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0)Highest
IGain of 1.
legitimate yes
5 0 yes (Research, no,
no, yes, yes, no, no,
no, no, no, no, yes,
yes, no, no, no)
legitimate no legitimate no
6 0 no (conflict) legitimate no legitimate yes
7 1 no legitimate yes (Research, no,
no, yes, yes, no, no,
no, no, no, no, yes,
yes, no, no, no)
legitimate yes
8 1 no legitimate yes (Diagnosis, yes,
no, yes, no, yes, no,
yes, yes, yes, yes, no,
no, no, no, no)
p 0.02, IGain: 0.31
legitimate yes
9 1 no malicious yes (Research, no,
no, yes, yes, no, no,
no, no, no, no, yes,
yes, no, no, no)
p¡¡0.05, IGain of 0.8
malicious yes
10 1 yes (DA) malicious no (conflict) malicious yes
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Table 3.5: Web services implemented in our experiment
Service Dinput Doutput Op Description
WSGenomic hasGene {hasGeneLocation, ha-
sOMIM, hasGene, has-
Gender, hasAge}
getGeneInfo(x) Returns detailed gene
info of patients who
have gene x
hasRS {hasRS, hasSNPLoca-
tion, hasGene, hasGen-
der, hasAge}
getSNPInfo(x) Returns detailed SNP
info of patients who
have RS x
hasTrait {hasTrait, hasRS, has-
Gene, hasRSLocation,
hasGender, hasAge}
getGenPhenAssoc(x) Returns Genotype Phe-
notype associations of
patients who have trait x
WSDrug hasDrug {hasDrug, hasGene, has-
SNP, hasCoMedication,
hasGenderhasAge}
getDrugInfo(x) Returns Drug info of
Drug x
WSClinical hasTrait {hasHGVS, hasDis-
ease, hasOMIM, has-
Date, hasTreatment,
hasTestResult, hasGen-
der, hasAge}
getDiagnosis(x) returns clinical details
of trait x
WSPharma hasDrug {Dosage, hasDrug,
hasGeneDrugAsso,
hasGenPhenAsso,
hasGender, hasAge}
getPharmInfo(x) returns pharamy info
about a drug x
WSClinical {hasTrait,
hasDrug,
hasT}
{hasName, hasAddress,
hasGender, hasAge}
getClinicalPersonalInfo(x,y,z)
WSDemog {hasAge, has-
Gender}
{hasName, hasAddress,
hasGender, hasAge}
getPersonalInfo(x,y)
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3.7 Evaluation
We conducted two case studies using two XACML engines and two performance testing frame-
works, as detailed in the following:
3.7.1 Case Study 1: Bio2RDF
The purpose of the first study is to evaluate the performance of our context handler and the
overall performance of our PEP implementation with the context handler included.
Study Setup. In this section we discuss study setup.
Environment. We ran our tests on a 2GHz Intel Dual-Core i7, 8GB RAM, 64bit OS X 10.8 Mac
machine. We used one WSO2 IS instance with a policy store which is running on the same ma-
chine. We ran Jmeter on the same machine with a memory foot print of -Xms1024m -Xmx2048m
-XX:MaxPermSize=1024m. To measure scalability, we used a 2.83GHz Intel Quad-Core CPU,
8GB RAM, 32bit Windows Server 2007 machine.
Data sets. As for the request sets, we generated synthetic sets to simulate practical cases in which
one data type property appears repeatedly in different requests. To generate a set of n requests we
first generated k core requests, with m data type properties each, such that all properties within
a single request, as well as across multiple requests are completely different. Then, we permuted
the n   k remaining requests from the k previous ones. For the instance sets, we created RDF
files using concepts from several ontologies of the Bio2RDF project (Table 1.2), including NCBI-
Gene,PharmKGB, DrugBank, CDT, and GeneCDS available from [22]. We created an adversarial
model through a set of queries modeled on the data type properties in Table 1.2 and the purposes in
Table 3.2. For the policy sets, we generated several policies using an ALFA-generated core policy
template. We feed the policy generation code with the set of data type properties in Table 1.2 and
the purposes in Table 3.2.
Context Handler Evaluation. We evaluated each of the context handler components, detailed as
under:
Clusterer. To build our classification model we needed a set of labeled queries. Since we did not
have labeled queries, we applied clustering to an initial set of queries. Since our query data consists
mostly of binary attributes, and since we want to measure similarities between queries based on
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the ‘1’ value of the query attributes, hierarchical clustering is most suitable in our case. To cluster
the first set of queries we applied four configurations of Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering as
implemented in Matlab: Single linkage/Jaccard Coefficient (SLJ), Average linkage/ Jaccard Co-
efficient (ALJ), Single linkage/Euclidean distance (SLE), and Average linkage/Euclidean distance
(ALE). We used the query sets from the first three iterations to evaluate our clustering model. We
first performed clustering based on the first set of queries (training set). For the validation stage
we used the second set of queries (validation data) and we evaluated the clustering model based on
the previous clusters. We compared the robustness of several clustering algorithms by means of an
ROC curve by comparing a partitionQSc of the query setQS obtained by the clustering algorithm
to a true partition QSt labeled based on our knowledge of the queries. The ROC curve indicates
that ALE clustering is the most robust (Fig. 3.6, a). Finally, we used another set of queries (test
data) to perform the actual clustering based on unseen labels.
Classifier. We used the clustering results as labels to train our classification model. The results
of running the NB classification model on the query sets from the third, fourth, and fifth iterations
indicate that 60% of the queries in the third and fourth iterations, and 80% of the queries in the
fifth iteration were labeled as malicious while the rest were labeled as legitimate.
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Figure 3.6: ROC curve comparison
Relative Sensitivity. The relative sensitivity results agreed with the classification results 60% of
the time for the third iteration, 30% of the time for the fourth iteration, and 40% of the time for
the fifth iteration. Moreover, the relative sensitivity results detected that 80% of the queries in the
third iteration contained a subset of data type properties that is relatively sensitive. In the fourth
iteration, only 20% of queries contained relatively sensitive data. In both cases, half of the queries
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contained data that was sensitive relative to DA while the rest contained data that was sensitive
relative to some other set Dk in a previously submitted query. 40% queries in the fifth iteration
contained relatively sensitive data, most of which contained data sensitive relative to DA.
Table 3.6: Diversity handler results for first three iterations.
Iteration1 Iteration2 Iteration3
Ph HP HPD HDIP Ph HP HPD HDIP Ph HP HPD HDIP
1 0.97 1.92
P1 1.58
3 1.5 2.32
P1 0.0 5 1.37 2.32 P1 1.6
P2 0.0 P2 1.0 P2 0.0
P3 0.0 P3 1.0 P3 0.0
2 0.0 0.72
P1 0.0 H 2.0 3.22 P1 1.14 H 2.08 4.1 P1 1.5
P2 0.0 P2 1.53 P2 1.56
P3 0.0 P3 0.13 P3 1.0
H 1.48 2.32
P1 0.474 1.37 2.32 P1 0.0 6 1.44 3.32 P1 1.6
P2 0.86 P2 1.6 P2 0.0
P3 0.0 P3 0.0 P3 0.0
H 2.15 3.64 P1 1.1 H 2.08 3.28 P1 1.8
P2 1.6 P2 2.0
P3 1.0 P3 1.1
Diversity. Table 3.6 provides details of query diversity results for each phase of the third, fourth,
and fifth iterations. The table shows both entropy values per phase and diversity changes between
phases. We focus on the cases where the entropy values are 0 which suggest that all queries had the
same value for an attribute and the cases where the entropy is 1 which suggest that the queries had
equal number of each attribute value. For example, entropy values for the purpose attribute (HP) in
the second phase of the third iteration match the relative sensitivity results for the last four queries
of the third iteration. The diversity results indicate that in the third iteration, the purposes of the
submitted queries were equally likely for phase one while in phase two all submitted queries were
for the same purpose. The diversity in purposes increased until phase 4 when it remained around 2.
For the purpose and data combined (HPD), the results did not indicate interesting entropy values
or significant increase or decrease in diversity. A closer look at the entropy results for the data per
purpose (HPID) suggest that for most of the purposes in the third iteration the entropy per phase
is 0 and so is the diversity which indicate similarities among queries in the initial phases which
match the results from the other components.
PEP Evaluation.
Jmeter Test Plan. We used Apache Jmeter 2.8 and we configured it to simulate 100 concurrent
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3 4 5
Q Cluster Rel. Sen. data
detected? (DB)
Class Rel. Sen. data
detected? (DB)
Class Rel. Sen. data
detected?
1 1 no malicious yes malicious no
2 1 yes legitimate yes legitimate yes
p 0.05,IGain:
0.49
3 1 yes legitimate yes legitimate yes
p 0.02, IGain:
0.31
4 0 no (conflict) legitimate yes
Highest IGain of
1.
legitimate yes
5 0 yes legitimate no legitimate no
6 0 no (conflict) legitimate no legitimate yes
7 1 no legitimate yes legitimate yes
8 1 no legitimate yes legitimate yes
9 1 no malicious yes
p 0.05,IGain of
0.8
malicious yes
10 1 yes (DA) malicious no (conflict) malicious yes
users, starting a new thread and sending parallel SOAP/XML-RPC Requests every 30 seconds (by
setting the ramp up period to 3000 seconds) for varying number of requests. Since the WSO2 IS
PDP is exposed via a Web service, we configured Jmeter to call that service API. We imported
XACML policies associated with RDF instances into the PDP policy store using a tool that auto-
mates the WSO2 IS EntitlementPolicyAdminService API. Since the PDP uses caching
to improve the performance, each time we ran the tests we loaded the PDP with different XACML
requests stored in a CSV file. We used two transaction controllers. One (PEP+CH) had three
Java Request samplers to test our implementation of the different context handler components (Ta-
ble. 3.7), while the other (PEP) had a SOAP/XML-RPC sampler to test XACML request evaluation
by comparing them to the 10 published policies.
In the test plan of our context handler we used two transaction controllers. One controller had
three Jmeter Java Request samplers to test our implementation of the different context handler
components (Table. 3.7). For each component we implemented a Java class that implements the
JavaSamplerClient interface then we configured the JavaRequest sampler in Jmeter to test
our classes. The other controller had both the first controller and a SOAP/XML-RPC sampler to
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test XACML request evaluation. We created a similar version of our test plan but with the Web
portal included. We created an HTTPS Request sampler to record user navigations through our
Web portal, which in turn communicates with our PEP agent client. To avoid the overhead created
through navigating through the Web portal, we show the results from testing only the context
handler Java code.
Table 3.7: Setup for Jmeter test plan
XACML version 3.0
XACML Engine WSO2 IS
PIP attribute store LDAP store
Threads (Users) 100
Iterations (no. of test runs) 5, 10, 20
Ramp-up time 3000 sec
Transport SOAP over HTTPS
Sampler(s) Soap/XML-RPC and Java Re-
quest
Policies (Instances) 10
Requests 10, 50, 100
Data type properties/request 14, 28
Metrics. We defined different metrics and, for each implementation, we measured the average
evaluation time over different runs. The evaluation time measures the elapsed time from the mo-
ment a given request is sent to the server until the moment the last bit of information has returned
to the client. Our metrics are:
• Cost of context inference (CCI). This metric measures the cost incurred in the context infer-
ence phase relative to the total evaluation time.
• Accuracy (ACC). This metric measures the percentage of permit decisions vs. deny decisions
in our implementation compared to that of the standard implementation provided by WSO2
IS.
• Scalability (SCA). We define the scalability point as the minimum number of concurrent
users from which any increase no longer increases the Throughput per second.
Results. We present results for PEP evaluation time for each of the metrics mentioned above.
• CCI. The results of running the test plan for 5, 10, and 20 iterations indicate that the dif-
ference in average evaluation time between the two implementations did not change signif-
icantly (Fig. 3.7). Also, the overhead introduced by the context handler is not significant.
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The evaluation time varies between the different context handler components. The relative
sensitivity component has the largest evaluation time followed by the diversity handler then
the classifier. The PEP slightly outperforms the PEP+CH implementation at the cost of pro-
ducing less accurate decisions as the ACC metric indicates.
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Figure 3.7: Cost of Context Inference over several test runs.
• ACC. The results for different number of requests for a fixed number of 14 data type prop-
erties and 3 purposes (Fig. 3.8) show that, on average, the percentage of the decisions that
came as permit using a standard PEP is always higher than that of PEP with our context han-
dler incorporated. Same is observed for different number of data type properties for a fixed
number of 100 requests and 3 purposes (Fig. 3.8). This metric justifies the results obtained
from the CCI metric above.
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Figure 3.8: PEP Accuracy for PEP (left) vs. PEP+CH (right)
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• SCA. To measure scalability, we ran one test on a local machine with the specifications pro-
vided in Sec. 3.7.1 and another on a cloud version of Jmeter. In the first case, we scheduled
our load test to start a new thread every 30 seconds. After 30 min of running the test, we
found that the throughput increased until it reached about 70 requests per second (50 on
average) with 53 active users. It then hardly increased as more users were added with an
increasing error rate. In the second case, we scheduled the test with 50 users (due to Jme-
ter limitations) where a new thread starts every 2 seconds. We found that the throughput
increased until it reached more than 50 hits/sec on average with all 50 users active (Fig. 3.9).
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Figure 3.9: Scalability
3.7.2 Case Study 2: E-HIP
In this study, we compared our PEP implementation to a similar work, in Decat et al [36]. We
used the Home Patient Monitoring System (HPMS) available from E-HIP [6] as our subject sys-
tem. The E-HIP project provides an information platform for sharing patient’s medical data across
several healthcare providers including hospitals, general practioners, and screening centers.
Study Setup. In this section we discuss study setup.
Environment. We used the same environment settings used in the first study (Section. 3.7.1). We
used an optimized version of SunXACML [3] to implement our PEP. We incorporated the context
handler into the PEP implementation. For the PIP module, we used a JDBC-based attribute store
using a MySQL database in the case of Decat et al. and an ontology-based repository in our case.
As a PIP attribute store we used a MySQL database running on the same machine.
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Data sets. We used the request generation technique used in the first study to generate XACML
requests. As for the instance sets, we generated RDF files. For requests, instances, and policies
we used the classes and data type properties from the E-HIP project (Table 1.2) and the 3 purposes
shown in Table 3.2. For the policy set, we used a realistic policy set provided by the Ehip project,
which consists of 19 atomic policies. The policies are designed to require 30 attributes in total.
Since our approach requires fixed query sizes, we chose 16 of those attributes to represent the
resource attributes. Of the 30 attributes, 8 are considered sensitive, so we chose those as our initial
set of sensitive data DA and assigned the remaining 8 properties 0 values.
Java Metrics Test Plans. For performance testing we used the Java Metrics library. Table 3.8
shows the test plan.
Table 3.8: Setup for Java metrics library test plan.
Subject system E-HIP HPMS
XACML version 2.0
Environment 2GHz Intel Dual-Core i7 Mac, 8GB
RAM, 64bit OS X 10.8.
XACML Engine SunXACML
PIP attribute store MySQL database
Threads (Users) 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32
Warm-up runs 10
Iterations (no. of test runs) 100
Policies (instances) 19 policies
Requests 3
Data type properties/ request 3, 6, 11
Metrics. We compared the average evaluation time and average throughput of both implementa-
tions (SunXACML, SunXACML+CH) for each of the metrics defined in Sec. 3.7.1. The through-
put measures either the number of requests per second that are sent to the PEP or the number of
classified queries that are written to an output file during a test. For this study, we measured the
following additional metrics:
• Dimensionality (DIM). In this metric, we record the time and the throughput for varying
input sizes. Namely, the number of requests and the number of data type properties in a
request.
• Overhead Cost of Semantic Handler (OCSH). Based on our discussion of obligations above,
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the overhead incurred by the Semantic handler (SH) is due to three steps: retrieving the
required data type properties in the request (e.g. hasPurpose); retrieving the Context for the
obligation (PDP, SH); and retrieving the instances that match the query (PEP, SH) (Fig. 3.1).
This measure reflects the attribute fetch time of the PIP, which is in our case the overhead
added by searching through the RDF repositories for matching instances. It measures the
overhead of PEP parsing RDF repositories looking for attributes and generating requests
from them.
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Figure 3.10: PEP performance for different number of data type properties for different threads
Results. We present results of comparing our implementation of PEP (SunXACML+CH) to that
of Decat et al. (SunXACML) for each of the above mentioned metrics.
• CCI. The results of both the evaluation time and throughput (Fig. 3.10) indicate that the
overhead introduced by the context handler is not significant.
• DIM. Fig. 3.10 illustrate that the average evaluation time and throughput of our PEP im-
plementation did not change significantly between our implementation and that of Decat et
al.
• OCSH. Fig. 3.11 shows the total evaluation time, the portion of time spent in fetching at-
tributes, the portion spent on processing the rules of our PEP implementation compared to
that of Decat et al. It also illustrates the evaluation times in terms of the number of data type
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properties. The total evaluation time grows linearly and so does the overhead of fetching
attributes as the number of data type properties increases. The figure also confirms that the
overhead of processing requests through context inference (CCI metric) is not significant
compared to Decat et al.
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Figure 3.11: Attribute fetch time in Decat et al (left) compared to our implementation (right)
• ACC. Fig. 3.12 illustrates the accuracy of our implementation (PEP+CH) compared to that
of Decat et al. (PEP) for different number of requests. The results indicate that our imple-
mentation filters out more denied queries compared to Decat et al.
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3.7.3 Case Study 3: Comparison to Dynamic Data Publishing
We compare our approach to two representative algorithms for K-Anonymity and HDB.
Namely, the K-Anonymity algorithm in [60] and the HDB algorithm in [58]. Since none of
the algorithms add context to the data we cannot compare to our context inference algorithm.
The candidate algorithm for comparison becomes the dynamic rule evaluation algorithm (Algo-
rithm 4). Some of the parameters that vary between the three algorithms are the the data set size
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(|Ij|) (the size of the original table |T | in their case), the number of attributes in a query |Dj|
(dimension(QID) in [60] and number of columns |C| in [58]), the number of rules |Rj| (for each
dk in Dj of an instance i in Ij), which is the closest equivalent to the size of the choices table
(choice %) in [58], and k. The only common parameter among all algorithms is |Ij|. However, the
results cannot be reproduced entirely unless we use an environment similar to theirs (which makes
a precise comparison hard).
In terms of metrics we can compare our algorithm to HDB in terms of execution time. Since
Mondrian is a fast algorithm (nlogn) we can focus on the utility loss metric.
Execution time. Amajor limiting factor in HDB can be attributed to the cost incurred by translat-
ing policy files into choice tables and storing them in the database, rewriting queries, and fetching
the privacy meta-data. Thus, we expect an overhead cost to be incurred by those modules accord-
ing to the worst case conditions reported in [58]. We can estimate the overhead cost of privacy
translation and choice retrieval based on their experiments. We expect the results to vary based on
the storage method of the choice table (CPU processing time in case of internal storage of choices
as case statements or I/O time in case of external storage of choices), the percentage of attributes
(columns) on which a user chooses to add a restriction (size of a choice table), and the disclosure
model (query vs. table semantics). None of which applies in our case.
The only overhead cost that we expect by running our Dynamic Rule Evaluation algorithm is
the overhead cost added by the semantic handler which we reported in our experiments. In addition
to |Ij|,|Dj|,|Rj|, our algorithm further relies on the size of the context block |CTXTj| for each
attribute dk of each instance in the set Ij.
Utility loss. As a measure of quality in terms of query answerability, the discernibility metric
has been applied to Mondrian. We expect that for a large value of k the utility loss will decrease
when |QID| (Dj in our case) increases and we expect it to increase when k increases for a fixed
|QID|.This measure does not apply in our case, so a better measure need to be defined and applied
to both algorithms for precise comparison.
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CHAPTER 4 K-ANONYMITY BASED PRIVATEWEB SERVICE SELECTION
Unlike Chapter 3, this chapter focuses on how we solve privacy issues in automatic or semi-
automatic data access environments as described in Section 1.1. In service oriented environments,
interaction occurs between two entities: clients and providers. Clients submit input data to invoke
providers operations, who in turn return output data. Privacy can be achieved on input data, output
data, or operation invocation. To guarantee privacy of operation invocation, it is essential to know if
there is compatibility between a client’s privacy requirements and the Web service privacy policies
before the client invokes the operation. The client can then use the results of such a comparison
to decide whether to invoke the operation. In this chapter, we focus on privacy at the Web service
operation invocation level, then we generalize the approach to the business process level.
4.1 Motivating Scenario
Assume a collaborative Web service environment that consists of five web services:
WS1,WS2,WS3,WS4andWS5, each of which has a set of operations Op1, ..., Opn. Accord-
ing to a naiive Web service conversation model, an initially invoked operation initiates a chain
of subsequent operation invocations according to a configuration defined in a WSCL file (e.g.,
Listing 4.1).
Listing 4.1: A 5-Operation WSCL Definition. Interactions show all operations and Transitions show which operation
calls which other operation
<ConversationTransitions>
<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="getLab1Results"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="getLab3Results"/>
</Transition>
<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="getLab2Results"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="getLab3Results"/>
</Transition>
<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="getLab3Results"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="getLab4Results"/>
</Transition>
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<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="getLab5Results"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="getLab4Results"/>
</Transition>
</ConversationTransitions>
Fig. 4.1 depicts an abstract choreography of the conversations defined in Listing 4.1. Based on
the figure, we have the following orders of operation invocations:
WS1/OP1! WS3/OP3! WS4/OP4,
WS2/OP2! WS3/OP3! WS4/OP4,
WS3/OP3! WS4/OP4,
WS5/OP5! WS4/OP4,
WS4/OP4
Given all possible end to end routes, for each possible operation invocation, there may exist one
or more downstream operations along the route to the operation destination. For example, for the
route 1! 4, Op1 has one downstream operationOp3, which in turn has one downstream operation
Op4. Therefore, invoking Op4 indicates that Op3 was invoked, and thus that Op1 was invoked.
If we assume that Op1 is a private resource, the above mentioned invocation scenario is not pri-
vate, since for the source operation Op1 there are at least 2 operations leading to the downstream
operation Op3 which it invokes. Similarly, there are 4 operations leading to the downstream op-
eration Op4 which it invokes. For example, if a requester Bob wants to detect a disease with
which a patient Alice was diagnosed, he can use a service composition chain which involves the
operation sequence getPrescriptionPrice(patientid) on WSclinical, getPrice(medicine) on WSdrug,
getMedicine(disease) onWSdrugPhenoAssoc, etc. Since some diseases can be inferred form the price
of their medicine (e.g., cancer), the operation getPrescriptionPrice(patientid) can be considered a
private resource, and knowing that the operation getPrice(medicine) has been invoked can reveal
that getPrescriptionPrice has been invoked. Thus, a standard WSCL configuration does not guar-
antee the privacy of the data hosted by a Web service neither at the operation level nor the data
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(operation input and output parameters) level. It is crucial to privacy to know the extent to which
the invoking an operation can be inferred if one knows that a downstream operation was invoked.
We propose an approach that takes into account k-Anonymity at the operation level in determining
compatibility within privacy frameworks.
Figure 4.1: A choreography of a 5-operation (left) and 9-operation (right) invocation configurations.
4.2 Web Service Composition Standards
Two main composition models can be applied to obtain value-added services: orchestration
(e.g., BPEL) and choreography (e.g., WSCL). In the orchestration model there is a centralized
orchestrator that manages the invocations, while in the model it is more of a decentralized style
and each Web service has it’s own WSCL definition. Fig. 4.2 depicts a model that combines both
models.
4.2.1 Web Service Conversation Language (WSCL)
WSCL definitions defined and accessed on the Web service side reflect the relationships be-
tween web service operations; by indicating which operations call which other operations. For
instance, in a composition consisting of nine Web services: WS1, . . .WS9, and a set of opera-
tions Op1, ..., Op9 corresponding to each service, an initially invoked operation initiates a chain
of subsequent operation invocations according to a configuration defined in a 9-Operation WSCL
Definition (Listing. 4.2). The WSCL definition specifies interactions (all possible operations) as
well as transitions (which operation calls which other operation). Fig. 4.2 depicts an abstract chore-
ography of the conversations defined in a 5-Operation and a 9-Operation WSCL models employed
by the composite services CS2 and CS3, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: A hybrid composition model using BPEL orchestration and WSCL choreography.
Listing 4.2: A 9-Operation WSCL Definition. Interactions show all operations and Transitions show which operation
calls which other operation
<ConversationTransitions>
<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="Op1"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="Op3"/>
</Transition>
<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="Op2"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="Op3"/>
</Transition>
<Transition>
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<SourceInteraction href="Op3"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="Op4"/>
</Transition>
<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="Op3"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="Op5"/>
</Transition>
<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="Op6"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="Op5"/>
</Transition>
<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="Op5"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="Op7"/>
</Transition>
<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="Op8"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="Op7"/>
</Transition>
<Transition>
<SourceInteraction href="Op9"/>
<DestinationInteraction href="Op7"/>
</Transition>
</ConversationTransitions>
4.2.2 Business Process Execution Language (BPEL)
In BPEL, the composition result is called a process (Listing. 4.3, participating services are
partners, and message exchange or intermediate result transformation is called an activity. BPEL
also defines the data used by a process as variables. A process thus consists of a set of activities and
interacts with external partner services throughWSDL interfaces. Business processes can be either
Executable business processes, which model actual behavior of a service in a business interaction
and business protocols, which describe process logic in terms of message exchange between the
interacting services, without exposing their implementation details. Fig. 4.2 depicts an abstract
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orchestration of two processes in a composite service CS1.
Each step of a process is represented by an activity, which is implemented as either an out-
bound web service invocation on an external partner service or as an inbound web service re-
quest. According to BPEL data model, a process consists of a sequence of activities. Those
activities represent units of processing (e.g. receive and reply) and show what the process
actually does. External partner services are defined by WSDL interfaces. Activities map to oper-
ations defined in WSDL files. Some of these activities are invocations to external Web services.
In BPEL these external services are called partnerlinks, and represent the web services with
which the process (composite service) interacts. If an activity involves invoking an operation de-
fined in a WSDL of an external service, the operation is considered an outsourced operation. For
instance, the invocation Op2,1 ! OS1 illustrates an outsourced communication link between CS1
and CS3. A process in BPEL can communicate with either a Web service or with another BPEL
process. For instance, the invocation Op1,6 ! Op2,1 illustrates a communication link between
BP1 and BP2.
The web service operations exposed by the process can aggregate other web services in per-
forming the business tasks associated with the process. Thus, the flow of the process includes a set
of Web service interactions between the process itself, internal Web services, and external partner
Web services. BPEL processes interact with WSDL services exposed by business partners. Thus,
we distinguish between interfaces exposed by the BPEL process and interfaces consumed by the
BPEL process. The later may involve outsourcing. Composition in BPEL is recursive; it consists
of structured activities, which can be nested. For instance, activities contained in a flow are exe-
cuted in parallel, partially ordered through control structure activities contained in a sequence are
performed sequentially in lexical order. In an if then else, exactly one branch of activity is selected
from a set of choices.
Listing 4.3: BPEL definition from our scenario
<process name="outsourcedOperationCallScenario">
<partnerLinks>
<partnerLink name=client/>
<partnerLink name=serviceA/>
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<partnerLink name=serviceB/>
<partnerLink name=serviceC/>
</partnerLinks>
<variables>
<variable name=processInput/>
<variable name=AInput/>
<variable name=AOutput/>
<variable name=BCInput/>
<variable name=BOutput/>
<variable name=COutput/>
<variable name=processOutput/>
</variables>
<sequence>
<receive name=receiveInput variable=
input/>
<assign><copy>
<from variable=processInput/>
<to variable=AInput/>
</copy></assign>
<scope>
<sequence>
<invoke name=invokeA partner-
Link=serviceA
inputVariable=AInput output-
Variable=AOutput/>
</sequence>
</scope>
<assign><copy>
<from variable=AOutput/>
<to variable=BCInput/>
</copy></assign>
<flow>
<sequence>
<invoke name=invokeB partner-Link=serviceB
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inputVariable=BCInput/>
<receive name=receive_invokeB
partnerLink=serviceB
variable=BOutput/>
</sequence>
<sequence>
<invoke name=invokeC partner-Link=serviceC
inputVariable=BCInput/>
<receive name=receive_invokeC
partnerLink=serviceC
variable=COutput/>
</sequence>
</flow>
<invoke name=reply
partnerLink=client
inputVariable=processOutput/>
</sequence>
</process>
4.3 Private Web Service Selection Model
In this section, we present the privacy management framework proposed in [94, 95], and howwe
extend it using K-Anonymity. The model accounts for privacy at both the data (input and output)
and operation usage levels. We also provided a matching protocol and a negotiation model to
resolve incompatibility between client’s requirements and provider’s policies. We briefly describe
the model and we refer the reader to [94, 95] for further details.
According to the model, a provider WS defines a privacy policy PPWS . For each provider
WS, a client C defines privacy requirements PRC/WS regarding WS input output and operations.
C may demand full compatibility between PPWS and PRC/WS or a partial compatibility with
certain threshold. In case of incompatibility, C and WS have two options: either discontinue the
interaction or initiate a negotiation process to reconcile privacy policies and requirements. The
model consists of the following concepts:
• Resource: we refer to private information as resources, including input parameters submitted
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Table 4.1: Two business processes (BP1 is from Org1’s perspective, BP2 is from a competitor’s perspective) and
constituent activities.
CS BP Activity flow type WS Operation input output
1 1 receive client Op1,1
1 1 invoke AB:
performed by
providers A,B
PAR ServiceA Op1,5 processInput/AInput Aoutput
1 1 invoke AB:
performed by
providers A,B
PAR ServiceB OS1 processInput/BInput BOutput
1 1 invoke C:
performed by
provider C
SEQ ServiceC OS2 Aoutput
1 2 receive client Op2,1
1 2 invoke DBE:
performed
by providers
DBE
PAR ServiceD Op2,2 processInput/DInput Doutput
1 2 invoke DBE:
performed
by providers
DBE
PAR ServiceB OS1 processInput/BInput BOutput
1 2 invoke DBE:
performed
by providers
DBE
PAR ServiceE Op2,3 processInput/EInput EOutput
1 2 invoke F:
performed by
provider F
SEQ ServiceF Op2,4 BOutput FOutput
1 2 invoke C:
performed by
provider C
SEQ ServiceC OS2 FOutput COutput
to providers, the fact that a client invoked an operation, or the output data. The type of
resource is determined using the notion of a privacy level.
• Privacy level: resources can be either data or operations that the Web service invokes to re-
trieve such data. We handle both cases. Privacy at the data level handles handles privacy poli-
cies or requirements imposed on data resource that a client and a provider exchange, whereas
privacy at the operation level handles privacy policies or requirements imposed on the in-
voked operation. Data resources can be operation input and output parameters defined by a
service (i.e., WSDL). For instance, an input parameter to an operation getLabResults
could be patient id and the output could be test results (Fig. 4.3). patient id
and test results are data resources whereas the operation getLabResults is an op-
eration resource. The operation getLabResults can be considered a private resource by
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Figure 4.3: Web service privacy model.
the organization hosting the Web service that defines that operation (e.g., a hospital), espe-
cially when disclosing the invocation of this operation to other organizations (e.g., research
institutes) can cause liability issues for the hospital.
• Privacy Rule: We define a rule Ri as a tuple hTi, Li, Di, Sii, where Ti is the topic, and
it can have any of the values {Purpose, Retention,Recipient,KAnon}, Li is the pri-
vacy level and it takes the values {data, operation}, Di is the domain and contains the
possible values that can be taken by a topic {no   retention, indefinitely, stated  
purpose , public, government, research, federaltax, same, and otherservices}, and Si
is the scope of a rule and defines the granularity of the resource that is subject to pri-
vacy constraints, and it can be any of the values {total, partial, GTE1, GTE2, GTE3,
GTE4, GTE5, GTE6, GTE7, GTE8, GTE9, GTE10, INFINITE}. The values
GTEx are only assigned in cases where the topic is indicated as KAnon, and they indicate
that the KAnonymity value should be at least as large as this value and INFINITE means that
the operation does not invoke any other operations (there are no downstream operations).
In the case of data rules (i.e., Li = data), we consider data resources as atomic. Hence,
the only scope value allowed is total. Partial scope may be assigned only to operations (i.e.,
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Li = operation) and complex data resources (e.g., a data structure). If an operation resource
is assigned a total scope for a given rule, then the whole entry of that operation in the service
log is private. An example privacy rule is R1 = hT1 = Recipient, L1 = Data,D1 =
{public, government, federaltax}, S1 = {total}i
• Privacy Assertion: A privacy assertion A(Ri, rs) is the application of a rule Ri =
hT i, Li,Di, Sii on a resource rs, where rs has a level Li, domain Di, and scope Si. A privacy
assertionA(Ri, rs) on a resource rs determines the granularity of a resource that is subject to
privacy. The granularity g of a resource is determined by the scope Si of a rule. An assertion
on rs according to Ri = hT i, Li,Di, Sii is defined by the pair hpf, gi; pf = di ^ · · · ^ dj
where di, . . . , dj 2 Di; g 2 Si. The assertion A1(R1, patient id) = (government ^
research), for instance states that patientid can be shared with government and research
institutes.
• Privacy Policy: a privacy policy PPi of a service providerWSi is a set of assertions that the
service specifies on the resources that it hosts. For instance, for a Lab service PPLabService =
{A1(R1, patient id) = (government ^ research, total), A2(R2, getLabResult()) =
(federaltax ^ research, total)}.
• Privacy Requirement: clients perceive privacy not only on resources but also on services. For
each service WS, a client C defines a privacy requirement PRC/WS stating C’s assertions
about resources provided by WS. PRC/WS assertions describe two requirements. First, C’s
expectation about how WS will treat the privacy of resources (noted as A(Ri, rsE)) (e.g.,
patient id). Second, C’s practices regarding how C treats the privacy of output data returned
byWS (noted as A(Ri, rsP )) (e.g. test result). Clients may unequally value the assertions
specified in PRC/WS by assigning a weight wj to each A(Ri, rs) in PRC/WS . The weight
is a decimal value between 0 and 1 that determines the importance of the corresponding
assertion. The total of weights assigned to all assertions is equal to 1. We give clients the
possibility to control their privacy requirements by associating a mandatory attribute mj to
each assertion (Aj(Ri, rsk), wj,mj) in PRC/WS .
Subsumption Matching Protocol. We use the notion of privacy subsumption defined in [94] to
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Table 4.2: Domain subsumption relationships
subsumed domain subsuming domain
government public
research public
federal tax public
federal tax government
capture the semantic relationship among domain values. For a set of domains Di={di,dj}, di is
subsumed by dj iff dj is more general than di. For instance, in the set of domains Di={public,
government, federal tax, research} the value public is more general than the other values in Di.
Subsumption can also be generalized to assertions [94]. Two Assertions A(Ri, rs) = (pf, g)
and A(Ri, rs) = (pf, g) are compatible if their is a subsumption between them. Namely, A’ is
subsumed by A (A v A) , if Ri = Ri, rs = rs, g = g, and pf ) pf .
Privacy Preserving Composition Plan. In a service composition plan CP, any serviceWS which
depends on another service WS 0 is considered a consumer of the data provided by WS 0. Thus,
WS can be viewed as a client andWS 0 can be viewed as a provider. We have previously proposed
a Privacy Compatibility Matching PCM algorithm to check the compatibility between the PR
of WS and PP of WS 0. The algorithm considers a CP as privacy compatible if the privacy
compatibility is fully satisfied for all the dependencies among the services in CP. If at least one
dependency in CP has an incompatible assertion then CP violates privacy and is discarded from
CP. Fig. 4.4 depicts a sample CP. The data resource drug DR is an input parameter toWS6,WS7
andWS8, and an output forWS5. Thus, those services depend onWS5 for providing DR.
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Figure 4.4: A sample CP with dependencies.
Privacy Compatibility Matching (PCM) Algorithm. Upon request of a resource rs, the PCM
algorithm extracts the resource rs and the assertions associated with that resource. For full com-
patibility, the algorithm requires that all assertions A in both PRWS and PPWS0 are fully com-
patible. For each A 2 PRWS and A0 2 PPWS0 , the algorithm checks if A subsumes A0 and
returns the set InC of incompatible assertion pairs . The algorithm follows the subsumption pro-
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tocol described above. For instance, for the composition in Fig. 4.4, the PCM algorithm checks
the compatibility of the assertions defined on resource rs = DR in PRWS5 and PPWS6 etc. If
PRWS5 = (A1(R1, DR) = hospital) and PPWS6 = (A01(R1, DR) = researchLab), then the
two assertions are incompatible since hospital is not v researchLab. Hence, PCM adds both asser-
tions to the set of incompatible assertions (i.e., InC = (A1, A10)).
The above check works in the case of total matching. However, some clients may be willing to
use a service even if some of their privacy constraints are not satisfied. To that end, the PCM also
enables partial matching by incorporating the notion of a privacy matching degree. The privacy
matching degree estimates the ratio of client assertions (PRC/WS) that match the service assertions
(PPWS). We refer toM ⇢ PRC/WS as the set of all such PRC/WS assertions. The privacy degree
is mathematically defined as:
Degree(PRC/WS , PPWS) =
X
wj8(Aj(Ri, rsk), wj ,mj) 2M
The threshold ⌧ is provided by a service client and illustrates the minimum value allowed for a
matching degree. The PCM determines that PRC/WS and PPWS are compatible if any of the
following holds:
• The privacy matching degree is above the threshold set by C: Degree(PRC/WS, PPWS)  
⌧ .
• Every non-matched PRC/WS assertion is optional: 8(Aj(Ri, rsk), wj,mj) 2 (PRC/WS  
M) : mj = “False”
4.4 K-Anonymity Based Privacy Compatibility Matching (KPCM)
We extend our Privacy Compatibility Matching (PCM) algorithm to also incorporate k-
anonymity check. Motivated by the notion of K-Anonymity at the relational data table level (Sec-
tion 2.4.1), we leverage that notion to a Web service operation invocation level. Our architecture
is shown in Fig. 4.5.
K-Anonymity at the Operation level: K-Anonymity beyond relational data. Since QIDs can
be indicators of a data owner’s identity (Section 2.4.1, downstream operation invocations can be
indicators of source operation invocations. Analogous to linkability through QIDs, we use des-
tination operation invocations as a basis for calculating K-Anonymity scores. We leverage the
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Figure 4.5: KPCM Architecture.
notion of k-anonymity to the level of Web service operation. We define k-Anonymity of an op-
eration as the value that determines the extent to which an operation invocation can be inferred if
one knows that a downstream operation was invoked. To determine k-anonymity counts, we use
operation invocation route configuration stored in Web Services Conversation Language (WSCL)
definitions.
Definition Let G = {Op1, ..., Opn} be a WSCL graph of n operations. For each source operation
Opi 2 G, there exists a k-anonymity score k if, for each destination (downstream operation), there
are at least k occurrences of that operation. Opi is called k-Anonymous .
To cover all possible invocation scenarios we take into account the cases where all operations
can be invoked (including those that are invoked in the middle), the case where all operations can
be invoked (excluding middle operations), and the case where only end point operations can be
invoked. Next, we explain how we determine K-Anonymity values.
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Table 4.3: Transisitions (left) and all possible routes (right)
Opsrc Opdst
getLab1Results getLab3Results
getLab2Results getLab3Results
getLab3Results getLab4Results
getLab5Results getLab4Results
Opsrc Opdst
getLab1Results getLab3Results
getLab1Results getLab4Results
getLab2Results getLab3Results
getLab2Results getLab4Results
getLab3Results getLab4Results
getLab5Results getLab4Results
Table 4.4: KAnonymity counts for All WSCL Methods can Be called (Pass-Through Methods Counted)
Source Destination KAnon Scope
getLab1Results getLab3Results 2 GTE2
getLab1Results getLab4Results 4 GTE4
getLab2Results getLab3Results 2 GTE2
getLab2Results getLab4Results 4 GTE4
getLab3Results getLab4Results 2 GTE2
getLab5Results getLab4Results 4 GTE4
Calculating k-Anonymity Values. K-Anonymity values are derived based on both WSCL defini-
tions and K-Anonymity types.
• WSCL Definition Selection. First, the transitions are extracted from the WSCL
file (e.g., Table 4.3). Then, for each source and destination combination a row is
added to the table WSCL Transitions. Then, the same information is put onto table
WSCL Transition AllPossibleRoutes. Next, we add additional rows that represent the cases
where the source of one row is equal to the destination of another row. For instance, if the
transitions 1! 3, 3! 4, and 4! 5, are found, then 1!5 is considered as an end-to-end
route. Therefore, a row with the source operation 1 and the destination operation 5 is added
to the table. Table 4.3 indicates all the possible end to end routes derived from the transitions
shown in Table 4.3.
• Determine K-Anonymity Type. The user then selects the desired k-Anonymity type from
the following options:
PTOC - All WSCL Operations Can Be Called (Pass-Through Operations Counted). For
this K-Anonymity type, we first classify the end-to-end routes derived in Table 4.3 by the
number of nodes that they have in the middle (middlemen). Following our running example,
the route 1! 5 consists of three sub routes 1! 3, 3! 4, and 4! 5. In this case, there are
two middlemen: Op3 and Op4. Then for each case, we get a count of all the routes leading
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to the destination of the source operation that we are invoking (count in Table 4.10). Then
we subtract from this count the number of routes that lead to the source operation that we
are invoking (KAnon1 in Table 4.10). For example, from the perspective of Op3, when we
calculate k-Anonymity for an operation to which it leads, we subtract the count of operations
leading to Op3 (i.e. Op1 and Op2) since we need k-Anonymity from the perspective of
Op3. For the 5-Operation WSCL file, these operations can be called: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and
the operations that we pass through are part of the k-Anonymity count. Table 4.4 expands
upon the information in table 4.3, indicating all possible end-to-end routes and k-Anonymity
values.
Table 4.5: WS Privacy Ruleset Items derived from Table 4.4
WS rule item topic level domain scope
1 3 10 k-Anon operation other services GTE2
2 3 10 k-Anon operation other services GTE2
3 3 10 k-Anon operation other services GTE2
4 3 28 k-Anon operation other services INFINITE
5 3 11 k-Anon operation other services GTE4
The rows in Table 4.4 are then added to set of WS Privacy Ruleset Items in order to be
used in Web service assertions later on (Table 4.5). For each source Web service operation
we choose the rows with smallest GTE values, which define the minimum KAnonymity
Privacy Policy Rule Item for each operation. Since these represent KAnonymity rules, we
indicate the topic as “K-Anonymity”, the level as “operation”, and the domain as “other Web
services”.
Table 4.6: KAnonymity counts for All WSCL Operations can Be called (Pass-Through Operations Not Counted)
source destination KAnon scope
getLab1Results getLab3Results 2 GTE2
getLab1Results getLab4Results 3 GTE3
getLab2Results getLab3Results 2 GTE2
getLab2Results getLab4Results 3 GTE3
getLab3Results getLab4Results 2 GTE2
getLab5Results getLab4Results 3 GTE3
PTONC- All WSCL Operations Can Be Called (Pass-Through Operations Not Counted).
For this K-Anonymity type, we start with the set of rows resulting from the PTOC stage
(Table 4.4). Then, as an additional step, we subtract out the number of middlemen from
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the k-Anonymity count for the initial operation (source operation) for each route. For the
5-Operation WSCL file, these operations can be called: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, and the operations
that we pass through are not part of the k-Anonymity count. Table 4.6 expands upon the
information in table 4.3, indicating all possible end-to-end routes and k-Anonymity values.
Table 4.6 represents the set of WS Privacy Ruleset Items that will be used in Web service
assertions.
Table 4.7: WS Privacy Ruleset Items derived from Table 4.6
WS rule item topic level domain scope
1 3 10 k-Anon operation other services GTE2
2 3 10 k-Anon operation other services GTE2
3 3 10 k-Anon operation other services GTE2
4 3 28 k-Anon operation other services INFINITE
5 3 11 k-Anon operation other services GTE3
Table 4.8: KAnonymity counts-Only Endpoint Operations can Be called
source destination KAnon scope
getLab1Results getLab3Results 2 GTE2
getLab1Results getLab4Results 3 GTE3
getLab2Results getLab3Results 2 GTE2
getLab2Results getLab4Results 3 GTE3
getLab5Results getLab4Results 3 GTE3
EPOC- Only Endpoint WSCL Operations Can Be Called. This k-Anonymity type is a subset
of the above case (PTONC), with k-Anonymity values for only endpoint operations. For the
5-Operation WSCL file, these operations can be called: 1, 2, and 5, and operations that we
pass through are not part of the k-Anonymity count. Table 4.8 expands upon the information
in table 4.3, indicating all possible end-to-end routes and k-Anonymity values. Table 4.8
represents the set of WS Privacy Ruleset Items that will be used in Web service assertions.
Table 4.9: WS Privacy Ruleset Items derived from Table 4.8
WS rule rule item topic level domain scope
1 rule 3 10 k-Anonymity operation other services GTE2
2 rule 3 10 k-Anonymity operation other services GTE2
5 rule 3 11 k-Anonymity operation other services GTE3
4.4.1 K-Anonymity Based PCM (KPCM)
Following the above scenario, before a Web service operation can be called (e.g.,
getLab1Results() on WS1), the KPCM algorithm is invoked (Algorithm. 5). The KPCM
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algorithm takes as input a Web serviceWSi and an operation (Opj). The algorithm first retrieves
the client assertions array PRC/WS from the client database. A call is then made to retrieve the
Web service assertions array PPWS for the specified operation. Then the system goes through
each assertion in both arrays looking for mismatches. The matching check occurs on mandatory
items in each assertion A including the following:
• Resource R: Client PR Practices and WS PP Expectations are treated as special cases.
• Rule Topic, Level, Scope: As defined in Client PR and Web service PP; need full match. If
scope is “k-Anonymity” a special check is performed by calling theK AnonymityCheck
algorithm. TheKPCM algorithm extracts the WSCL transitions table TR from the WSCL
file (e.g., Table 4.3) and passes it to theKAnonymityCheck algorithm.
• Domain: a check is performed per propositional formula. For the domain, a full, partial or no
match may be required. If there is no direct match, the algorithm checks for a subsumption
match by calling the SubsumptionMatchProtocol algorithm.
Algorithm 5 KPCM
1: inputWSi, Opj
2: output: match
3: PR  , PP   , A0   , compatible true
4: PR GETPRIVACYREQUIREMENTARRAY
5: PP  GETPRIVACYPOLICYARRAY(WSi, Opj)
6: for each Ai in PR do
7: for each Aj in PP do
8: ifMi then
9: if Ai[rs] == Aj [rs] & Ai[R][T ] == Aj [R][T ] & Ai[R][L] == Aj [R][L] & Ai[R][S] ==
Aj [R][S] then
10: if Ai[R][S] =0 KAnonymity0 then
11: TR GETWSCLTRANSACTIONS
12: KANONYMITYCHECK(TR, type)
13: end if
14: if Ai[D]! = Aj [D] then
15: SUBSUMPTIONMATCHPROTOCOL(Ai, Aj)
16: end if
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: return compatible
If a mismatch is found, a false compatibility trigger is returned together with the set of assertions
A0 that are incompatible. If there is compatibility, the desired web service operation is called. For
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Table 4.10: K-Anonymity values for the WSCL configuration in Table 4.3
WS Opsrc Opdes midmen count KAnon1 KAnon2 KAnon3
1 1 3 0 2 2 2 2
1 1 4 1 4 4 3 3
2 2 3 0 2 2 2 2
2 2 4 1 4 4 3 3
3 3 4 0 4 2 2 0
5 5 4 0 4 4 4 4
example, a service privacy policy array may include the assertions:
PP Servicelab = A1(R1, patientid), A2(R2, getLabResult)
, where A1(R1, patientid) = (gov ^ research, total),
and A2(R2, getLabResult) = (fedtax ^ research, total)
The KAnonymityCheck algorithm (Algorithm 6) takes as input a WSCL transitions table
(TR[Op1, ..., Opn]) and a previously configured kanonymity type (PTMC,PTMNC,EPMC).
The algorithms first generates the end-to-end routes table (TRroutes). To generate TRroutes the
algorithm copies all the rows from TR to TRroutes. It then adds additional rows that represent the
cases where the source of one row is equal to the destination of another row (Table 4.3). Then, for
each row in TRroutes, it calculates the midmen, the count, and based on the selected type, it gener-
ates the kanon count and appends the newly created row to a new table TRKAnon with k-anonymity
counts included. The algorithm returns the table TRKAnon.
4.5 Private Web Service Outsourcing Approach
In this section, we present our approach, including the system architecture (Section 4.5.2). We
also provide two definitions of K-Anonymity: at the operation level (Section 4.5.3) and at the
business process level (Section 4.5.4) and the K-Anonymity score calculation in each case. Then,
we introduce uncertain operation invocation precedence graphs in Section 4.5.9, the different K-
Anonymity types in Section 4.5.7, and the K-Anonymity check algorithm. Finally, we explain how
all of that fits into our model for private service outsourcing.
4.5.1 Running Example
We consider the case of a composite service CS in which the invocation of an operation may
result in the execution of part of a process that includes various activities. We look into several
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Algorithm 6 KAnonymityCheck
1: input TR, type
2: output: TRKAnon
3: row   , TRroutes   , TRKAnon   , count 0,KAnon 0, scope INFINITE
4: TRroutes  TRroutes [ TR
5: for each rowi in TR do
6: for each rowj in TR do
7: if rowi[Opdst] == rowj [Opsrc] then
8: row  (rowi[Opsrc], rowj [Opdst])
9: TRroutes  TRroutes [ row
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: for each rowi in TRroutes do
14: for each rowj in TRroutes do
15: if rowi[Opdst] == rowj [Opdst] then
16: count count+ 1
17: end if
18: if type == PTOC then
19: KAnon count
20: end if
21: if type == PTONC then
22: KAnon count midmen
23: end if
24: if type == EPOC then
25: KAnon count midmen
26: end if
27: Scope KAnon
28: row  row [KAnon [ Scope
29: TRKAnon  TRKAnon [ row
30: end for
31: end for
32: return TRKAnon
outsourcing instances from the perspective of one process as well as different process within CS.
Assume that, given that a process BPi has outsourced to a provider WSi as part of a business
process execution route, an adversary would like to guess (with probability p) how likely that the
same outsourcing had occurred in other processes or other routes within the same process, and to
which providers a process has outsourced.
We look into the cases where a process may outsource to the same provider or to different
providers. We also look into the cases where an outsourcing occurred in two routes in two pro-
cesses or two routes within the same process. A process may or may not go down a certain route
(due to a conditional activity for example), but in each route it may outsource certain operations.
In each process, we classify operations as either outsourced or inhouse. Fig 4.2 depicts a com-
posite service CS1 that uses an orchestration model of two business processes. The invocation
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graph shows that both processes outsource to similar services. The problem occurs when different
competitors, attempt to monitor the outsourcing behavior of each other and infer to whom other
competitors are outsourcing or whom they are partnering with.
Listing 4.3 shows a BPEL configuration representing a scenario in which there are three Web
service providers, A, B, and C that outsource to a client, who requests access to a customers data
from each service in order to accomplish subsequent outsourced activities. Table. 4.1 explains
each activity. One practical example of this could be several telemarketing companies (clients)
requesting customer data access from several bank services. The example below shows one process
and one client.
4.5.2 System Architecture
The proposed approach can be utilized either by developers and service administrators at de-
sign time or by the composition engine at runtime (Fig. 4.6). At design time, a developer designs
an application that involves composition. At deploy time, the service admins implement the Web
service logic and deploys it to the registry. They also specify the different parameters used by
the K-Anonymity check algorithm, including K-Anonymity types. K-Anonymity types account
for three different possible invocation scenarios on an operation invocation precedence graph.
Namely, PTOC (All Operations Can Be Called (Pass-Through Operations Counted), PTONC (All
Operations Can Be Called (Pass-Through Operations Not Counted)), and EPOC (Only Endpoint
Operations Can Be Called) as we shall explain later.
At run-time, the composition engine parses BPEL or WSCL definitions for operation invo-
cations depending on the composition style applied. Since in BPEL activities represent units of
processing, the algorithm parses the BPEL definition and instead of getting all the operations it
tracks the invoke and receive activities. Different processes interact with each other via partner
link ports. It tracks partner links as indicators of the WSDL services with which processes inter-
act and may involve outsourcing. It relies on language constructs at an individual process level
to handle all possible scenarios. It parses Process execution flows of each process of CS looking
for operation invocations including both inhouse and outsourced ones. It differentiates between
inhouse and outsourced operations using partner links.
78
 !%
 
!
 # 
 

 !

%!%
)
&
	&
*
 ! 
%!%  
   ! 

	 	
%
 !
 (
$$ 
 
&)
+&''&
*&
))+&&*&&)+&&**
#
 ! 
  "! 
  "! 


	
Figure 4.6: A framework for private Web service outsourcing.
4.5.3 K-Anonymity At the Operation Invocation Level (Revisited)
We leverage the notion of k-anonymity to the level of Web service operation. We define k-
Anonymity of an operation as the value that determines the extent to which an operation invocation
can be inferred if one knows that a downstream operation was invoked. To determine k-anonymity
scores, we use operation invocation route configuration stored in Operation Invocation Precedence
Graph (OIPG) definitions (e.g., WSCL).
Definition LetG = (Op, TR) be be a directed operation invocation precedence graph, OIPG, that
consists of n operations (vertices),Op, andm transitions (edges), TR. Each vertex is an operation
2 Op and each edge is a pair of source/destination operations (Opi, Opj) where Opi, Opj 2 Op.
For each source operation Opi 2 TR, there exists a k-anonymity score k if, for each destination
(downstream) operationOpj ofOpi, there are at least another k 1 occurrences of that operation.
Opi is called k-Anonymous with respect to Opj .
Definition An end point operation in an OIPG is an operation that is not invoked by any other
operations or that does not invoke a downstream operation.
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4.5.4 K-Anonymity At the Business Process Level
We define K-Anonymity as the extent to which outsourcing an operation (by a service) in one
process (route) can be inferred if one knows that an outsourcing of that operation has occurred in
another process. Formally:
Definition Let G be a graph with several components Gi, . . . , Gn corresponding to a set of
business processes BP = {BP1, . . . , BPn} in a composite service CS. Each component
Gi consists of a subset of invoke activities corresponding to inhouse Web service operations
Op = {Opi,1, . . . , Opi,m} in BPi, and another that corresponds to outsourced operations OS =
{OS1, . . . , OSw} in BPi. For each process BPi 2 BP there exists a k-anonymity score k with
respect to an outsourced operation OSw, if for that outsourced operation there exists at least k  1
other outsourcing occurrences of that operation. There exists also a score k with respect to an
inhouse operation Opi,j , if for that operation there exists at least another k 1 occurrences of that
operation. BPi is called k-Anonymous with respect to OSw or Opi,j .
4.5.5 K-Anonymity Score calculation for Inhouse Operations
To determine k-anonymity scores, we do the following:
Table 4.11: TR table (left) from the graph in Fig. 4.2 and TEERouts table derived from it.
Opi Opj
Op1 Op3
Op2 Op3
Op3 Op4
Op3 Op5
Op6 Op5
Op5 Op7
Op8 Op7
Op9 Op7
Opi Opj
Op1 Op3
Op2 Op3
Op3 Op4
Op3 Op5
Op6 Op5
Op5 Op7
Op8 Op7
Op9 Op7
Op1 Op5
Op2 Op5
Op2 Op5
Op3 Op7
Op6 Op7
Op6 Op7
Op6 Op7
Op6 Op7
• For each CS, for each BP, the algorithm generates source/destination operation transitions by
parsing transitions in WSCL files (Table 4.11) or invoke activities in execution flows defined
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in BPEL files (Table 4.12).
• From those transition tables, the algorithm generates a table of all possible end-to-end routes
TEERouts (Tables 4.11 and 4.12).
• Each end-to-end route is then classified based on the number of intermediate operations
along each source-destination path. Classes could be 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. depending on
the number of intermediate operations (column midmen, Table A.3 ). For example, in the
9-Operation WSCL graph in Fig. 4.2, the route Op1 ! Op7 consists of three sub routes
Op1 ! Op3, Op3 ! Op5, and Op5 ! Op7. Thus, there are two middlemen: Op3 and Op5.
So, this route falls under the 2-middlemen class.
• Then for each source/destination operation transition Opi ! Opj , the algorithm calculates
a count of all the routes leading to the destination Opj of the source operation being invoked
(|TOpjRouts |). For example, for Op1,1 ! Op1,5 in Fig. 4.2, |TOpjRouts | for Op1,5 is 1 (column
|TOpjRouts |, Table A.3).
• To find the K-Anonymity score k, the algorithm subtracts from |TOpjRouts | the number of
routes that lead to the destination through that source operation |TOpiRouts |.
Algorithm 7MidmenClassSupression
1: /*search for the row in EERoutes that has midmenOp as source and Opj as destination and they have a direct link*/
2: for each rowi in TREERoutes do
3: if rowi[midmen] > 0 then
4: for each op in rowi[midmenOp] do
5: for each rowj in TREERoutes do
6: if op == rowj [Opi] AND rowi[Opj ] == rowj [Opj ] AND rowj [midmen] == 0 then
7: /*mark that row for supression*/
8: rowj [Opi] =0 S0
9: rowj [Opj ] =0 S0
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: end if
14: end for
4.5.6 K-Anonymity Score Calculation for Outsourced Operations
To calculate K-Anonymity scores for outsourced operations, we take the Business process BPi
into account, in selecting the end-to-end routes to consider for the K-Anonymity score calculation
of an outsourced operation. The reason for this is that an outsourced operation is common between
the two processes, which may produce excessively more routes (thus introduce negative number of
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OIPG OIPG with 1 midman supression
Opi Opj midmen midman Op Opi Opj
1 3 0 1 3
1 4 1 3 1 4
1 5 1 3 1 5
1 7 2 3,5 1 7
2 3 0 2 3
2 4 1 3 2 4
2 5 1 3 2 5
2 7 2 3,5 2 7
3 4 0 S S
3 5 0 S S
3 7 1 5 3 7
routes). An inhouse operation (e.g., Op1,1), on the other hand, is local to the current process (e.g.,
BP1). For each outsourced operation, the score is k if there are at least k   1 routes pointing to
that operation in another process (k occurrences of that operation). We generate two counts: one
count from the perspective ofOSi as a destination and one from the perspective ofOSi as a source.
Table 4.14 explains how K-Anonymity scores are calculated.
In our running example (Table 4.1), an competitor may be interested in the possibility that a
competitor service provider had outsourced operation OS2. They can use the fact that the provider
had invoked Op2,1 to infer that the competitor outsourced OS2. In this case, the operation OS2
is 2-Anonymous, since it could have been invoked through at least two other routes, which is an
indicator that at least two other providers have outsourced that operation.
4.5.7 K-Anonymity Types
In this section, we describe the three K-Anonymity types used by the algorithm to generate K-
Anonymous (Uncertain) operation invocation precedence graphs, and the K scores or uncertainties
associated with each. We apply the same calculations to both operation level and business process
level K-Anonymity.
PTOC - All Operations Can Be Called (Pass-Through Operations Counted). For this K-
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Table 4.12: Transitions table (left) from the graph in Fig. 4.2 and TEERouts table derived from it.
CS BP Opi Opj
1 1 1,1 1,5
1 1 1,1 OS1
1 1 1,1 1,6
1 1 1,5 OS2
1 1 1,5 1,6
1 1 OS2 1,6
1 1 1,6 2,1
1 2 2,1 OS2
1 2 2,1 2,3
1 2 2,1 OS1
1 2 OS1 2,4
1 2 OS2 2,2
1 2 2,2 2,4
1 2 2,3 OS1
CS BP OPi Opj
1 1 1,1 1,5
1 1 1,1 OS1
1 1 1,1 1,6
1 1 1,5 OS2
1 1 1,5 1,6
1 1 OS2 1,6
1 1 1,5 1,6
1 2 2,1 OS2
1 2 2,1 2,3
1 2 2,1 OS1
1 2 OS1 2,4
1 2 OS2 2,2
1 2 2,2 2,4
1 2 2,3 OS1
1 1 1,1 OS2
1 1 1,1 OS2
1 1 1,1 OS2
1 1 1,1 1,6
1 2 2,1 2,4
1 2 2,1 2,4
1 2 2,1 2,4
1 2 2,1 OS1
Anonymity type, we consider all operation invocations, including the intermediate operations that
lead to the destination (i.e., middlemen). For the 9-Operation WSCL file, the following operations
can be called: Op1, Op2, Op3, Op4, Op5, Op6, Op7, Op8, and Op9 and the operations that we pass
through are part of the k-Anonymity score (column kPTOC , Table 4.13). Similarly, for the BPEL
in Fig. 4.2, the PTOC k scores are shown in Table A.3.
PTONC- All Operations Can Be Called (Pass-Through Operations Not Counted). For this K-
Anonymity type, we start with the set of rows resulting from the PTOC stage (kPTOC , Table 4.13
or kPTOC , Table A.3). Then, as an additional step, we subtract the number of middlemen from
the k-Anonymity score for the source operation Opi for each route. The number of middlemen
corresponds to the intermediary nodes that lead from Opi to Opj , and does not include the in-
termediary nodes that lead to Opj through other source operations. For the 9-Operation WSCL
file, the following operations can be called: Op1, Op2, Op3, Op4, Op5, Op6, Op7, Op8, and Op9,
and the operations that we pass through are not part of the k-Anonymity score (column kPTONC ,
Table 4.13). For example, in calculating k score for Op1 in the invocation Op1 ! Op4, we exclude
the route that passes through Op3 from Op1 but not the route that passes through Op3 from Op2.
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Table 4.13: K-Anonymity scores derived from the WSCL configuration in Table 4.11
Opi Opj midmen |TOpiRouts | |TOpjRouts | kPTOC kPTONC kOEOC
1 3 0 0 2 2 2 2
1 4 1 0 3 3 2 2
1 5 1 0 4 4 3 3
1 7 2 0 7 7 5 5
2 3 0 0 2 2 2 2
2 4 1 0 3 3 2 2
2 5 1 0 4 4 3 3
2 7 2 0 7 7 5 5
3 4 0 2 3 1 1 -
3 5 0 2 4 2 2 -
3 7 1 2 7 5 4 -
5 7 0 4 7 3 3 -
6 5 0 0 4 4 4 4
6 7 1 0 7 7 6 6
8 7 0 0 7 7 7 7
9 7 0 0 7 7 7 7
Similarly, for the BPEL in Fig. 4.2, kPTONC scores are shown in Table A.3.
EPOC- Only Endpoint Operations Can Be Called. This k-Anonymity type is a subset
of the above case (PTONC), with k-Anonymity values for only endpoint operations. For
the 9-Operation WSCL transactions in Fig. 4.2, only the following operations can be called:
Op1, Op2, Op4, Op6, Op8, and Op9, and operations that we pass through are not part of the k-
Anonymity score (column k EPOC, Table 4.13). Similarly, for the BPEL in Fig. 4.2, only
Op1,1, Op1,6, and OS1 in BP1 and Op2,1, Op2,4 in BP2 can be invoked. The kEPOC scores are
shown in Table A.3.
4.5.8 K-Anonymity as a Measure of Uncertainty
We use k-Anonymity as a measure of uncertainty. The higher the K-Anonymity score the higher
the uncertainty and the more private the invocation. Recall from our scenario, since some diseases
can be inferred form the price of their medicine (e.g., cancer), the operation getPrice(medicine)
can be considered a private resource, since knowing that this operation has been invoked can reveal
that getMedicine() has been invoked. Similarly, getMedicine() can reveal that getDisease() has
been invoked (Fig. 4.7). However, if at least one more operation getMedicine() has been invoked,
the probability of knowing that getMedicine has been invoked through getDisease() becomes
50%, which increases the uncertainty.
Definition A transition table TR consists of a multiset of source/destination pairs. An equivalence
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Table 4.14: K-Anonymity scores derived from the BPEL configuration in Table 4.12
CS BP Opi OpType Opj OpType midmen |TOpjRouts | |TOpiRouts | PTOC PTONC OEOCk k k
1 1 1,1 inhouse 1,5 inhouse 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1,1 inhouse OS1 outsourced 0 4 0 4 4 4
1 1 1,1 inhouse 1,6 inhouse 0 4 0 4 4 4
1 1 1,5 inhouse OS2 outsourced 0 5 1 4 4 -
1 1 1,5 inhouse 1,6 inhouse 0 4 1 3 3 -
1 1 OS2 outsourced 1,6 inhouse 0 4 5
1 1 1,5 inhouse 1,6 inhouse 0 4 1 3 3 -
1 2 2,1 inhouse OS2 outsourced 0 5 0 5 5 5
1 2 2,1 inhouse 2,3 inhouse 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 2 2,1 inhouse OS1 outsourced 0 4 0 4 4 4
1 2 OS1 outsourced 2,4 inhouse 0 5 4 1 1 1
1 2 OS2 outsourced 2,2 inhouse 0 1 5
1 2 2,2 inhouse 2,4 inhouse 1 5 1 4 3 -
1 2 2,3 inhouse OS1 outsourced 1 4 1 3 2 -
1 1 1,1 inhouse OS2 outsourced 1 5 0 5 4 4
1 1 1,1 inhouse OS2 outsourced 2 5 0 5 3 3
1 1 1,1 inhouse OS2 outsourced 1 5 0 5 4 4
1 1 1,1 inhouse 1,6 inhouse 1 6 0 6 5 5
1 1 1,1 inhouse 1,6 inhouse 2 6 0 6 4 -
1 2 2,1 inhouse 2,4 inhouse 1 5 0 5 4 4
1 2 2,1 inhouse 2,4 inhouse 2 5 0 5 3 3
1 2 2,1 inhouse 2,4 inhouse 2 5 0 5 3 3
1 2 2,1 inhouse OS1 inhouse 1 4 0 4 3 3
class for TR with respect to Opj is the set of all pairs in TR containing identical values Opj .
Definition K-Anonymity property states that Table TR is k-anonymous with respect to Opi, Opj
if every unique pair (Opj) in TR occurs at least k times. That is, the size of each equivalence class
in TR with respect to Opj is at least k.
We explain how the algorithm generates a probability (uncertainty) table depending on the k
score for each operation. We can group the Opj invocations in TREERoutes table into equivalence
classes based on the source operation Opi. Then, we calculate the probability of a destination
operationOpj leading to (can be an indicator of)Opi based on the other operations that also lead to
Opi. Thus, from the perspective of the ith operation in TEERoutes, the probability Pr(Opj ! Opi)
can be calculated as follows:
Pr(Opj ! Opi) = 1/|TOpj!Opi |
where TOpj!Opi is the table of only the routes that has Opi as their source operation. For instance,
in Table 4.12, Pr(Opj = 1, 5 ! Opi = 1, 1) = 1/7 (14%) since there are 7 routes of it’s
equivalence class 1,1. Similarly, Pr(Opj = OS1 ! Opi = 1, 1) = 1/7, Pr(Opj = OS2 !
85

	


	


	



	



	

 
	
 	


	

 	

	
 	


	

 	

	
 	

	
 	

    

 

 		

      
      
      
      
      
      
Figure 4.7: K-Anonymity as uncertainty from our scenario.
Opi = 1, 1) = 3/7, and Pr(Opj = 1, 6 ! Opi = 1, 1) = 2/7. Thus, for any equivalence class
Opi, we can generalize the probability of knowing that Opi was invoked given that an operation
Opdst has been invoked to the formula:
Pr(Opdst ! Opsrc) = 1
n
⇥
nX
s=1
Pr(Opdst ! Opi), where n is the size of the equivalence class
The resulting probability values represent uncertainty in detecting that an invocation occurred
in a route given that an invocation had occurred in another route (Table A.3). If an invocation
involves a single service/process invocation, an adversary can deduce with certainty 100% that an
invocation or an outsourcing had occurred. However, if at least two processes are involved, then
the probability will be 50%, and the uncertainty increases.
4.5.9 Anonymous (Uncertain) Operation Invocation Precedence Graph
We introduce the notion of an operation precedence graph as a generic abstraction for model-
ing relationships between Web service operation invocations in standards like BPEL and WSCL.
We add the calculated uncertainty values as labels on the precedence graph edges to produce an
uncertain precedence graph. Fig. 4.8 shows the precedence graph for the 9-Operation WSCL with
uncertainty values added to edges. Figures. 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 depict the precedence graph from
our running example corresponding to the PTOC, PTONC, and OEOC K-Anonymity types, re-
spectively. The graph includes uncertainty values on edges. For instance, the operation OS2 is
2 Anonymous, so this leaves the adversary with 50% uncertainty (two outsourcing invocations)
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Table 4.15: Different Equivalence classes in TREERoutes and their sizes (Derived from Table A.3).
equivalence class size
Opi Opj
Op1 Op3 2
Op1 Op5
Op2 Op5 3
Op2 Op5
Op2 Op3
Op3 Op7 3
Op3 Op4
Op3 Op5
Op5 Op7 1
Op6 Op7 5
Op6 Op7
Op6 Op7
Op6 Op7
Op6 Op5
Op8 Op7 1
Op9 Op7 1
Table 4.16: Routes in the Opi = 1, 1 Equivalence class (derived from Table 4.14)
CS BP Opi Opj
1 1 1,1 1,5
1 1 1,1 OS1
1 1 1,1 1,6
1 1 1,1 OS2
1 1 1,1 OS2
1 1 1,1 OS2
1 1 1,1 1,6
about the exact same process that outsourced the operation.
The uncertainty values on the precedence graph introduce several observations:
Observation 1 The uncertainty decreases by excluding the routes leading to the source operation
for which we calculate the K-Anonymity score. Since we calculate K-Anonymity from the per-
spective of the an outsourced operation by counting the number of other routes that lead to it’s
destination, we subtract the number of those routes that lead to the operation itself. For example,
by subtracting the two routes that lead to the outsourced operation OS2 (Table A.3), the score
Table 4.17: Routes in the OS1 Equivalence class (derived from Table 4.14).
CS BP Opi Opj
1 1 1,1 OS1
1 2 2,1 OS1
1 2 2,3 OS1
1 2 2,1 OS1
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Table 4.18: Uncertainty probabilities derived from the End-To-End Routes table TEERouts (Table 4.12)
CS BP Opi Opj |TOpj!Opi | Pr(Opj ! Opi) Pr(Opdst ! Opi)
1 1 1,1 1,5 7 1/7 7/49
1 1 1,1 OS1 7 1/7 7/49
1 1 1,1 1,6 7 1/7 7/49
1 1 1,5 OS2 2 1/3 3/9
1 1 1,5 1,6 2 1/3 3/9
1 1 OS2 1,6 2 1/2 2/4
1 1 1,5 1,6 2 1/3 3/9
1 2 2,1 OS2 3 1/3 7/21
1 2 2,1 2,3 3 1/3 7/21
1 2 2,1 OS1 3 1/3 7/21
1 2 OS1 2,4 1 1 1
1 2 OS2 2,2 2 1/2 2/4
1 2 2,2 2,4 1 1 1
1 2 2,3 OS1 1 1 1
1 1 1,1 OS2 7 1/7 7/49
1 1 1,1 OS2 7 1/7 7/49
1 1 1,1 OS2 7 1/7 7/49
1 1 1,1 1,6 7 1/7 7/49
1 2 2,1 2,4 3 1/3 7/21
1 2 2,1 2,4 3 1/3 7/21
1 2 2,1 2,4 3 1/3 7/21
1 2 2,1 OS1 3 1/3 7/21
reduces from 4 to 2 which decreases the uncertainty from 25% to 50% thus increases the privacy
risk.
Observation 2 The uncertainty varies from route to another. For instance, in Table A.3, operation
OS1 has three scores corresponding to operations Op1,1, Op2,1, and Op2,3. In particular, it is 4-
Anonymous (25% uncertainty) with respect to operationsOp1,1 andOp2,1 (since at least four other
routes exist), while it is 3-Anonymous (33% uncertainty) with respect to Op2,3. So, the route that
passes through Op2,3 is more private. The algorithm uses the lower uncertainty percentage as a
threshold to guarantee a private composition. The notion of K-Anonymity threshold is explained
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Figure 4.8: Operation precedence graphs for the three K-Anonymity types with uncertainties added to edge labels.
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Figure 4.9: Operation precedence graph (PTOC) with uncertainties added to edge labels.
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in detail in Sec. 4.5.11.
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Figure 4.11: Operation precedence graph (OEOC) with uncertainties added to edge labels.
Observation 3 The uncertainty value depends on the K-Anonymity type.
For instance, the graphs in Figures. 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 depict that the uncertainty decreases as we
move from the K-Anonymity type PTOC to PTONC and from PTONC to OEOC. The reason for
this is that when we move from PTOC to PTONC we limit the invocations to only direct invoca-
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tions, so we exclude some edges (e.g., the indirect edge from Op1,1 ! Op1,6). The uncertainty
calculations exclude the routes that go through the middlemen that lead from Opi to Opj , and
includes only the routes that pass through the middlemen that lead to Opj through other source op-
erations. For instance in the precedence graph of the 9-Operation WSCL (Fig. 4.8), the uncertainty
for the invocation Op1 ! Op4 decreases (33% to 50%) since it excludes the route that passes
throughOp3 fromOp1 and considers only the indirect route that passes throughOp3 fromOp2 and
the direct route Op3 ! Op4. Same thing applies to the graphs corresponding to the BPEL graphs.
Fig. 4.10 highlights the invocation edges that are included in the uncertainty value calculation for
some operation pairs (e.g., Op1,1 ! Op1,6). Also, when we move from PTONC to OEOC we
get limit the number of operations that can be invoked, so we exclude some operations. Fig. 4.11
highlights the operation nodes that are included in the uncertainty value calculation.
4.5.10 K-Anonymity Check Algorithm (Revisited)
For a composite serviceCSi in which an invocationOp0 initiates a business processBPj , the K-
Anonymity check algorithm (Algorithm 8) generates a transitions table TR from the execution flow
in BPj . Then, it traverses the resulting table to produce TREERoutes. The algorithm initializes k
score of all operations to 0 and the corresponding thresholds to1. Then, it iterates the TREERoutes
table, and for each operation the algorithm calculates k. It then selects the minimum value of k as
a threshold.
Table 4.19: Example of K-Anonymity rules that can be applied to Web service definitions.
WSi BPi Opsrc Opdst input output KAnon type level operation type Threshold
CS1 1 Op1,1 OS1 d1 d2,d3 PLOC process outsourced GTE2
CS1 1 Op1,2 Op1,4 d2 d5 PTONC process in house GTE2
CS1 1 Op1,3 Op1,1 d6 d7 EPOC process in house GTE2
CS1 2 Op2,4 Op2,2 d1 d2 EPOC process in house 1
CS1 2 Op2,5 Op2,1 d7 d8 PTOC process in house GTE4
CS2 - Op1 Op2 d1 d5,d6 PLOC operation - GTE3
CS2 - Op2 - d2,d8 d3,d4 PTONC operation - GTE2
CS2 - Op3 Op1 d1,d2,d4 d9,d3 EPOC operation - GTE2
CS3 - Op1 Op2 d1 d4,d7 - data - -
CS3 - Op4 Op2 - d1,d2,d3 - data - -
4.5.11 Private Web Service Outsourcing Model
After deriving k-anonymity scores, we can incorporate them into rules that govern the usage
of business processes or operations for each composite service in the system. Table 4.19 shows a
sample set of rules. According to our model, we define the following:
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• Privacy level: resources could be data (BPEL variables or operation parameters), BPEL
business processes, or WSCL operations.
• Operation type: in addition to privacy level being operation, we add the operation type as
{outsourced,inhouse} to indicate whether the invoked operation is local to the Web service
or is an outsourced operation invoked on an external Web service.
• K-Anonymity threshold: Unlike traditional K-Anonymity, our approach accounts for all pos-
sible invocation routes, so one operation can have two different K-Anonymity scores with
respect to two different source (invoking) operations along a certain route. Moreover, those
scores vary within the same business process as well as across different processes. For
instance, in the BPEL example in Table A.3, OS1 has two scores corresponding to opera-
tions Op1,1, Op2,1, and Op2,3. In particular, it is 4 anonymous with respect to operations
Op1,1 and Op2,1 since at least four other routes exist, while it is 3 anonymous with respect
to Op2,3. Thus, our algorithm traverses the scores and determines a threshold value based
GTEX based on the minimum scoremin(k). Thus, a service admin can choose among the
set {GTE1, GTE2, GTE3, GTE4, GTE5, GTE6, GTE7, GTE8, GTE9, GTE10,1}.
Thresholds indicate that the K-Anonymity value should be at least as large as this value.
1 means that the operation does not invoke any downstream operations.
4.6 Prototype Implementation
The proposed K-Anonymity check algorithm can be incorporated into any service composition
middleware. It could be integrated either in a composition development environment to assist
developers during process design by performing compile-time process validation or in a run-time
environment (composition engine) to perform run-time validation during process execution. We
provide two implementations of our framework.
4.6.1 Design-time Validation System
We implemented the first system in Microsoft Visual C sharp using Visual Studio 2010. We
used ASP.Net for our web application and Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) for Web
service implementation. We used ASP.Net Development Server to deploy our Web application
and Web services and we used SQL Server 2008 to store our database. Both SOAP and WSDL
protocols were used. The prototype consists of the following subviews:
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Main console is where the K-Anonymity check is performed. Through this view the user selects a
Composite service, then all the business process that comprise the composition in that service are
displayed. From those processes, the user can execute a composition. The system populates the
K-Anonymity scores table for each operation. The results of the K-Anonymity check as well as the
results of the composition are then displayed. For each operation in the table, the user is presented
with information on whether there is an indicator of outsourcing in other routes. It also indicates
the uncertainty.
Admin console on the Web service side allows the user to select a BPEL file and a k-Anonymity
type. The file is then parsed and used together with the K-Anonymity type to calculate k-
Anonymity scores for each of the defined operations. The system displays the results as well
as the precedence graph of operation invocations.
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Figure 4.12: Prototype main view
Home (default) view is where compatibility check between PR and PP is performed. Through this
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view the user selects a Web service, then all the operations for that service are displayed along with
the corresponding parameters (Fig. 4.12, A). The user then enters the comma-delimited parameters
and clicks submit (Fig. 4.12, B). Then the system populates client assertions array from the client
database as well as the Web service assertions array for the specified operation. Then the system
goes through each item in both arrays, looking for matches. The results of the compatibility check
(Fig. 4.12, C) as well as the results of invoking the selected operation (Fig. 4.12, D) are then dis-
played. For each client item, the user is presented with information on whether there is an overall
match or overall mismatch, and whether the matching is mandatory or non-mandatory; topic, level,
resource, domain and scope, and client-specified weight are also shown. It also indicates whether
simple or complex subsumption match was performed depending on the domain. Special output
Messages from compatibility checks include:
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Figure 4.13: K-Anonymity compatibility messages
• K-Anonymity compatibility checks: in this case, three results can be returned depending on
the WS and client scope values (Fig. 4.13). A match is returned if k-Anonymity scopes are
identical or if a client’s k-Anonymity scope is less than that of WS. A mismatch is returned
if client’s k-Anonymity scope is greater than that of WS.
• Threshold compatibility checks: if the Web service privacy matching degree is less than the
threshold specified by the client, a mismatch is reported. In this case, the user is prompted
to resubmit with three options. First, is to make a change in the area(s) of incompatibility
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(i.e., client side assertions or threshold level) and resubmit without determining the GUID
“Unique Identifier for Resubmission” value. This tells the system that the incentive is not
desired. For example, the user can change the client threshold amount by entering a value
in the field “Client Threshold (0 to 1)”. Second, is to make a change in the area(s) of in-
compatibility, provide the GUID, and resubmit. This tells the system that the incentive is
desired. Third, is to leave the areas of incompatibility unchanged, provide the GUID and
submit in order to be presented with a different incentive retrieved from the Web service
database. If incompatible again, another offer is made. The user can continue to resubmit
until all incentives stored in the WS database are exhausted and no more offers are made.
WSCL Admin view on the Web service side allows the user to select a WSCL file and a k-
Anonymity type (Fig. 4.14, A). The WSCL file is then parsed and used together with the K-
Anonymity type to calculate k-Anonymity scores for each of the defined operations. The system
displays the results as well as a choreography of operation interactions and transitions (Fig. 4.14,
B).
!
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Figure 4.14: WSCL admin view
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Table 4.20: Examples of Web Service and Client Assertions. W and M are only in the case of client assertions.
WS operation resource W ⇤ M⇤ R T L D S
1 getLab1Res get lab results 0.1 No 1 recipient data public total
1 getLab1Res get lab results 0.1 Yes 3 K-Anon op services GTE2
1 getLab1Res patient id 0.1 Yes 1 recipient data govrnmt total
1 getLab1Res test results EXP 0.1 No 1 recipient data govrnmt total
1 getLab1Res test results PR 0.1 Yes 1 recipient data research total
2 getLab2Res get lab results 0.2 yes 2 recipient op public partial
2 getLab2Res get lab results 0.1 yes 3 K-Anon op services GTE1
3 getLab3Res get lab results 0.2 yes 2 recipient op public partial
3 getLab3Res get lab results 0.1 yes 3 K-Anon op services GTE4
Client and Web Service Reference View serves as a client and WS assertion configuration panel.
Each Web service provides the user with the ability to select from a set of preferences whenever
they want to add aWS PP Assertion or a Client PR Assertion (which is identical to a WS assertion
except for the mandatory flag M and the weight W ) (Table 4.20). The newly added row then
becomes available in the lists of client PR and WS PP views .
Client Privacy Requirements (PR) view is located on the client side. Using this view, a user first
selects from the full set of privacy rule constituent items that can be assigned to a client, assuming
these choices have been added via the Client and WS Preference view. When an individual item
is chosen, it is added to the list of entitled privacy rule items for that client. Items on this list are
now available to be used in client assertions (PRs). One can add to the list of Client Assertions by
selecting a client privacy rule item, the Web service, and the desired operation. The set of client
assertions is later compared with Assertions for WS via the Home (default) view for compatibility
check.
WS Privacy Policies (PP) view is located on the Web service side and the client obtains access to
it by invoking an operation on the selected Web service. This view displays a list of PP items for
a WS. This way, the k-Anonymity information reflected in the WSCL file is made available to be
used for defining WS PP assertions.
4.6.2 Run-time Verification System
We implemented the second system in Java using Eclipse and SQL server as our database server.
Since most of the K-Anonymity check code is implemented as stored procedures we invoked those
procedures from our code. We incorporated the K-Anonymity check algorithm into the composi-
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tion middleware provided by theWSO2 business process server (WSO2 BPS) [7]. WSO2 BPS pro-
vides a comprehensive web-based console to manage, deploy, view and execute processes within
a single server instance. WSO2 BPS implements an Apache ODE-powered BPEL engine. WSO2
BPS supports the BPWS4J [34] implementation of the IBM, Microsoft and BEA BPEL4WS spec-
ification. The BPWS4J platform is an Eclipse plug-in that consists of an engine and an editor. The
BPWS4J engine takes the BPEL document for each process to be executed, a WSDL description
of the interface that the process presents to the external clients or service partners (without binding
information), and several WSDL documents of the partner services with which the process may
interact. We extended the RESTful management APIs to include the K-Anonymity checks.
4.7 Experiments
4.7.1 Environment
We conducted the experiments using a 2.83GHz Intel Quad-Core CPU, 8GB RAM, 32bit Win-
dows Server 2007 machine. We ran Jmeter on the same machine with a memory foot print of
-Xms1024m -Xmx2048m -XX:MaxPermSize=1024m. We used an SQL server 2008 instance and
a WSO2 BPS server 3.5 instance running on the same machine.
4.7.2 Jmeter Test Plan
We configured Apache Jmeter 2.8 with threads to simulate 100 concurrent users, starting a new
thread and sending parallel XML documents (WSCLs and BPELs) every 30 seconds (by setting
the ramp up period to 3000 seconds) for varying number of documents. Since the WSO2 BPS is
exposed via a Web service, we configured Jmeter to call that service API. We imported 30 BPEL
files associated with 10 services into the BPEL store using the WSO2 BPS API. Since BPS uses
caching to improve the performance, each time we ran the tests we loaded BPS with different
BPELs stored in a CSV file. We used a transaction controller with a SOAP/XML-RPC sampler to
test WSCL and BPEL K-Anonymous graph generation (Table. 4.21).
4.7.3 Data Set
We investigated 2507 real world services from the QWS data set [13]. Since the dataset does
not take service composition into account, we generated random service compositions from the
available services. We used the BPELUnit Framework [72] to generate BPEL compositions while
we implemented our ownWSCL generator. We generated synthetic compositions to simulate cases
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Table 4.21: Jmeter test plan setup
BPEL version 3.0
BPEL Engine WSO2 BPS
Database SQL server
Threads (Users) 100
Iterations (no. of test runs) 10
Ramp-up time 3000 sec
Transport SOAP over HTTPS
Sampler(s) Soap/XML-RPC and HTTP Request
Services 10
BPEL files 30
Operations/BPEL 20
in which an operation appears as both a source and destination along a certain route. To generate
a set of n composition documents (BPEL and WSCL) we first generated k core documents, with
m operations each, such that all operations within a single document, as well as across multiple
documents are different. Then, we permuted the n   k remaining documents from the k pre-
vious ones. We generated 30 different WSCL documents (WSCL01, . . . ,WSCL30, Table A.4),
each of which defines operations identified by 20 collaborating services. We generated 30 BPEL
documents (BPEL1, . . . , BPEL30, Table A.5), each of which defines a process identified by 15
inhouse, 5 outsourced operation invocations, and 10 variables from several collaborating partner
services from the QWS service repository. Each generated BPEL document started with a receive
activity and ended with a reply activity and was generated using a nested structure of flow and
sequence activities, each of which included a set of random number of invoke activities. The ser-
vices and their operations were randomly selected such that there is overlap between the services
used in each document. The parameters of each generated document are shown in Tables A.4
and A.5.
4.7.4 Variables and Metrics
The performance of our K-Anonymity check algorithm depends on the size of the composition.
We measure the size of the composition in terms of both number of Web services involved in a
composition |WS| which is proportional to the number of operations |Op|. We also measured the
size of the composition in terms of the number of operation invocations |Transitions| and the
total possible routes |TEERoutes|. We analyzed the evaluation time, throughput, and scalability
of the K-Anonymity check algorithm as the above variables increase and we compared the results
among the different K-Anonymity types (PTOC, PTONC, and OEOC).
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Figure 4.15: Evaluation time of different WSCL compositions
4.7.5 Results
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Figure 4.16: Performance results of different BPEL compositions
K-Anonymity check time. The K-Anonymity check algorithm (algorithm 8) depends on |TR|
(N ) and |TEERoutes| (M ). The time complexity is O(M2) since M   N . The results show that
the time grows linearly with the number of routes regardless of the size of the composition (|Op|,
which is equivalent to the number of services as per our assumption). for both WSCL (Fig. 4.15)
and BPEL (Fig. 4.16) compositions. Table. A.1 illustrates that the time different is due to the
number of routes that have to be traversed by the algorithm in each case.
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Figure 4.17: Performance results of different CP sizes.
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Figure 4.18: Performance results of different TREERoutes table sizes for a fixed CP of size 5.
Privacy compatibility check time. We evaluated the feasibility of our approach with k-
anonymity included (KPCM). The performance of the KPCM algorithm depends on the total
number of assertions that must be compared and the size of the composition plan CP . The number
of comparisons among a PR set containing N assertions and a PP set containing M assertions
in a composition plan CP of size |CP | is equal to N x M . We analyzed the scalability of our
KPCM as the size of PR and PP increases in terms of both the number of resources and number
of assertions as well as the size of CP . We generated several composition plans in which we varied
the number of services (|CP |). We measured the performance of KPCM as the composition CP
size increases in terms of the number of services. We also measured how the time changes as the
size of PR and PP increase in terms of the number of assertions |A|.
The time requirement grows almost linearly with the number of services, and we expect the
KPCM to scale well on larger PR and PP sets. The reported time is the time to check the pri-
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Figure 4.19: KPCM Performance
vacy compatibility of PR and PP of all services in CP. The running time of the algorithm has
slightly increased from 135ms for |A|=10 to 250ms for |A|=30, when 100 services were processed
(Fig. 4.19).
4.8 Conclusion
WSCL and BPEL definitions can play a very important role in determining privacy compatibil-
ity between a client and a Web service at the operation invocation and business process levels. We
presented formal definitions and prototype implementations of two approaches: one that integrates
k-Anonymity scores calculated from Web service compositions defined in WSCL and BPEL into
a privacy management framework.
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Algorithm 8 KAnonymityCheck
1: input CSi, BPj , Op0, Otype,Ktype
2: output: TRKAnon
3: TR GETTRANSACTIONS(BPj)
4: row   , TEERouts   , TKAnon   , TOpiroutes  0, TOpjroutes  0, count 0, k  0,K⌧  1
5: /*get all end to end routes*/
6: TEERouts  TEERouts [ TR
7: for each rowi in TR do
8: for each rowj in TR do
9: if rowi[Opdst] == rowj [Opsrc] then
10: midmen midmen+ 1
11: row  (rowi[Opsrc], rowj [Opdst])
12: TEERouts  TEERouts [ row
13: end if
14: end for
15: TKAnon  TKAnon [ rowi [midmen
16: end for
17: for each rowi in TKAnon do
18: for each rowj in TKAnon do
19: if rowi[Opdst] == rowj [Opdst] then
20: TOpjroutes  TOpjroutes + 1
21: end if
22: end for
23: rowi  rowi [ TOpjroutes
24: end for
25: for each rowi in TKAnon do
26: for each rowj in TKAnon do
27: if rowi[Opsrc] == rowj [Opsrc] then
28: TOpiroutes  TOpiroutes + 1
29: end if
30: end for
31: rowi  rowi [ TOpiroutes
32: end for
33: for each rowi in TKAnon do
34: for each rowj in TKAnon do
35: count rowi[TOpjroutes]  rowi[TOpiroutes]
36: rowi  rowi [ count
37: ifKtype == PTOC then
38: k  count
39: rowi  rowi [ k
40: end if
41: ifKtype == PTONC then
42: k  count  rowi[midmen]
43: rowi  rowi [ k
44: end if
45: ifKtype == EPOC then
46: k  count  rowi[midmen]
47: rowi  rowi [ k
48: end if
49: end for
50: end for
51: return TKAnon
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CHAPTER 5 PRIVACY FLOW ANALYSIS
In services-based data analytics environments, multiple services may be dynamically composed
to enable scientific data discovery. This composition requires appropriate privacy mechanisms to
guarantee the confidentiality of all participants along the composition chain. Since services on the
Web interact through process executions that trigger operation invocations by providing input data
and retrieving output data, a mechanism is needed to ensure that the data privacy is maintained as
it flows between those services. To this end, we propose a static privacy flow analysis between
the composition plan generation and its execution phases, that uses dataflow concepts from pro-
gramming languages. We formally define our static analysis using Pri-calculus, which extends the
Pi-calculus for process algebra with privacy level types for private flow enforcement.
Using cloud-based services for data analytics makes them increasingly data-intensive. Main-
taining privacy in such environments is a challenging task, since that data could potentially be
distributed among several organizations, some of which manages the data access and usage via a
service. Privacy of health science data is of a major importance. For instance, scientific workflows
are formalizations of complex scientific processes distributed among several services that need to
be dynamically composed to enable scientific discoveries (data search and analysis tasks). Com-
position of such services requires appropriate privacy mechanisms to guarantee the confidentiality
of all participants along the composition chain. Scientific workflows are different from business
workflows in several ways. First, unlike business workflows, which tend to be controlflow oriented,
scientific workflows are dataflow oriented [39]. Second, they are often based on service and do-
main ontologies to support semantic discovery of workflows (e.g., MyGrid tools and BioWeb [86]).
In fact, the Linked Open Data (LOD) initiative have focused on transforming health science data
into ontology-based repositories using RDF as a universal exchange language to support semantic
discovery of data. In such repositories an ontology is defined in OWL format including classes
(e.g., Disease) and data type properties to link instances of those classes to their data (e.g.,
hasMedicine). The Bio2RDF project [22] provides a good example as it incorporates data from
several domain ontologies, including PharmKGB, DrugBank, and GeneCDS. Therefore, services
in such environments can be characterized by their computation logic, their data repositories, and
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input and output data types. Several service composition (orchestration and choreography) lan-
guages have been proposed, including OASIS BPEL4WS (BPEL) [14] and W3C WS-CDL [53].
BPEL is a result of a large industry consensus and can be used for creating composite services
in the form of business processes in a centralized service orchestration manner. While BPEL has
been proposed as a standard for business workflows, a few efforts have been made to add language
abstractions (e.g., hierarchical composition) to the BPEL syntax to make it more expressive as a
Scientific Process Execution Language [105, 90, 108].
Table 5.1: Web services involved in our scenario.
Service Dinput Doutput Op Description
GenomicWS hasGene {hasGeneLocation, ha-
sOMIM, hasGene, has-
Gender, hasAge}
getGeneInfo(g) Returns detailed gene
info of patients who have
gene g
hasRS hasRS, hasSNPLoca-
tion, hasGene, hasGen-
der, hasAge
getSNPInfo(rs) Returns detailed SNP
info of patients who
have RS rs
hasTrait hasTrait, hasRS, has-
Gene, hasRSLocation,
hasGender, hasAge
getGenPhenAssoc(d) Returns Genotype Phe-
notype associations of
patients who have trait
(disease) d
DrugWS hasDrug hasDrug, hasGene, has-
SNP, hasCoMedication,
hasGenderhasAge
getDrugInfo(m) Returns Drug info of
Drug m
ClinicWS hasTrait hasHGVS, hasDisease,
hasOMIM, hasDate, has-
Treatment, hasTestRe-
sult, hasGender, hasAge
getDiagnosis(d) returns clinical details of
trait t
PharmaWS hasDrug Dosage, hasDrug,
hasGeneDrugAsso,
hasGenPhenAsso,
hasGender, hasAge
getPharmInfo(m) returns pharamy info
about a drug m
ClinicWS hasTrait,
hasDrug
hasName, hasAddress,
hasGender, hasAge
getClinicPersonInfo(d,m)
DemogWS hasAge,
hasGen-
der
hasName, hasAddress,
hasGender, hasAge
getPersonalInfo(a,gd)
A typical chain of operation invocations on those services is shown in Table 5.1. Phenotypes
such as diseases and traits are associated to genes or variants (SNPs). Assume a service Ge-
nomicWS that provides both variation phenotype and gene phenotype lists which serve as sources
of phenotype associations. Genetic disorders can be identified by linking genotypes to pheno-
types, so an adversary can obtain a list of Gene information by invoking the getGeneInfo()
operation which returns the data type properties GeneLocation,OMIM, etc. of the class
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Gene. To further analyze the results, he invokes the getSNPInfo() operation which returns
(rsno., Location,Gene) of the SNP class. He can then invoke the getGenPhenAssoc() opera-
tion which searches a Phenotype Genotype Association dataset by a phenotype Trait and returns
(Trait, rsno., Gene, Location) of the PhenGenoAssoc class. The adversary can conduct the
above analysis in any order. For example, he can search the PhenGenAssoc dataset by a pheno-
type Trait. Similarly, he can search the Gene data set by Gene IDs retrieved from the association
results. OMIM provides a catalog for human genes and genetic disorders. Thus, he can link
genes or SNPs to diseases contained in the OMIM disease dataset through the OMIM number. He
can also search an SNP dataset by SNP rs numbers retrieved from the association results. Later,
he analyzes the data using DrugWS which queries a data set that combines a drug with drug
target (e.g. a gene sequence) information. A sample data set has the properties (DrugLabel,
InteractingGene, SNP , CoMedication). For example, Citalopram can be used for the treat-
ment of major depression and is associated with Gene symbolGRIK2 and SNP rs2518224. The
adversary can then consult PharmWS to query a pharmacogenomics knowledge base that en-
compasses clinical information including dosing guidelines and drug labels, potentially clinically
actionable gene-drug associations and genotype-phenotype relationships. Finally, he can confirm
the desired victim names by cross-referencing the possible last names with public records of peo-
ple of similar ages and locations. He consults DemographicWS for that and he indicates the age
and gener to identify people who participated in Genomic studies and detect that those people has
been diagnosed for a certain disease.
Listing 5.1: RDF instance from our scenario
<rdf:RDF xmlns:mc="http://www.michcare.com/michcare.owl#" >
<mc:Patient rdf:about="Alice">
<mc:hasDisease>depression</mc:hasDisease>
<mc:hasPrivacyLevel>H</mc:hasPrivacyLevel>
<mc:hasDisease>flu</mc:hasDisease>
<mc:hasPrivacyLevel>L</mc:hasPrivacyLevel>
</rdf>
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5.1 Privacy Policies
Privacy policies govern the usage of data owner’s information and are often deployed by a
privacy management engine implemented by the hosting service. Using those engines, services
hosting the RDF-based data repositories can tie each data type property of each data instance to
privacy policy rules based on the data owner’s privacy preferences. For instance a patient Alice
may indicate that the fact that she has been diagnosed with a disease (hasDisease data type
property) is highly private (hasPrivacyLevel, H) for the depression disease but not as such
(hasPrivacyLevel, L) for flu (Listing 5.1). However, in a composite system, process executions
rely on service interactions via operation invocations by providing data as input parameters and
retrieving output data which is supplied to the following operation as input and so on. Privacy
can be achieved on input data, output data, and operation invocation; and to guarantee privacy
at operation level, it is essential to know if there is compatibility between the invoking service’s
privacy requirements and the privacy policies of the invoked service.
5.2 Composition Logic As Program Execution
Processes are based on constructs that are equivalent to declarations in most programming lan-
guages (Fig. 5.1). Similar to a class definition in object-oriented languages, a process provides
generic service interfaces (e.g.,DrugWS) to be called (classes) and the variables to be used (fields).
Actual instantiation of a service is similar to an object of a class. Each service can be viewed as a
control structure describing it’s behavior according to an interface to be able to communicate with
other services. However, it is unpredictable how a composite system will behave at run-time. An
instance of a service (e.g., S1) can be identified by an instance of a process definition (e.g., P1)
providing a service located at S1. Mapping service interfaces to actual services is achieved through
Endpoint references. In a BPEL-based workflow, for instance, an implementedGenotypePheno-
typeAssociation process would have an instance for each actual query or analysis task being
processed. Each instance has its own state which is captured in BPEL variables. Since multi-
ple service operations can be invoked by different clients, several instances of the same process
can run simultaneously. Analogous to Object-Oriented programming, in which several program
instances may produce different execution traces, a service composition may produce several out-
puts even if given the same input and initial state. Thus, we can analyze a composite system as a
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Process P{ 
 Partners Client c,GenoWS S1,DrugWS S2,
 ClinicWS S3, PharmWS S4,DemoWS S5 
 Variables g,d,gd,a,m,n 
 sequence { 
   p.recieve(g) 
   flow { 
     invoke(S1.getGeneInfo,g,gd) 
     invoke(S2.getDrugInfo,m,g,d) 
     invoke(S4.getDiagnoInf,d,gd,a) 
   } 
   invoke(S3.getPharmInf,m,gd,a) 
   invoke(S4.getClinPersInf,d,m,n,a) 
   invoke(S5.getPersInfo,a,gd,n,a) 
   c.Reply(n,a) 
 } 
} 
 










	







Figure 5.1: Composition as a program execution with dataflow communication links corresponding to variable read
(recieve), variable write (assign) and operation invocation (invoke) expressions. The label g:L indicates a flow of
variable g (due to operation invocation) with low privacy level. A prohibited flow link to the requesting client is due
to the fact that the process is returning a variable with high privacy level.
program.
One form of program analysis is static analysis, which covers all possible execution scenarios
of a program. Moreover, applying the analysis to different program instances (e.g. Main class in
Java) may produce completely different results. Thus, we can use static analysis to analyze all
possible executions of a process, and analyze a composite system in the context of each process
instance. Since each process instance concerns particular set of data instances, and since those
data instances can be tied to privacy preferences, we can extract privacy preferences from those
policies and use them to supply the analysis (Fig. 5.2). For example, g:L in Fig. 5.1 indicates a
flow of variable g with low privacy level. A prohibited flow link to the requesting client is due to
the fact that the process is returning a variable with high privacy level. To this end, we propose
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a static privacy flow analysis at the level of the composition engine, that uses data flow concepts
from programming languages. The underlying framework is based on the Pi-Calculus for process
algebra [75], which models a core for most service composition languages.
CompositeSystem { 
 Client c, GenPhenAssoc GPA,  
 GenoWS S1,DrugWS S2, ClinicWS S3,  
 PharmWS S4, DemoWS S5 
Process Client{ 
 S1.invoke(S1.getGenePhenAssocInfo,g:MH) 
 receive(returnFinalResult,resultTuple) 
  } 
Process GenoPhenAssoc { 
  Variables g:MH,d:MH,gd:<MH,MH>,a:MH, 
            m:MH,n:MH 
 sequence { 
   recieve(S1.getGeneInfo,g:MH,gd:MH)  
   flow { 
 invoke(S1.getGeneInfo,g:MH,gd:H) 
 assign(gd:H,gd:MH)  
 invoke(S2.getDrugInfo,m,g,d) 
 invoke(S4.getDiagnoInf,d,gd,a) 
   } 
   invoke(S3.getPharmInf,m,gd,a) 
   invoke(S4.getClinPersInf,d,m,n,a) 
   invoke(S5.getPersInfo,a,gd,n,a) 
   c.Reply(n,a) 
 } 
} 
<rdf:RDF mc=
http://www.michcare.com/genows.owl#>
<mc:Patient rdf:about="patient1">
 <mc:hasGene>GRIK2</mc:hasGene>
 <mc:privLevel>H</mc:privaLevel>
</rdf>
<rdf:RDF mc=
http://www.michcare.com/drugws.owl#>
<mc:Patient rdf:about="patient1">
 <mc:hasDrug>Citalopram</mc:hasDrug>
 <mc:privLevel>H</mc:privLevel>
 <mc:hasDrug>Actic</mc:hasDrug>
 <mc:privLevel>H</mc:privLevel>
  <mc:hasDrug>Cold drug</mc:hasDrug>
 <mc:privLevel>L</mc:privLevel>
</rdf>
<rdf:RDF mc=
http://www.michcare.com/clinicws.owl#>
<mc:Patient rdf:about="patient1">
 <mc:hasDisease>Cancer</mc:hasDisease>
 <mc:privLevel>H</mc:privLevel>
<mc:hasDisease>Cold</mc:hasDisease>
 <mc:privLevel>L</mc:privLevel>
<mc:hasDisease>Depression</mc:hasDisease>
 <mc:privLevel>H</mc:privLevel>
</rdf>
Figure 5.2: Composition as a program execution with privacy levels derived from policy files.
5.3 Contributions
This chapter’s contribution is three-fold. First, we introduce Pri-calculus, as an extension
of the Pi-calculus with privacy level types; Second, we define a data flow analysis for private
service composition, including the lattice model, the abstract syntax, and dynamic semantics of
our extended calculus; Third, we present a prototype implementation of our analysis as a privacy
level annotations-based type checker and incorporate it into a composition engine;
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: we provide background about the BPEL and
WSDL standards used to model services and their composition. The proposed approach is then
described in terms of the analysis formalization (Section 5.5). We present the prototype imple-
mentation in Section 5.6.
5.4 Business Process Execution Language
Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) describes business logic in terms of activities
and interaction scenarios to be executed for a service to complete it’s task. A service task could
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be a reaction to another service invocation. Thus, a service can result from orchestrating other
available services. BPEL enables inter-service communication via PartnerLinks, which provide
a process with the ability to provide operations or invoke operations provided by other services.
According to a BPEL describing the scenario above (Listing B.1), five participating services may
be involved: GenomWS, DrugWS, and PharmaWS, ClinicWS, and DemoWS. Each service is
expressed through a Web Services Description Language (WSDL) interface.
WSDL is aW3C standard that express the services functionality in terms of operation signatures
as well as data variables used as parameters or return values by those operations. The roles within
collaborations are specified at a PortType level via PartnerLink constructs. Port types are collec-
tions of web service operations. Listing B.2 shows excerpts from a WSDL definition. Variables
in BPEL can be either entire messages, whose type is declared as a WSDL message in the WSDL
description of the service using that message or a primitive XML type (e.g., string). Processes
perform structured activities and primitive activities. Primitive activities include receive, invoke,
and reply while structured activities perform primitive activities in sequences, in parallel, or based
on a conditional. Invoke and receive activities specify three arguments: a partner link identifying
the partner service, the invoked or provided operation and a tuple of variables for storing the sent
or received variable values. A process instance is created by triggering one activity at a time using
the createInstance=“yes” attribute. For instance, our example process gets instantiated through
the receive activity.
BPEL performs service composition either statically or dynamically depending on the service
selection style. Static composition involves static binding in which the service URL is hardcode as
part of the composite service specification. Dynamic binding, on the other hand, can be done in two
ways: either by reference by determining the URI of the service to be invoked from the value of a
specified variable (e.g., assigned to a variable by a previously executed operation or passed by the
client) or by lookup (e.g., definition of a query whose result will be used to determine the service
to be invoked). PartnerLinkTypes are defined at the WSDL level, where the actual partner service
may be dynamically determined. Since multiple service operations can be invoked by different
clients, several instances of the same process can run simultaneously. Thus, responses to operation
invocations need to be sent back to the corresponding service partner and to the corresponding
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process instance provided by that partner. Therefore, WSDL interfaces can be directly compared to
interfaces in Object-Oriented Programming languages, concrete services that result from dynamic
binding can be compared to concrete classes implementing those interfaces, and an instance of a
BPEL process can be used to resemble a main program.
The abstract syntax of BPEL (Fig. 5.3) expresses the composition of two or more activities using
sequence, parallel, conditional, and alternative constructs. BPEL process syntax relies on sets of
ports ranged over by x, y, z. An activity A receives a tuple u˜ and handles an action related to a port
x. A port is a service identifier identifying a specific operation (end point) of that service. Thus, a
port on a service S is expressed as xS . A port receives operation invocation (invoke(xS, i˜, o˜)), input
(receive(xS, i)), or output (reply(xS, o)) actions.
A ::=empty (empty)
|invoke(xS, i˜, o˜) (invoke)
|receive(xS, i˜) (receive)
|reply(xS, o˜) (reply)
|sequence(A,A) (sequence)
|flow(A,A) (parallel)
|switch(xS = y0S)A;A (conditional)
|pick(x, i˜1,A), (x, i˜2,A) (alternative)
Figure 5.3: Abstract Syntax of the BPEL calculus.
5.5 Formalization of the Analysis
In this section we describe the abstract syntax and the dynamic semantics of Pi-calculus
(Sec. 5.5.1). The type system (Sec. 5.5.2) of our extended calculus is then provided. Finally, we
describe our data flow analysis formalization (Sec. 5.5.3) illustrated through a series of examples
from our scenario.
5.5.1 Pri-calculus Abstract Syntax
We formally define Pri-Calculus using the ⇡-Calculus as a core of the BPEL language syntax.
In Pi-calculus (Fig. 5.4), P,Q,R, . . . range over process names, processes interact over channels
ranged over by x, y, . . ., and exchange tuples ranged over by u˜, v˜, . . .. Processes perform actions
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 1,  2, . . .. The syntax of processes and actions is given by:
P ::= (vx)P | P |P |
X
i2I
 i.P i| A
  ::= 0| [x = y] | x(y) | x¯[u˜]
Figure 5.4: Abstract Syntax of the Pi-calculus.
( x)P introduces the new name x with scope P , I is a finite index set, and   takes one of four
forms: a null action, a match of two names, an output action, or an input action. x(u¯) denotes
receiving tuple u¯ on channel x, x¯[u¯] denotes sending tuple u¯ on channel x. Summation states that
only one element is selected from a set of pending communications while the others are aborted.
Several processes can execute in parallel and communicate via compatible channels. Parallel pro-
cess composition is denoted as P |Q. For example, x¯ [u].P |x(v).Q contains two parallel processes.
The first is ready to send u over the channel x; after this it continues executing P . The second,
x(v).Q, is ready to receive v over the same channel x, then continue with Q. The name v is the
formal argument and it is local to Q. Matching allows P to proceed only if channels x and y are
the same channel. !P denotes parallel composition of an infinite number of copies of P . Using
Pi-calculus, we can describe our composition as follows:
(  c, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5)(S1(g).S¯1[gd]|S2(m).S¯2[g, d]|
S4(d).S¯4[gd, a].S3(m).S¯3[gd, a].S4(d).S¯4[m, n, a].
S5(a).S¯5[gd, n, a].c(n, a)
where the dotted notation specifies an action sequence in which the process receives the variable g
on the channel c then sends it to channel S1 whose components are bound to the variable g, and
so on.
The behavior of BPEL processes can be modeled using Pi-calculus dynamic semantics
(Fig. 5.5). The first two rules state that we can reduce under both parallel composition and re-
striction. The communication rule R-COMM takes two processes, which communicate over a
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channel x, and binds v1, ..., vn (a.k.a., free names f(n)) to the variables u1, ..., un (a.k.a., bound
names b(n)). Processes P andQ get discarded since at most one process in a summation is allowed
to execute.
Q 7! R
P | Q 7! P | R [R-PAR]
P 7! Q
( x)P 7! ( x)Q [R-REST]
u˜ = u1, ..., un, v˜ = v1, ..., vm, n = m
(P + x¯[u˜].Q)|(x¯[v˜].R +Q) 7! {v˜/u˜}Q|R [R-COMM]
x¯[v˜]|!x(u˜).P 7! P{v˜/u˜}|!x(u˜).P [R-REPL]
x = y
if (x == y) then P else Q 7! P [R-BRANCH-T]
x 6= y
if (x == y) then P else Q 7! Q [R-BRANCH-F]
Figure 5.5: Dynamic semantics through reduction rules.
We introduce Pri-Calculus, which extends the Pi-Calculus abstract syntax (Fig. 5.4) with pri-
vacy level types. The metavariables T1, ..., Tn range over types, e ranges over expressions, and  
ranges over actions. Types can be assigned to channel names (e.g., x : Ti) or variables in a tuple
(e.g., ui : Ti). The constituent parts of a process (i.e., variables, channels, operations, etc.) may
have different privacy types at different locations in a process instance. Thus, we introduce the
meta variable ` to range over locations. ` represents a result of computation, which eventually
reduces to a value.   is a store typing that maps names to types. A store M maps locations ` to
their contents: the defining service of the operation and the values stored in its variables. M [`]
denotes the store entry for `. The store also holds the actual privacy level parameters for each
location.
Privacy level parameters. Unlike java programs where classes are the basic unit of execution, in
service composition there are two levels of definitions, the service definition and the process def-
inition. We look at both processes and partners as services. Each service communicates through
a port type and the communication link is identified by the partner link type. Also, each service
provides an internal implementation of a process then that process gets instantiated and executed.
Thus, there is a recursive process execution since composite services are themselves services and
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P ::= P |P (parallel composition)
| (  x : Ti) P (restriction)
|
X
 i.Pi (alternative composition)
  ::= 0 (nill)
| [x == y] (Conditional)
| x(u1 : T1, ..., un : Tn) (input)
| x¯[u1, ..., un] (output)
e ::=   | ` (expression)
` 2 locations (store location)
T ::= (T1, ..., Tn) (privacy types)
  ::=   (empty)
|  , x : Ti (typed name)
M ::= ` 7! S < ↵¯ > (v¯) (store Map)
  ::= ` 7! Ti ( store typing)
⌘ ::= x 7! Ti ( type environment)
Figure 5.6: Abstract Syntax of Pri-Calculus (Pi-calculus with privacy types)
can be used as participants in other compositions at higher levels of abstraction. Thus, we param-
eterize both the process definition (BPEL process) and the service definition (WSDL interface) by
a list of privacy level parameters ↵¯ that can be bound to actual values at run-time.
5.5.2 Privacy Levels Type System
The aim of the privacy levels type system is to formally encode privacy levels as types, and
check whether a composite system is well-typed after binding abstract services in the orchestration
to the corresponding concrete services in the service registry.
Typing and Subtyping Rules. A series of operations cause the value of a variable u to be
derived from a value of another variable i. Thus derivation causes a flow from i to u.Typing rules
guarantee private explicit (e.g., assign) and implicit (e.g., receive) flows. All services that would
like to use users private data should possess the corresponding types before data transfer. We
define type inference rules for making judgments to ensure private flow of data between services
in a composition. We use those rules to formally reason on data privacy types and to propagate
those types along the execution plan to newly computed data. Processes are well-formed under a
set of privacy constraints on their bound b(n) and free names f(n). By adding types we restrict
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a channel to certain types of input or output in a given context. The appropriate behavior of each
participating process in a composite system can be ensured by statically type checking it in an
environment ⌘ where the type of x allows only inputs of type T1 that match it’s type T .
The privacy levels type system defines rules that enable proving both typing judgments (i.e.,
⌘ ` e : T ), which indicate that an expression e has type T under environment ⌘, and subtyping
judgments (i.e., T1 <: T2). Data can flow only if both channel names or variables agree on their
privacy levels or if the privacy level for one is a subtype of the other. We can define a subtyping
relation <: on types which states that an output action x¯[y] is well-typed only if Ty <: Tx, where
y : Ty and x : Tx. Similarly and input action x(y : T ) is well typed if Tx <: T where x : Tx. The
subtyping rule encodes the partial ordering relation v between the privacy levels lattice elements
and the annotation semantics as we shall explain in Sections 5.5.3 and 5.5.3.
The typing rules (Fig 5.7) follow directly from the reduction rules, and express how they ma-
nipulate the privacy levels type system. All the typing rules are of the form ⌘,  ` e : Ok, which
means “in environment ⌘ and store typing   expression e is well-typed (is Ok). Parallel composi-
tion is well-typed if each participating process is well-typed in isolation. The summation behavior
under typing is the same as Parallel composition. A replication is well typed if a single copy of the
process is well-typed. An input expression x(u1 : T1, ..., un : Tn).P is well typed if the type of x in
the current context guarantees that a tuple of values read from x will have types or <: T1, ..., Tn.
It is also necessary to check that the body of P is well-typed assuming that the channels u1, ..., un
behave consistently with the types T1, ..., Tn. Similarly, for an output expression x¯[u1, ..., un].P
to be well-typed we check whether the process P is well-typed and that the type of x in ⌘ allows
x to be used for outputting the tuple u˜. This implies that the type of x should be a subtype of the
tuple of types  (u1), ..., (u2).
5.5.3 Private Data Flow Analysis
In this section, we define our data flow analysis. The lattice model and a more precise descrip-
tion of the core annotation system are provided by the formal semantics in Sec 5.5.3 and 5.5.3,
respectively. Then, we describe the annotation-based transfer functions and the worklist algo-
rithm.
The Privacy Levels Lattice Model. Our privacy levels lattice is a tuple (LPA,v,t,?,>), where
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⌘,  ` P : Ok ⌘,  ` Q : Ok
⌘,  ` P | Q : Ok [T-PAR]
⌘,  ` P : Ok
⌘,  `!P ; : Ok [T-REPL]
⌘, , x : T ` P : Ok
⌘,  ` ( x : T ) P : Ok [T-REST]
⌘ `  (x) <: (T1, ..., Tn)  , u1 : T1, ..., un : Tn ` P : Ok
⌘,  ` x(u1 : T1, ..., un : Tn).P : Ok [T-INPUT]
⌘ `  (x) <: ( (u1), ..., (un))   ` P : Ok
⌘,  ` x¯[u1, ..., un].P : Ok [T-OUTPUT]
Figure 5.7: Typing rules
LPA is a set of abstract elements corresponding to privacy levels, v is a partial ordering relation
between elements in LPA and indicates an at least as precise as relation. t is the least upper bound
that should exist for every two elements in LPA. t merges two abstract values in LPA, ? is the
least element of LPA and means part of the program (composition) that we have not yet analyzed.
> is the greatest element of LPA and means that we do not know anything about the program
(composition) yet. Our lattice consists of the following:
LPL = {?, H, L,MH}, where > = MH
? v H,? v L,L vMH,H vMH
? t X = X,> t X = >,X t X = X, H t L = MH
Annotations for Private Data Flow. Annotations encode the privacy level types and have no se-
mantic significance; they only serve as labels into the Pri-calculus language syntax to facilitate the
analysis. A simplified annotation syntax is shown in Fig. 5.8. Annotations correspond to abstract
elements in LPA, so they may be H,L,MH , or a parameter ↵. Actual privacy level parameters
on variables in the source process must be parameters of the enclosing service definition. During
reduction, these parameters may be replaced with locations `, indicating the variable that corre-
sponds to that actual privacy level parameter. Annotations can be on channel names x as well as
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tuples (variables) u. Examples of the concrete annotation language are shown in Sec. 5.6.
CS 2 compositeSystem ::=(P¯ , e)
P 2 ProcessDefinition ::= P < ↵¯ > {T¯ , S¯, v¯,  ¯}
S 2 ServiceDefinition ::=S < ↵¯ > {x¯S}
  2 ActionDeclaration ::=0| [xS1 = yS2] | xS(v) | x¯S[u˜]
T 2 PrivLevelDecl ::=privacyLevel Ti
xS 2 ServicePortDecl ::=xS (˜i, o˜)
v, u, i, o 2 V ar ↵ 2 PrivacyLevelParam
Figure 5.8: Simplified Annotation Syntax adapted from the formal system in Fig. 5.6.
Table 5.2 summarizes the constraints that the privacy type annotations place on value flow. The
various annotations are listed along the left side and the top of the table. An X indicates that
the data can flow from a location with the annotation on the left to a location with an annotation
above. The table shows that H is a universal source (a variable with any privacy level value can
be assigned a high privacy level value), and that L is a universal sink (variables with low privacy
levels can be assigned a value with any type annotation). The other privacy level annotations must
be kept separate from each other. The subtyping rule encodes the annotation semantics (Table 5.2),
where H is a subtype of any other annotation, L is a supertype of any other annotation, and all
other annotations must match exactly.
Table 5.2: Value flow between privacy levels
To
H L ↵ MH
From
H X X X X
L X
↵ X
MH X X
Abstract interpretation. A composition system CS is defined with a list of process definitions
P¯ , a list of Web service interface definitions S¯, and a main expression e (Fig. 5.8). A process
definition gives the process a unique name P and defines it’s constituent services as well as activ-
ities between those services and the variables that they exchange. A Web service definition gives
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the service a unique name S and defines its operations and input and output variables and their
types. The analysis starts with a root expression eroot that explicitly instantiates the root process
Proot (the action associated with createInstance=”yes”). The analysis starts by creating the pro-
cess instance Proot from the main process definition then it abstractly interprets eroot in the context
of Proot. First, the process creates all global channels that will be used by the participating pro-
cesses. In our running example, a client initiates a process, which creates five channels with fresh
names (  GenomWS,PharmaWS, DrugWS, ClinicWS, DemoWS), sends the variable g along
GenomWS, waits for response on GenomWS, then passes the output over to DrugWS, and so
on.
The abstraction functionmaps each concrete expression e to an element in LPA. A composition
lattice in our case   is a tuple lattice, and it is the set of all maps from variables to LPA.  1 vPA  2
iff 8u 2 V ar  1(u) vPA  2(u). Also,  1 tPA  2 = {u 7!  1(u) tPA  2(u)|u 2 V ar}. For
example, for the two tuple lattice values [u 7! H, i 7!MH] and [u 7!MH, i 7! L]:
[u 7! H, i 7!MH] 6v [u 7!MH, i 7! L]
[u 7! H, i 7!MH] t [u 7!MH, i 7! L] = [u 7!MH, i 7!MH]
In our case, the abstraction function derives abstract values from the privacy preferences attached
to the data. Flow (transfer) Functions then compute dataflow information after executing an ex-
pression e from the dataflow information before executing that expression. Formally, we map a
lattice element and a control flow graph (CFG) node corresponding to a process node to a new
lattice element (i.e., fPA( , [e]) =  0), where   is the old lattice, e is the expression that we are
transferring over, and  0 is the new lattice. The intuition behind building a CFG is to connect
nodes in order of operation defined by the language. For example, in a BPEL4WS conditional we
evaluate the condition first.
We employ Killdal’s worklist algorithm [55], which keeps track of nodes (expressions) to which
we need to propagate dataflow information. The algorithm computes a results array, which keeps
track of the dataflow value for each node i in the system. The algorithm initialize the lattice values
for all nodes to the bottom element in LPA. For the first expression to be executed in the process
the results will be whatever the initial information is. We assume that initially any of the variables
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Algorithm 9Worklist Algorithm
1: worklist = new Set();
2: for all node indexes i do
3: results[i] = ?PA;
4: end for
5: results[entry] = >PA //MH;
6: worklist.add(all nodes);
7: while (!worklist.isEmpty()) do
8: i = worklist.pop();
9: before = tk2pred(i) results[k];
10: after = fPA(before, node(i));
11: if (!(after v results[i])) then
12: results[i] = after;
13: for all k 2 succ(i) do
14: worklist.add(k);
15: end for
16: end if
17: end while
could be highly private (i.e., may be, may be not). Next, the algorithm takes each node off the list
and takes the join of the lattice values for all its predecessors. For instance, if it reaches the end of
a conditional, the algorithm does a join on the lattice information obtained from the then branch
and the else branch. So, if the privacy level type on a variable was H in one branch, and L in the
other, the algorithm assumes that it isMH.
This provides the results for the lattice information obtained before executing a node. The
algorithm then applies the transfer function fPA to that before information, and the node that is at
position i and computes the after lattice information based on that. Next, the algorithm determines
how this information propagates in the system. If the results remain the same as they were before,
it stops analyzing that particular node. However, if a change is indicated, it needs to add all the
successors of this node to the worklist since they need to be analyzed with the new information.
If the results got worse from before (i.e, they are not at least as precise as they were before), the
algorithm updates the results array based on the newly computed after value, then it pushes all
successors onto the worklist. The analysis terminates if all nodes are visited and the values do not
change any more.
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Table 5.3: Results of running the worklist algorithm (Listing 9) on the sample process execution in Listing 5.2
position worklist channels tuples/variablesc S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 g d gd a m n
0 1 MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH
1 2 MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH
2 3 MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH
3 4,5,9,10,11,12 MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH
4 5,9,10,11,12 MH MH MH MH MH MH L MH MH MH MH MH
5 6,7,8,9,10,11,12 MH MH MH MH MH MH L MH MH MH MH MH
6 7,8,9,10,11,12 MH L MH MH MH MH L MH L MH MH MH
7 8,9,10,11,12 MH L H MH MH MH MH H L MH H MH
8 9,10,11,12 MH L H MH H MH MH H MH H H MH
9 10,11,12 MH L H H H MH MH H MH H H MH
10 11,12 MH L H H H MH MH H MH H H MH
11 12 MH L H H H H MH H MH H H H
12 H L H H H H MH H MH H H H
5.5.4 Working Example
We simulate the privacy flow analysis execution on the sample composition in Listing. 5.2. The
labels 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 correspond to positions in the process execution. Table 5.3
shows the results of running the worklist algorithm (Listing 9) on a sample process execution
(Fig. 5.1). First, we assume that all variables may have a high privacy level (MH). expressions
1 and 2 have no impact on the composition lattice since they are only declaration expressions.
Expression 3 is a sequence activity, so it leaves the lattice as is. Next, the algorithm pushes all
nested actions of that sequence on the worklist (i.e., expressions 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, and 12). Next,
expression 4 initializes the gene variable g (assume that the client sent the valueGRIK2 which has
a low privacy level), so the algorithm changes it’s lattice value to L. Expression 5 is a flow activity,
so it leaves the lattice as is, and all it’s nested expressions get pushed onto the worklist (i.e., 6,7,8).
The next expression to be analyzed is the invoke expression at position 6, which takes g:L as input.
Since the invoke is on S1, which is instance of GenomWS, the analysis propagates the privacy
level type L to the subsequent operation invocations inside GenomWS (if any). Since S1 is the
receiver of this invocation, it also gets assigned a privacy level type L. Also, the output variable gd
gets assigned that value.
Listing 5.2: Example composition
[Partners Client c,GenoWS S1,DrugWS S2,ClinicWS S3,PharmWS S4, DemoWS S5]1
[Variables g,d,gd,a,m,n]2
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sequence[
[ p.recieve(g)]4
flow[
[invoke(S1.getGeneInfo,g,gd)]6
[invoke(S2.getDrugInfo,m,g,d)]7
[invoke(S4.getDiagnoInf,d,gd,a)]8
]5
[invoke(S3.getPharmInf,m,gd,a)]9
[invoke(S4.getClinPersInf,d,m,n,a)]10
[invoke(S5.getPersInfo,a,gd,n,a)]11
[Reply(c,n,a)]12
]3
The main process continues with other executions to be instantiated, and the analysis continues
analyzing each of those expressions based on the initial privacy level type on the received variable
and propagating the privacy level types to the invoked services. Assume that the next invoke
expression (expression 7) receives the value Citalopram for the medicine variable m with a high
privacy level. The invoke expression takes m:H as input and propagates that to DrugWS. Since
the operation returns the tuple g,d, and since g previously had an L lattice value, the algorithm
takes the join of the two (i.e., Lt H=MH) and replaces the lattice value of g with this new value.
For some of the following expressions the values flow from the previous results within the running
process instance. For example, the disease input variable d in the invoke expression at position
10 is obtained from the output d of the invoke expression at position 7. Thus, it gets assigned the
same privacy level type that d had. The analysis reaches a termination state whenever any further
execution of the program does not change the composition lattice. The analysis may produce
completely different results if the value of the supplied g variable was an indicator of a different
disease (e.g.,flu).
5.6 Implementation
Fig. 5.9 depicts the architecture of the proposed system. In our scenario, a client initiates a
business process then a service agent parses the abstract definitions of each of the collaborating
services (S={GenomWS, PharmaWS, DrugWS, ClinicWS, DemogWS}) and looks up the
119
matching services to get the concrete BPEL composition (concrete processes). Each process in-
stance communicates with the composition engine when it receives an action and when it finally
replies. Upon receiving a query, a process is instantiated and the corresponding invoked services
are looked up in the service registry. The run-time environment executes the service logic by
invoking other services (through SOAP and HTTP modules). Upon receiving an operation invo-
cation, each service looks up it’s data repository for the matching instances (e.g. RDF files). Data
owners specify minimum input by informing the hosting service about their privacy preferences.
Thus, each data instance indicates a privacy level for each data type property.
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Figure 5.9: Composition with Private data flow
The annotator uses the initial privacy levels indicated at the data type properties of each of the
data instances (required for the process execution) to generate the initial set of annotations. In
our scenario, for instance, each of the variables gene, disease,medicine, gender, age, name has
an actual privacy level. Annotations are then added to both the variables involved in the process
instance as well as service definitions in WSDL files. The privacy flow analysis uses the annotated
process instance to analyze the actions in the context of that instance and infer privacy levels as
they flow between services. Since data type properties flow as input or output variables throughout
a process instance execution and throughout the entire composition, the analysis keeps track of
the privacy levels needed for every process instance and uses those to propagate privacy level
annotations to each subsequent activity in the process execution. The analysis uses an internal type
checker that uses the annotations to enforce private flow of data between services. In the following,
we explain how we implemented each component.
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5.6.1 The Privacy Flow Analysis
We implemented our framework in Java using the Crystal static dataflow analysis frame-
work [2]. We extended the Crystal framework to support our model. Crystal’s dataflow anayl-
sis works on any control flow graph (CFG) and intermediate representation (Three Address Code
TAC) of a language’s Abstract Syntax Tree (AST), on which it performs AST-walking analy-
ses. We refactored the core classes of the crystal framework to abstract away the concept of
an ASTNode to work generically on any AST node, including both the BPEL4WS constructs
and the WSDL constructs. We also extended the ControlFlowGraph interface to support the
model generated from BPEL4WS and WSDL. We utilized the capability of the dataflow anal-
ysis infrastructure provided in Crystal to implement a forward analysis that is context-sensitive
(it distinguishes between different invocation sites), flow-sensitive (the order of the execution af-
fects the result of the analysis), and branch sensitive (to avoid loss of precision in handling con-
ditional expressions). The PrivacyFlowAnalysis algorithm (Algorithm. 10) runs an instance of
the worklist algorithm implemented in Crystal (Algorithm 9) on each process expression if it
is not yet analyzed. The analysis core functionality lies in both the PAASTVisitor and the
Annotation-BasedPATransferFunction.
Algorithm 10 AnnotatedPrivacyFlowAnalysis
1: Input Proot
2: output: result
3: worklist = createWorkList(Proot)
4: result = worklist.performAnalysis();
5: labeledResultsBefore=result.getLabeledResultsBefore();
6: labeledResultsAfter = result.getLabeledResultsAfter();
7: nodeMap = result.getNodeMap();
8: currentLattice = result.getLattice();
9: cfgStartNode = result.getCfgStartNode();
10: cfgEndNode = result.getCfgEndNode();
We implemented several privacy flow transfer functions that are aware of the privacy level
annotations added to each ASTNode expression. Based on those function the PAASTVisitor
checks each variable. For instance, the transfer function for an Invoke expression invoke(xS, i˜, o˜)
takes as arguments the invocation expression invoke and the tuple lattice, which maps a variable
to it’s abstract lattice value. The visitor checks whether parameters of the operation invocation are
safe based by comparing their incoming actual privacy level annotations and the formal privacy
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level requirements on that operation parameters. Given the operation binding the visitor obtains a
summary of annotation info for that operation definition. It then looks up the annotation summary
for the operation xS , and for each parameter variable in i, it adds to the lattice the variable and it’s
corresponding lattice value.
5.6.2 The Privacy Analysis Type Checker
We implemented the type checker as a plugin to the Crystal framework. The type checker relies
on an initially generated set of annotations added to a process instance based on initial set of privacy
levels annotations. The annotation generator starts by adding the first round of annotations based
on privacy preferences of the requested data in the concrete process instance that is being executed.
It annotates every bound variable or service instance in the process instance with a privacy type.
The annotation generation tool implements support for annotating process definitions as well as
WSDL interface definitions of external services referenced in the BPEL process.
Annotations on BPEL processes are added to operation invocations, input, and output vari-
ables. Annotations on WSDL interfaces are added to operations input and output variables. The
annotation generator rewrites BPEL and WSDL ASTNode expressions with the annotations. For
BPEL process instances the annotation generator feeds the annotations as concrete privacy level
types. Whereas for BPEL and WSDL definitions it defines formal privacy level parameters. For
the WSDL definition in our scenario, the annotator adds the formal privacy level parameters G,D
corresponding to the operation input and output variables, respectively. Upon receipt of the gene
variable in the BPEL instance with actual privacy level H, the formal parameter G gets bound to
to the actual value H.
<receive partner-Link="client" portType="GenoWSPT" Variable="gene"
privacyLevel="H" createInstance="yes"/>
<wsdl:definitions>
<privacylevelparams>
<privacylevelparam name="G"/>
<privacylevelparam name="D"/>
</privacylevelparams>
<portType name="GenomWSPT">
<operation name="getGenePhenAssoc">
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<input privacyLevel="G" message="gene"/>
<output privacyLevel="D" message="disease"/>
</operation>
</portType>
</wsdl:definitions>
The type checker then performs the analysis by feeding the process instance as an input to the
analysis. Type checking is performed on annotations to guarantee that dataflow between services
can only flow according to Table 5.2. The PAASTVisitor implements a method that is used by
the type checker to report either a warning or an error based on the severity of the privacy violation.
The errors and warnings get displayed in the Eclipse problems view.
5.6.3 Technology Implications
The proposed privacy flow analysis implementation can be incorporated into any service com-
position middleware. It could be integrated either in a composition development environment
to assist developers during process design by performing compile-time process validation or in
a run-time environment (composition engine) to perform run-time validation during process exe-
cution. For instance, it could be incorporated into the composition middleware provided by the
WSO2 business process server (WSO2 BPS), which provides a comprehensive web-based console
to manage, deploy, view and execute processes within a single server instance. WSO2 BPS im-
plements an Apache ODE-powered BPEL engine and provides extensible RESTful management
APIs. WSO2 BPS supports the BPWS4J [34] implementation of the IBM, Microsoft and BEA
BPEL4WS specification. The BPWS4J platform is an Eclipse plug-in that consists of an engine
and an editor. The BPWS4J engine takes the BPEL document for each process to be executed,
a WSDL description of the interface that the process presents to the external clients or service
partners (without binding information), and several WSDL documents of the partner services with
which the process may interact.
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CHAPTER 6 LITERATURE REVIEW
We discuss some of the existing approaches for privacy policy management organized by the
following axes: context-awareness, dynamic rule evaluation, relative sensitivity, semantic-based,
and implementation and evaluation.
6.1 Context Awareness
The literature has several works that have proposed context-aware privacy management sys-
tems [23, 40, 43, 12]. Some of these approaches dynamically handle a user request by applying
techniques that regulate rather than prevent the data access such as HDB [58]. The dynamic trust
adjustment model proposed in [23] also dynamically handles context, but they focus on access
control, in terms of who has access to the information as opposed to what is being collected. Also,
their approach relies on inferring context using sensed spatial and temporal information and they
do not achieve dynamicity at rule level. Several technologies have been applied to achieve privacy
policy enforcement by considering the requester’s permission, the owner’s consent, and the con-
text [61, 43, 12]. Grandison [43] and Agrawal [12] leverage the Active Enforcement module of
the Hippocratic Database technology (HDB) by transforming an original query to another query
that is policy-compliant. Similar to our approach, those approaches do not rely on a third party for
enforcement purposes. They also track the purpose of a query to determine if a query is suspicious
or not, but do not keep track of usage context.
6.2 Dynamic Rule Evaluation.
Few researchers have started looking at dynamic policy rule evaluation as opposed to static
policies [16, 51]. Among the relatively few researchers who took dynamicity of a context to a
higher level by considering dynamicity of a rule is Pallapa et al. [80]. They proposed a context
aware scheme for privacy preservation by maintaining a model of the user’s environment, which
is characterized by user’s activities and situations. Their solution accounts for fine grained rules
and they apply a dynamic rule generator. However, both the rule and the context types are still
predetermined based on a set of activities and states in which the user could be. Also, these
rules are not defined in semantic terms and do not govern what is potentially sensitive data. Our
approach implicitly updates policy rules based on dynamically inferring a query’s classification,
what is considered relatively sensitive data, and diversity of queries.
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6.3 Relative Sensitivity.
Some notable techniques that applied machine learning, data mining, or information theory for
sensitive data detection include [10, 92, 70, 52]. Agrawal et al. [10] have done valuable work in that
respect. In their work they defined conditional privacy using conditional entropy and information
loss. We leverage similar techniques to partially define our context. Their notion of conditional
privacy compares the distribution of the original data to that of the perturbed data to test if the
original value can be guessed from the perturbed value. In contrast, our approach uses only the
original data by comparing the data that appears in a newly submitted query to both the previ-
ously determined set of sensitive data and all the previously submitted data sets to dynamically
identify potential breach of more sensitive data, and we incorporate the context into our privacy
policy rule evaluation. Our approach for sensitive data detection is complementary to other ap-
proaches [69, 19]. Machanavajjhala et al. [69] have proposed the notion of perfect privacy using
query containment mapping to ensure perfect privacy for relational data. Based on that, Barhamji
et al. [19] developed a query rewriting approach for data mashup services and applied it to RDF
views.
6.4 Semantic Policy Definitions
Few recent researchers have started using semantic concepts for defining privacy policies. For
instance, Ferrini et al. [40] used XACML obligations to add axioms to an ontology using semantic
functions to check for inconsistencies introduced in the ontology due to adding those axioms. We
use a similar approach to dynamically add contextual information to an instance to make the rules
that govern the data type properties of that instance smarter. However, our approach adds the
inferred context to the instance and uses the inferred context to impose more strict rules in the
corresponding policy. Thus, both the ontology instance and the policy definition of that instance
stay in sync. Among the approaches that proposed solutions for defining policies on top of domain
ontologies are [29, 85, 19, 101]. The work by Rahmouni et al. [85] stemmed from issues of
diversity, complexity, and dynamicity of the rules governing privacy protection. They proposed
a modeling approach to abstract rule complexities and facilitate the automation and enforcement
of rules at the process level. The closest approach to ours is the one by Barhamji et al. [19],
which ensures the dynamicity of a decision by query rewriting. Still, they rely on predefined user
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preferences and do not incorporate dynamically inferred context. Tumer et al. [97] have proposed
a semantic based privacy framework which takes into account hierarchies of nodes in an ontology
and how they inherit policies from parent to child.
6.5 XACML Enhancements.
Several researchers have provided enhancements to the performance of XACML PEP and PDP
components, such as efficiency and scalability [36, 77, 65] and adaptation [38, 56], but there exist
very few works that have provided enhancements to the accuracy of the PEP by enhancing the
context handler, which is the essence of our approach. Baily et al. and Laborde et al. [56] have
recently implemented Self-Adaptive Authorization Frameworks based on XACML that improves
the accuracy of a PEP by tracking malicious behaviors. Both works use obligations. Our work
is different in that it does not dynamically update the original policy definitions, but implicitly
incorporate context into rule evaluation. Brucker and Petritsch [25] enhanced the context handling
protocol used in XACML, but they focus on the efficiency of attribute resolution strategies either
via the PIP or the XACML context handler.
6.6 Dynamic Private Data Publishing.
Privacy preserving data publishing approaches can be classified into two major categories: data
disclosure and anonymization. Our approach falls under the limited disclosure category. One
representative approach in this regard is Hippocratic databases (HDB) technology, which enforces
privacy at the database level rather than the application level. While they do dynamic privacy
disclosure at the cell, column, and row levels, they do not incorporate previously inferred context
into future query evaluation.
Anonymization techniques can be further classified into generalization and suppression tech-
niques. One of the first approaches to anonymization is k-Anonymity [92]. Several researchers
have provided practical implementations of these algorithms ranging from top-down vs. bottom-
up to global vs. local to optimal vs. greedy to hierarchy-based vs. partition based. All these
algorithms prevent uniquely identifying individuals through record linking, but do not prevent
sensitive attribute disclosure. L-diversity [70] alleviates this problem by ensuring that sensitive
attribute values in each equivalent class are diverse. However, it is possible to infer sensitive at-
tributes when the distribution in a class is very different from the overall distribution of the same
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attribute. T-closeness [62], on the other hand, considers the sensitive attribute distribution in each
class, and its distance to the overall attribute distribution. The distance is measured using similarity
scores for distributions.
LKC-Privacy [76] provides a generalization over the aforementioned approaches with more
reasonable constraints on parameters. In essence, the main drawback to all generalization and
suppression algorithms lie in the utility or information loss incurred. Since these approaches rely
on frequency of an item, in some cases, certain co-occurrences of items are considered the source
of utility especially when record linkage is performed.
6.7 XACML-based Privacy for Mobile Applications.
We are not the first to provide privacy-aware solutions for mobile applications. Anh et al. [15]
implemented a middleware for building privacy-aware mobile applications. They built their solu-
tion on top of GAE and they used XACML obligations to define several functions to determine to
what extent users can share their data with their friends in social networking environments based on
similarity or filtering. De Cristofaro et al. [32] proposed a privacy-aware infrastructure for building
participatory sensing applications to protect the data of both the data user and the provider. Their
solution relies on a tagging mechanism that builds on the top of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE).
Similar to these approaches, our approach defines fine-grained privacy policies rules at the level
of each data item. Our approach further provides dynamicity at the rule rather than the decision
level. also, our approach defines rules using semantic concepts and defines preferences partially at
the instance level.
6.8 Anonymization Techniques
Anonymization techniques can be classified into generalization (replacing a value with a less
specific but semantically consistent one) and suppression (not releasing a value at all) tech-
niques.
6.8.1 K-Anonymity
One of the first approaches to anonymization is k-Anonymity [92]. Several researchers have
provided practical implementations of these algorithms ranging from Top-down specialization vs.
bottom-up generalization to Global (single dimensional) vs. local (multidimensional) to Com-
plete (optimal) vs. greedy (approximate) to Hierarchy-based vs. partition based [61, 59, 20].
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K-anonymity ensures that individuals cannot be uniquely identified by a record linking attack,
but does not necessarily prevent sensitive attribute disclosure. The algorithm primarily provides
a clustering of nodes into equivalence classes where each node is indistinguishable in its quasi-
identifying attributes QID from some minimum number of other nodes. When there is not much
diversity in the sensitive attributes inside an equivalence class, the sensitive attribute of everyone
in the equivalence class becomes known with high certainty.
6.8.2 L-Diversity and T-Closeness
L-diversity [71] alleviates the problem of sensitive attribute disclosure inherent to k-anonymity
by ensuring that sensitive attribute values in each equivalent class are diverse. A set of records in an
equivalence class C is l-diverse if it contains at least l well-represented (measured by several ways
including frequency counts and entropy). One drawback thus lies in the possibility to infer sensitive
attributes when the sensitive distribution in a class is very different from the overall distribution
of the same attribute. If the overall distribution is skewed, then the belief of someones value may
change drastically in the anonymized data. Also, the possibility to detect equivalent classes which
contain very similar sensitive attribute values. Also, l-diversity based approaches implicitly assume
that each sensitive attribute takes values uniformly over its class, so when frequencies of sensitive
attribute values are not similar there may be large utility loss on data. For example, consider
a dataset that contains 1000 patients with some quasi-identifying (QID) attributes and a single
sensitive attribute disease with two possible values cancer or flu. If there are only 5 patients with
cancer in the table, to achieve 2-diversity, at least one patient with cancer is needed in each QID
group. So at most 5 groups can be formed which causes information loss. T-closeness [63], on the
other hand, considers the sensitive attribute distribution in each class, and its distance to the overall
attribute distribution. The distance is measured using similarity scores for distributions.
All these algorithms prevent uniquely identifying individuals through record linking. The main
drawback, on the other hand, to all generalization and suppression algorithms lie in the utility
or information loss incurred, since they rely on frequency of an item, in some cases, certain co-
occurrences of items are considered the source of utility especially when record linkage is per-
formed. If an item occurs in no frequent itemset, then suppressing that item (attribute) incurs no
information loss. However, if an item occurs in many frequent itemsets (tuples) then suppress-
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ing the item incurs a large information loss, since all frequent itemsets containing that item are
removed from the data.
6.8.3 K-Anonymity Applied to Relational Data
k-anonymity has been initially proposed by Samarati and Sweeny [92] to prevent linking an
individual to a record in a relational data table through a quasi-identifier. Later, several researchers
have applied the notion of K-Anonymity to privacy. However, most of the K-Anonymity protection
models are at the relational data table level not at the Web service operation level. Therefore, the
private resource in their case is the identity of the subject whose information is contained in the
data. The K-Anonymity concept have been implemented in several real world systems, including
DataFly, mArgus, and K-Similar. Recentrly, few researchers have studied probabilistic notions of
k-Anonymity [49].
6.8.4 K-anonymity Applied to Graphs
The literature has a number of definitions derived from anonymity tailored to structural prop-
erties of network data. For example, k-degree anonymity [66], k-candidate anonymity [45], k-
automorphism anonymity [110], k-neighborhood anonymity [109], and (k,l)-grouping [30]. k-
degree anonymity indicates a graph as k degree anonymous if for every node v in V there exist
at least k 1 other nodes that have the same degree as v. This anonymization technique can pre-
serve privacy by preventing the re-identification of individual nodes by adversaries with a priori
knowledge of the degree of certain nodes. However, the anonymized graph may not be useful.
k-neighborhood anonymity has been first proposed by Wu et al. [109] and states that a graph is
k-neighborhood anonymous if every node has a 1.5-hop neighborhood graph isomorphic to the
1.5-hop neighborhood graph of at least k-1 other nodes. k-candidate anonymity states that an
anonymized graph satisifies k-candidate anonyity with respect to a structural query Q if there is a
set of at least k nodes which match Q, and the likelihood of every candidate for a node in this set
with respect to Q is less than or equal to 1/k. Zou et al. have proposed k-automorphism anonymity.
A graph is k-automporphic if every node has the same subgraph signature as at least k-1 other graph
nodes, and the likelihood of every candidate for that node is less than or equal to 1/k. Finally, (k,l)-
grouping is a privacy mechanism that has been proposed by Cormode et al. to handle attacks in
affiliation networks. It assumes that affiliation links can be predicted based on node attributes and
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the structure of the network. They use a greedy algorithm that generalizes node attributes without
modifying the network structure. They assume that each node is indistinguishable from at least k-1
other nodes in terms of node attributes.
6.9 Private Service outsourcing
Few researchers have studied privacy control in service outsourcing environments [54, 47, 107].
Hung et al [47] provided a private service outsourcing interaction protocol that enables sending
only the desired parts of data for each outsourced invocation. Their approach focuses on data level
privacy rather then the logic. Xiong et al. [107] have focused on outsourcing in data aggregation
services by proposing several protocols for private data sharing between service-hosted databases.
Recently, Jammalamadaka et al. [50] have developed a middleware for enforcing security con-
straints on outsourced data. They also defined an abstract secure service model. Ke et al. [54]
have proposed an algorithm to enhance service trust by detecting conflicts due to privacy incom-
patibility in cloud service composition. They apply the Tablue algorithm to OWLS documents.
Other researchers focused on outsourcing in other domains, including image reconstruction and
databases. Cong et al. [103] studied outsourcing from image reconstruction perspective.
6.10 Operation Invocation Correlation
Other research have tackled similar questions about Web service related operation invocations
but from different perspectives. Some of the questions that they tried to answer is given a service
I plan to use, what other services are usually used together? and given several services I want to
use together, can I find an operation invocation path to connect them, based on others past usage?
and what do people who use these services also use? they have applied techniques such as as-
sociation rule mining. Since we are tackling the problem from privacy perspective to anonymize
invocations KAnonymity is a good solution. A few researchers have looked into services as net-
works, especially for analyzing scientific analysis reuse [93]. Tan et al. [93] studied service-service
interactions and service-workflow interactions to identify possibilities for reuse. Their work incor-
porate metrics similar to ours, such as betweenness centrality, to measure services that occur the
most between different source and target service or workflow nodes. In fact, our approach can be
applied to that domain as well.
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6.11 Model Checking of Services Based Interactions
Model checking of services-based interactions, in general, has received enough attention[102,
64, 98, 81, 82]. The goal of those analyses is to analyze whether composite Web services are
well-formed from different perspectives, including concurrency, integration, failures, security, and
privacy. Some of these works focused on privacy and security using language-based analyses [87].
Several researchers provided implementations of verification tools, including the WebJet checker
by Gao et al. [42] and the verification tool by Abouzaid [8]. WebJet checker [42] is based on a
type system and a mapping from BPEL to pi-calculus and performs three formal verification steps.
Namely, open bisimulation, property checking and compatibility checking.
6.11.1 Process Calculi
Quite a few researchers extended the Pi-calculus by defining process calculi, including ⇡⇣-
calculus proposed in [68], Web⇡1 by Lucchi and Mazzara [67] and the recent WS-calculus by
Lapadula et al. [57]. ⇡⇣-calculus models more expressive composition concepts (e.g., processes
as objects and encapsulation). Web⇡1 is a web-based extension of pi-calculus that takes into
account the timing dimension. WS-calculus is a formalization for the constructs provided by both
WS-BPEL and WSDL, with the purpose of verifying conformance between WS-BPEL programs
and the associated WSDL definitions. Woodman et al. [106] proposed two XML languages based
on the Pi-calculus. One language is an extension to the WSDL language to enable specifying the
order in which operations should be invoked. The other is a composition language to define a
composite service structure. The former verifies whether a given composite service is free from
deadlocks and livelocks. Abouzaid [8], on the other hand, introduced the ⇡-logic based the µ-
logic associated with ⇡-calculus in order to express properties to verify whether a composition is
well-formed.
6.11.2 Type systems
Several researchers have defined type systems for Web service definitions, including Mil-
ner [75], Turner [99], Honda et al. [100], and Pierce et al. Milner proposed a type system based on
channel names. Pierce and Sangiorgi [84] revised Milner’s system by adding restrictions to read
and write from channels. While Milner’s typing is name-based, Pierce and Sangiorgi’s language
is structure-based and is more suitable to avoid misuse by processes that share a common resource
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(e.g., a printer). Volpano et al. [102] proposed a type system for a procedural programming lan-
guage to verify the noninterference security property. Their work was inspired by the works of
Denning [37] and Bell and La Padula [21]. Bell and La Padula proposed a model for multi-level
security based on which Denning proposed a lattice model. Hutter and Volkamer [48] leveraged
Volpanao et al.’s type calculus to dynamic Web service composition plans. They used a semantic
Web service composition language (OWLS-XPlan).
6.11.3 Dataflow Analyses an Lattice Models
Dataflow analysis for security purposes has attracted several researchers attention. Aziz et
al. [17] used denotational semantics to statically analyze the security of mobile systems at the level
of the communicated data. They assign security levels and apply a nonuniform dataflow analysis to
detect two privacy breaches: information leakage and insecure communications. They also define
a data flow framework in terms of a security levels lattice, abstraction and transfer functions. Their
lattice has infinite width of security levels and their transfer function is in the form of a policy
that localizes names depending on the level of the process to which those names are bound. They
also use the notion of location to differentiate between the different copies of the same name
(channel). Nielson et al. [78] developed a static data flow analysis to verify security properties that
are different from ours. For example, they validate that messages are only received after a login
action. They verify an action by checking whether there exists a path on the graph where an edge
with label a precedes another edge with label b.
6.11.4 Privacy in Scientific Workflows
Privacy in Scientific workflow based data analysis have been explored in few research
works [28, 35]. The majority of the solutions were to guarantee the privacy of the workflow logic
rather than the privacy of data that flows between processes. None of the above works tackled the
problem of privacy in Web service composition using data flow analyses that utilize annotation-
based transfer functions in the manner described in this thesis. Thus, their analyses are not modular
and do not propagate the analysis results to service definitions based on concrete process instances
and concrete service endpoint references in those processes. Also, some of the above approaches
provided theoretical frameworks to fix issues only at the design time while our approach works at
run-time.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this thesis I defined possible solutions for dynamic privacy management in services based
interactions. I defined and implemented three main components for dynamic, context-aware,
semantic-based privacy policy management that build on top of existing Web service standards
and technologies. I have also evaluated the feasibility of the implemented components in several
case studies in comparison to similar existing works.
The evaluation results are promising and, in the future I would like to explore practical ap-
plications of the implemented systems. Future work also includes exploring other challenges that
services based environments involve including privacy in service based social data sharing environ-
ments and services as collaborating networks. I would also like to explore some techniques includ-
ing applied security and cryptography and sticky policies to enforce traveling constraints.
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APPENDIX A K-ANONYMITY BASED PRIVATEWEB SERVICE SELECTION
A.1 GENERATED BPEL ANDWSCL FILES
Table A.1: Results of 10 test runs of the KAnonymity algorithm on WSCL files of different sizes.
WSCL Op TR TEERoutes time PTOC time PTONC time OEOC
wscl01 5 3 4 2983 3169 2981
wscl02 6 3 5 2806 2812 2792
wscl03 12 3 4 2834 2805 2810
wscl04 7 4 8 2768 2808 2780
wscl05 5 4 8 2818 2642 2832
wscl06 5 3 5 2824 2797 2794
wscl07 8 5 8 2792 2866 2795
wscl08 12 6 8 2829 2956 2787
wscl09 5 3 4 2874 2813 2794
wscl10 9 4 5 2961 2840 2818
wscl11 12 5 8 2887 2727 2629
wscl12 5 2 2 2828 2823 2812
wscl13 5 3 5 2775 2775 2948
wscl14 4 4 8 2710 2825 2763
wscl15 10 4 6 2858 2651 2812
wscl16 12 7 10 2776 2906 2832
wscl17 11 3 3 2878 2862 2777
wscl18 10 6 11 2802 2664 2847
wscl19 5 2 4 2788 2866 2628
wscl20 6 4 8 2831 2648 2842
wscl21 5 5 10 2725 2765 2812
wscl22 5 4 7 2791 2815 2800
wscl23 7 4 7 2752 2827 2815
wscl24 12 6 9 2823 2883 2771
wscl25 4 3 5 2734 2835 2749
wscl26 6 3 4 2894 2979 2860
wscl27 8 4 7 2755 2929 2886
wscl28 4 3 3 2668 2911 2786
wscl29 13 4 5 2875 2830 2873
wscl30 4 2 3 2685 2839 2695
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Table A.2: Results of 10 test runs of the KAnonymity algorithm on BPEL files of different sizes.
BPEL Op TR TEERoutes time PTOC time PTONC time OEOC
bpel01 7 40 80 526 546 570
bpel02 9 36 60 378 407 381
bpel03 9 42 90 409 415 421
bpel04 8 32 68 392 454 484
bpel05 7 46 72 409 465 415
bpel06 9 20 54 386 412 425
bpel07 7 35 76 408 412 427
bpel08 10 50 80 410 489 469
bpel09 8 34 57 358 403 384
bpel10 9 45 76 408 437 432
bpel11 9 38 76 412 410 425
bpel12 11 50 84 401 493 406
bpel13 9 41 80 412 446 444
bpel14 10 42 76 408 405 500
bpel15 5 40 72 383 537 389
bpel16 7 32 65 396 434 387
bpel17 7 29 54 370 399 385
bpel18 9 30 72 406 390 393
bpel19 8 52 95 448 441 447
bpel20 9 46 85 409 449 441
bpel21 10 42 74 386 402 458
bpel22 7 55 100 536 467 449
bpel23 10 31 80 446 500 573
bpel24 8 45 72 453 402 420
bpel25 11 41 80 432 468 422
bpel26 8 26 51 378 403 399
bpel27 8 33 68 368 400 449
bpel28 8 53 100 462 439 438
bpel29 6 31 76 457 421 500
bpel30 11 48 90 499 430 424
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APPENDIX B PRIVACY FLOW ANALYSIS SCENARIO EXAMPLES
B.1 BPEL ANDWSDL EXAMPLES
Listing B.1: Excerpts from the BPEL definition in our scenario
<process name="GeneticVariationDetection">
<partnerLinks>
<partnerLink name="client"/>
<partnerLink name="GenoWS"/>
<partnerLink name="DrugWS"/>
<partnerLink name="PharmWS"/>
<partnerLink name="ClinicWS"/>
<partnerLink name="DemoWS"/>
</partnerLinks>
<variables>
<variable name="g"messageType="integer"/>
<variable name="m" messageType="Drug"/>
<variable name="d" messageType="Disease"/>
<variable name="dm" messageType="ClinicPersInfo"/>
<variable name="agd" messageType="DemoInfo"/>
</variables>
<sequence>
<receive partner-Link="client" port-Type="SearchWSPT" Variable="g"
createInstance="yes"/>
<sequence>
<flow>
<invoke partner-Link="GenoWS" port-Type="GenoWSPT" operation="getGenInfo"
inputVariable="g" outputVariable="gd"/>
<invoke partner-Link="DrugWS" port-Type="DrugWSPT" operation="getDrugInfo"
inputVariable="m" outputVariable="gd"/>
</flow>
<invoke partner-Link="ClinicWS" port-Type="ClinicWSPT" operation="
getDiagnosisInfo" inputVariable="m" outputVariable="a"/>
<invoke partner-Link="PharmWS" port-Type="PharmWSPT" operation="getPharmInfo"
inputVariable="d" outputVariable="gd"/>
<invoke partner-Link="ClinicWS" port-Type="ClinicWSPT" operation="
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getClinicPersonInfo" inputVariable="dm" outputVariable="agd"/>
<invoke partner-Link="DemoWS" port-Type="DemoWSPT" operation="getDemoInfo"
inputVariable="agd" outputVariable="na"/>
</sequence>
</process>
Listing B.2: Excerpts from the WSDL definition in our scenario
<wsdl:definitions>
<message name="Disease">
<part name="disease" type="mc:Disease"/>
</message>
<message name="GenInfo">
<part name="gene" type="mc:Gene"/>
<part name="drug" type="mc:Drug"/>
</message>
<message name="DemoInfo">
<part name="address" type="mc:Address"/>
<part name="gender" type="mc:Gender"/>
</message>
<message name="ClinicPersInfo">
<part name="disease" type="mc:Disease"/>
<part name="drug" type="mc:Drug"/>
</message>
<portType name="GenomWSPT">
<operation name="getGenePhenAssoc">
<input message="GeneInfo"/>
<output message="result"/>
</operation>
</portType>
<portType name="ClinicWSPT">
<operation name="getDiagnoInfo">
<input message="getDiagnoInfo" />
</operation>
</portType>
<partnerLinkType name="ClinicWSLT">
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<role name="PharmaWS" portType="PharmaWSPT" />
<role name="ClinicWS" portType="ClinicWSPT" />
</partnerLinkType>
<partnerLinkType name="GenomWSLT">
<role name="GenomWS" portType="GenomWSPT"/>
<role name="client" />
</partnerLinkType>
</wsdl:definitions>
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Technology advancements have enabled the distribution and sharing of users personal data over
several data sources. Each data source is potentially managed by a different organization, which
may expose its data as a Web service. Using such Web services, dynamic composition of atomic
data items coupled with the context in which the data is accessed may breach sensitive data that
may not comply with the users preference at the time of data collection. Thus, providing uniform
access policies to such data can lead to privacy problems. Some fairly recent research has focused
on providing solutions for dynamic privacy management. This thesis advances these techniques,
and fills some gaps in the existing works. In particular, dynamically incorporating user access
context into the privacy policy decision, and its enforcement.
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